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Abstract
Community-Driven Development (CDD), which is characterized by the devolution 
of control over decision-making and resources to the local communities, is claimed as an 
effective mechanism for empowering the poor and has been widely promoted. At the same 
time, several studies find that CDD is incapable of challenging existing local institutions 
and social relations. The aim of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of the CDD 
approach in empowering the poor, using an analysis of the Chiase program in the socio­
political context of Vietnam, as a case study. The analysis involves three components: 
meaning of empowerment in the Chiase program, effectiveness of the program in 
transforming local power relations, and the factors affecting empowerment in the program.
This thesis has three groups of findings. First, it found that empowerment in the 
Chiase took many forms with different characteristics and consequences, which were all 
valued by the local people. It was also found that the elite tended to experience 
empowerment through gaining political power, the ability to influence the distribution of 
community resources, while the empowerment of the non-elite was mostly characterized by 
the increase in personal power, such as an improved awareness, confidence and basic skills. 
There were changes in power relations between local political patrons and the people, and 
between women and men, while the relationships between the economic ‘better-offs’ and 
the poor remained unchanged. The effects of collective processes in the Chiase program on 
empowerment were limited.
Second, it was found that that the Chiase program did transform the local power 
relations through improving people’s participation in local decision-making and their 
networks with government officials and external agencies. The consequence of this
transformation was the increased relevance of community decision-making and improved 
people's access to available resources and support provided by the government. The 
transformative effect, however, was impeded by inappropriate poverty targeting schemes. 
Finally, downward accountability of the commune-echelon government, the extent one 
participated in local organizations and the amount of material support and training one 
received from the program were the factors that significantly affected people’s 
empowerment.
The findings suggest that empowerment of the poor should go beyond the realm of 
political domination, to include broader processes involving both the improvements of 
access to assets and capabilities at individual level, as well as capacity to act at higher 
levels of decision-making. The CDD approach has a great potential to empower the poor, 
however, while changing the ‘uppers-lowers’ relationships between the local political 
patrons and the people, and women-men relationships are possible in this approach, 
reversing power relations between the elite and non-elite is much more difficult.
Key factors to be considered in the implementation of the CDD approach in Viet 
Nam include: the design of poverty targeting mechanisms, the downward accountability of 
the local government, the strength of local organizations, and the provision of material 
benefits and training. Careful attention to these factors would ensure more effective 
implementation of the CDD approach in Vietnam context, significantly contributing to 
improvement in the empowerment of the poor.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1.1. Introduction
Voicelessness and powerlessness are widely seen as important dimensions of 
poverty, and empowerment is becoming a key component of poverty reduction (Narayan et 
al., 2000: 31). The emphasis on empowerment has led to increasing popularity of the 
Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach to poverty reduction. The CDD 
approach, which is characterized by devolution of control over decision-making and 
strengthening of community-based organizations, is increasingly being promoted by World 
Bank and other multi-lateral development banks (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 2; Tanaka et al., 
2006: 6; Wassenich and Whiteside, 2004: 2). According to the proponents of the CDD 
approach, ‘the speed and directness with which the CDD empowers the poor people is 
rarely matched by other institutional framework for poverty reduction’ (Dongier et al., 
200T. 308). At the same time, some empirical studies find that Social Funds' — a branch of 
the CDD approach - is incapable of changing local institutions and social relations 
(Babajanian, 2005: 457; Rao and Ibanez, 2003: 33). These studies found that the Social 
Fund even strengthened and reinforced the existing positions and dominant roles of local 
leaders. In Vietnam, the CDD approach has also been recognized by the Comprehensive 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) of the Vietnamese government, as the 
key mechanism for poverty reduction at the local level (Government of Vietnam, 2002: 62-
1 Social Fund typically is a government agency that is set up as semi-independent institution reporting directly 
to the President or Prime Minister. Its role is to disburse grants directly to the communities in order to fund 
the construction o f a public good, with the community contributing a small proportion of the costs (often 5-20 
per cent), in cash, labor, or materials. The key idea behind the Social Fund is that people’s participation 
mobilized for selecting and implementing projects will increase the relevance and sustainability of community 
works, the capacity for collective action of the communities, and the cohesion among community members 
(Rao and Ibanez, 2003: 4).
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63).
The main focus of this thesis is the effectiveness of the CDD approach in 
empowering the poor in the socio-political context of Vietnam. Two related questions are 
examined: (1) How and to what extent the CDD approach empowers the poor; and (2) 
What are the factors affecting empowerment in this development approach. The analysis is 
facilitated through an examination of the Chiase poverty reduction program in Vietnam . 
The Chiase program was initiated in November 2003, operated in three provinces of Quang 
Tri, Ha Giang and Yen Bai, and used a CDD approach, characterized by devolution of 
control to local community and people's participation in local decision-making(Chiase 
Program Document, 2003: 36). In many ways it can be seen as an experiment of the 
approach to poverty reduction at local level of the Vietnam CPRGS.
The first question on empowerment is inspired by the argument of the scholars at 
the World Bank that the CDD approach is an effective mechanism for empowering the 
poor, and can do it on a large scale (Dongier et al, 2001: 307-308). This thesis examines the 
effectiveness of the Chiase program in empowering the poor through two components of 
analysis: the meaning of empowerment which involves people’s perception of 
empowerment as well as its implications for the change in power relations; and the 
effectiveness of the Chiase program in transforming local power relations which involves 
the performance of poverty targeting mechanisms and improvement in people’s 
participation in local decision-making and social networks.
The second question explored in this thesis asks what are the factors affecting 
empowerment in the Chiase program. The examination is mainly undertaken through a 
quantitative logistic regression analysis of survey results of factors which may have some
2 A detailed analysis o f the Chiase program is presented in Chapter Four.
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bearing on empowerment in this program, and supplemented by a qualitative analysis 
relying on people’s perception of empowerment and an institutional analysis of democratic 
decentralization in this program. The aim of this thesis is to provide a critical evaluation of 
the empowering potential of the CDD programs in a context in which this approach is 
becoming increasingly popular in development practice, and to point out areas where 
improvement of the CDD programs in the socio-political context of Vietnam may be made. 
This chapter will now outline the key issues of the study, the research questions, the scope 
of the study, and its rationale and limitations.
1.2. Research Issues
The language of empowerment has become popular in the development lexicon 
since the introduction of a new approach to development termed ‘alternative development’, 
‘people-centered development’ or ‘participatory development’ (Oakley et al., 1991: 2; 
Rahman, 1993: 206). The key issue of the new approach was that although physical 
development is important, it must be carried out in such way that the beneficiaries have 
both a central role in its implementation, and some control over it. There were two 
arguments being put forward: first, poverty is structural and has its roots in the economic 
and political system, and therefore it is essential to develop the abilities of the poor people 
to have a say in and have some influence on the forces which control their livelihoods if 
poverty is to be tackled. Second, development interventions have by-passed the majority of 
poor people, therefore poverty-targeted programs must be adjusted so that the previously 
neglected people have a chance to benefit from development initiatives (Oakley et al., 
1991: 2; Rahman, 1993: 206). In short, the people-centered approach saw the poverty 
reduction effort as a process that benefits the poor and marginalized people by giving them 
the power to control their own life.
Recently, empowerment has been increasingly used by development agencies,
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including NGOs and international organizations, as a key strategy in poverty reduction. The 
popularity of the empowerment approach relies on the recognition that to make poverty 
reduction sustained, the involvement of the poor in the social, economic, and political 
spheres is essential. Recent literature on the nature of poverty largely sees it not only in 
terms of material deprivation but also as a disempowerment process. The ‘Voices of the 
Poor1 report of the World Bank and ‘World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking 
poverty1 establish that in different social, economic, cultural and political contexts, among 
important factors underlying the poor people’s exclusion are voicelessness and 
powerlessness (Narayan et al., 2000: 31; World Bank, 2001: 15). Similarly, Amartya Sen 
(1999) defines poverty in terms of capacity deprivation and lack of freedom to lead the life 
people value. The relationship between disempowerment and poverty is explained by the 
World Bank (2002: 10) as the poor ‘are unable to influence and negotiate better terms for 
themselves with traders, financiers, government and civil society’ (p.lO). This Tack of 
voice1 severely affects the capacity of the poor to build assets and get out of poverty.
Nowadays, the debate is focusing less on whether empowerment should be the 
objective of development but more on the appropriate mechanisms that can effectively 
empower the powerless, and can do it at scale. The CDD, a development approach in which 
control over decision-making and resources is given to the communities, is widely claimed 
as an effective mechanism for the empowerment of the poor people and communities 
(Chebil and Haque, 2003: 120; Dongier et al, 2001: 307-308). This approach has become 
one of the fastest-growing approaches for channeling of development assistance among 
multilateral development banks and aid agencies since the mid 1990s (Mansuri and Rao, 
2004: 2; Tanaka et al., 2006: 1). A former World Bank president James Wolfensohn 
emphasized the CDD as a key approach that can be scaled up and leveraged to meet the
4
Millennium Development Goals (Wassenich and Whiteside, 2004: 1).
In Vietnam, since the 1990s, poverty and inequality have become central concerns 
of development partners in Vietnam including the government, International Organizations, 
and NGOs. In 2003, with the support of the World Bank and other international 
development agencies, the CPRGS was put forward in order to shape the framework for 
poverty reduction efforts in the country (Conway, 2004: vii). The CPRGS is a set of 
policies that center on four key approaches to poverty reduction:
• promoting a sustainable pro-poor economic growth;
• facilitating empowerment of the poor people by ensuring people’s basic 
needs and promoting good governance through decentralization and 
people’s participation;
• enhancing human capital and reduce inequality; and
• establishing ‘social safety nets’ for those marginal to or adversely affected 
by adjustment processes.
The CPRGS (Government of Vietnam, 2002: 62-63) strongly advocates a poverty 
reduction approach in which empowerment of the poor is facilitated by an increase of 
community’s control over local development, and an enhancement of participatory 
decision-making and implementation of these efforts. Obviously, the CDD approach lies at 
the heart of empowering approach to poverty reduction of Vietnam CPRGS. The central 
role of the CDD approach in international development generally, as well as in poverty 
reduction in Vietnam particularly, shapes the issue of this study: the effectiveness of the 
CDD approach in empowering the poor people. In the next sections, key issues about 
empowerment and this development approach as an empowerment intermediary are
5
discussed.
1.2.1. Empowerment
Several points can be extracted from the literature on empowerment in development 
that are fundamental to the conceptualization of empowerment in this thesis. First, the 
concept of power is less about domination but ‘[is]...logically tied to that of action’ 
(Giddens, 1979: 94). Power can be conceptualized in term o f ‘transformative capacity’, or 
‘...the capacity or likelihood of actors to achieve desired or intended outcomes’ (Giddens, 
1979: 88). The emphasis on the transformative nature of power suggests the close 
relationship between the concept of empowerment and that of agency. This relationship 
provides the ground on which the definition and measurement of empowerment in this 
thesis are based. Here, empowerment is defined in terms of change in agency, or in the 
other words, as the improvement in the range of choice and the ability to make choices 
(Kabeer, 1999: 436; Kilby, 2006a: 2). Second, empowerment is a multi-directional social 
process. Giddens (1979: 6) argues that the very presence of a social relationship implies 
that even the subordinates have some power over the other parties. Power lies in social 
relationship and is always two-way; therefore in a society, empowerment is multi­
directional.
Third, empowerment of the poor is necessarily related to processes through which 
they were previously disempowered. The analysis of disempowerment can be based on the 
understanding of how power structures are constituted. Some theories of power highlight 
three dimensions of the constitution of power (Bachrach and Barantz, 1970: 18; Lukes, 
1974: 17). The first version sees the power structure as ‘a network of decision-making’ 
through which the superiors make the subordinate to do what they would not otherwise 
have done. The second version regards the exercise of power as the establishing barriers
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(political values and institutional practices) which prevent others voicing their interests. 
The third version explains that power is exercised where the interests of the dominant party 
are taken to be natural or “God-given” and no alternative to the status quo can be imagined. 
These versions of power show that power can be exercised not only as domination, but also 
as the confining of decision-making spaces. This point, therefore, facilitates the 
understanding of how and why disempowerment is experienced and what can be done to 
achieve empowerment. Fourth, empowerment has both cognitive and political components 
(Goetz, 2001: 35; Sen, 1997: 2) that are not mutually exclusive. The expanded sense of 
self-efficacy and awareness is a precondition for people to question and initiate action. 
Conversely, changes in opportunities to act, often caused by structural or collective 
processes, increase the likelihood that one can exercise agency successfully. Further, Gita 
Sen (1997: 2) contends that genuine empowerment includes both elements, and is less 
likely to be sustainable without either.
Fifth, empowerment has a collective dimension. According to Giddens (1979: 89), 
power can be exercised at the collective level. More specifically, power is ‘a property of the 
social community’, ‘a network of decision-making’ or ‘an institutional phenomenon’. 
Power can be seen as a collective resource, such as a collectivity of support and an 
institutional framework to maximize the effectiveness of individual actions, as Giddens 
(1984: 16) stated:
‘Power within social system, which enjoys some continuity over time and space, 
presumes regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between actors and 
collectivities in contexts of social interaction’.
This relationship between individual power and collective or structural processes 
provides the theoretical basis for various forms of empowerment efforts. Riger (1993: 285, 
290) argues, however, that there is a tension between individual empowerment and
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community development. When empowered individuals act more autonomously, the sense 
of community is undermined. Therefore, the emphasis on personal agency and control may 
negatively affect community solidarity, which is crucial for the capacity of community to 
achieve its common goals. This raises the importance of balancing individual 
empowerment in community development.
Finally, as empowerment is basically related to changing power relations in favor of 
those who have little control over their own lives in the first place (Sen G.,1997: 2), 
therefore, the transformation in power relations between the poor and powerful elite is 
essential for the empowerment of the poor -  the issue of concern in this thesis. While the 
evaluation of ‘transformation’ is controversial, one realistic approach to measure 
‘transformation’ is to focus on the change in ‘political capabilities’ of the poor, which is 
defined as ‘institutional and organizational resources’ to support effective political action 
(Whitehead and Gray-Molina, 1999: 6), or in other words, the ability to ‘create new rules, 
transform social preferences, and secure new resources as they become available’ 
(Whitehead and Gray-Molina, 1999: 7).
1.2.2. Empowerment through the CDD Approach
Community-Driven Development (CDD) is basically a new participatory
development model in which the control over decision making and resources is devolved to 
the local communities and its locally elected bodies. It is a sub-group of Community-based 
development (CBD) projects which is an umbrella term for projects that actively include 
beneficiaries in their design and implementation (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 1). The CDD is 
distinguished from other earlier generations of CBD projects in that it emphasizes the role 
of the local communities in driving the development process rather than being the passive 
beneficiaries. As the devolution of control may take multiple forms with different levels of
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people’s participation, the CDD represents a broad set of participatory initiatives. 
Therefore, the amount of power devolved, or in other words, the level of people’s 
participation informs the nature of a CDD initiative. Based on the level of community 
control and the level of people’s participation in stages of the project cycle, Tanaka et al. 
(2006: 7) propose five defining characteristics of a CDD initiative: community focus,
participation in planning, participation in implementation, community control of resources, 
and Community-based monitoring and evaluation. These five characteristics show the 
continuum of the level of community participation in a CDD. Only the new generation of 
the CDD programs has all these characteristics while the earlier generations of the CDD 
may just have the first three characteristics (Tanaka et al., 2006: 7). The CDD approach is 
characterized by three underlying processes: poverty targeting, participatory decision­
making, and community organizing (Dongier et al, 2001: 4-8) which significantly affect 
people’s access to material benefits, political power and social capital.
Empowerment of the poor through the CDD approach can be characterized by the 
creation of their ‘political capabilities’ which is defined as the ability to ‘create new rules, 
transform social preferences, as well as secure new resources as they become available’ 
(Whitehead and Gray-Molina, 1999: 7). All three underlying processes in the CDD have a 
significant bearing on the ‘political capabilities’ of the poor. While participatory decision­
making and community organizing processes can directly affect people’s political 
representation and social networks, poverty targeting can significantly influence people’s 
motivation for participation and community cohesion (Dupar and Badenoch, 2002: 22; 
Osmani, 2000: 23). Therefore, to understand the empowerment impacts of the CDD 
approach, the analysis of all three above processes is essential. The next sections highlight 
the strengths and limitations of these processes in creating the ‘political capabilities’ of the
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poor.
Poverty Targeting
Poverty targeting refers to the extent to which scarce resources provided by the 
donor or government, are targeted to the poorest group. Each targeting mechanism is 
characterized by two factors: the method of targeting and the intermediary agent who 
implements the targeting (Conning and Kevene, 2002: 378). In participatory development 
interventions, of which the CDD forms a part, the donor or government agencies work in 
partnership with the local communities to implement the targeting. The responsibility of 
setting the criteria by which eligibility and assistance level will be judged is to a certain 
extent devolved to the community agents. Complete devolution is not common and most 
participatory targeting mechanisms give local communities a varying level of discretion 
within a set of rules and regulations (Conning and Kevene, 2002: 381).
According to the proponents of the CDD (Chebil and Haque, 2003: 126; Dongier et 
al, 2001: 307), by mobilizing local knowledge through direct participation, this approach 
can effectively target the poorest and the most marginal groups. The key advantage of 
participatory targeting is that it can target the poor in the absence of reliable information to 
allow means testing (Dongier et al, 2001: 307) and reduces likelihood of the adverse 
selection problem (Chebil and Haque, 2003: 126). Better information also helps to enhance 
the enforcement, reduce administration costs, and increase benefits delivered to the poor 
(Conning and Kevene, 2002: 382). As economic security is essential for collective actions 
and the mobilization of the poor (Osmani, 2000: 23), the effective poverty targeting in the 
CDD can have significant impacts on their 'political capabilities’.
Although the benefit of using local knowledge in poverty targeting are clear, 
poverty targeting relying on local knowledge is vulnerable to a number of problems. First,
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Bergeron et al. (1998: 1989-1901) found that local knowledge may be unreliable. Poverty 
rankings by local informants should be used with caution as there are many factors which 
may affect the reliability of this technique: training of informants, choice of ranking 
criteria, informant selection, and definition of target population. Second, the understanding 
of social justice and poverty reduction may vary among communities; and may be different 
from that of national welfare agencies (Chan et al., 1992: 189; King, 1997: 361) . If the 
preference of local communities is not pro-poor, the public resource is less likely to reach 
the poor. Third, elite capture, which denotes the situations where decentralized power is 
used to influence political outcomes through manipulation of information and perceptions, 
or by limiting the voice of others, may significantly influence the effect of targeting 
mechanism. For instance, Galasso and Ravallion (2000: 25-26) find that the performance in 
targeting the poor of the communities significantly decreased when the village inequality 
increased. Finally, inappropriate design of participatory programs may create tensions 
between achieving poverty targeting and other objectives that may worsen targeting effect 
of the programs (Conning and Kevene, 2002: 388).
Community Organizing
Community organizing, characterized by the strengthening of Community-based 
organizations, can enhance people’s networks and community social capital (Dongier et al, 
2001: 308). These improved networks and social capital are directly related to institutional 
and organizational resources supporting political and collective actions, or in other words, 
‘political capabilities’ of the poor. Therefore, community organizing has a great potential to 
transform the existing power relations. However, the notion that the improved social capital 
through the CDD approach can create transformation in local power relations is challenged
In this study, following Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 226) social capital is defined as the norms and 
networks that enable people to act collectively.
1 1
by both theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence.
Portes (1998: 15-18), Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 231) contends that social 
capital can be destructive as well as constructive, and identify a number of its negative 
consequences, including: the strong ties among group members can prevent the outsiders 
from access; the closed community, under certain circumstances, may prevent the success 
of business initiatives by their members; group participation necessarily creates demand for 
the conformity of the members, which results in a strong social control and restrictive 
personal freedom; and there are situations where group cohesion obstructs individual 
success and force the more ambitious to escape from it. Harriss (2001: 113-115) argues that 
the notion that the strengthening of the Community-based organization can improve social 
capital of the poor does not take into account the class differentiation and power relations, 
and Rao and Walton (2004: 16) point out that as social capital is characterized by the social 
ties that one can mobilize to gain material benefits, it can increase the inequality. This is 
because the elite may have better external and internal networks than the poor and may use 
these networks to reproduce unequal systems of domination. Empirical findings also 
support this point, for example, an evaluation of the World Bank Social Fund -  a form of 
the CDD -  found that this approach does not change the nature of the existing institutions 
and social relations, but rather it strengthened the positions and dominant roles of local 
leaders (Babajanian, 2005: 457). Similarly, the World Bank OED (2002: 43) found that 
Social Funds use rather than produce social capital, and the social networking skills 
developed through social funds tend to help the elite attract external resources, rather than 
empower the poor.
Participatory Decision-making
Participatory decision-making, an underlying process in the CDD approach, is
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characterized by the incorporation of local knowledge into the decision making process, 
which controls the local development and resources. In principle, through the participatory 
decision making process, the local development is driven by the local needs and demands 
what can be seen as the exercise of ‘voice1 and ‘choice’. Therefore, participatory decision­
making can directly improve the control over resources of the poor, or in other words, their 
‘political capabilities’ (Dongier et al, 2001: 308).
However, the mobilization of ‘local knowledge’ through participatory decision­
making is problematic for a number of reasons. The key obstacles impeding participatory 
decision-making include: the dependence of the rural poor on those with power (Oakley et 
al., 1991: 13), the lack of organizational skills (Korten, 1981a: 191), the high ‘cost’ of 
participation in terms of time or the conflicts arising from decision-making (Johnson, 2001: 
525; Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 6; Moore and Putzel, 1999: 10), the heterogeneity of the 
community (Korten, 1981a: 193; Oakley et al., 1991: 13), and how the agency is 
accountable in supporting participation (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 7). These obstacles can 
result in two important issues in participation: first, participatory decision-making can may 
be influenced and shaped by the local power relations. That is, since local communities are 
often not homogenous social and economic entities and given the various limitations of the 
poor and marginalized touched on above, it is likely that the better-off would dominate the 
local democratic decision making. In addition, the local planning process often requires 
several types of inputs - time, effort, technical, managerial and political skills - that the poor 
are less likely to be able to provide. This operational demand further makes the local 
decision-making, to a large extent, rely on and therefore, be controlled by the dominant 
group.
Second, the performance of participatory decision-making and the production of
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‘local knowledge' are strongly influenced by the pre-existing relationship between a 
development agency and the local communities. Patronage-type relationship between 
agency and communities may result in ‘local knowledge’ which is actually shaped by an 
outsider’s agenda (Mosse, 2001: 32). Therefore, the commitment to people’s participation 
of the development agency is essential for the creation of ‘indigenous knowledge’ rather 
than the knowledge shaped by planning context.
1.2.3. Factors Affecting Empowerment in the CDD Approach
There are a wide range of factors that can affect how the local people can be
empowered in a CDD program. This study focuses on three groups of factors: the 
household endowment, the benefits provided by the CDD programs, and the downward 
accountability of the local government involved in the CDD approach as the facilitator of 
community development processes. Specifically, potential factors being examined in this 
study include: education level, wealth level, participation in local organizations, amount of 
material support received, number of training courses attended, and downward 
accountability of the commune-level government, the partner supporting local communities 
in the Chiase program.
Educational attainment may be an important determinant of the empowerment in 
the CDD approach since the level of education should give people the access to knowledge 
and basic skills which are essential for their performance in various domains of life. 
Theories of democratic decentralization -  of which the CDD is a sub-group - suggests that 
the ability to access and understand ‘information about laws, policies, and the rights to 
which one is entitled’ is dependent on ability to read (Johnson, 2001: 525). Some studies of 
poverty in Vietnam also attribute the phenomenon to low education attainment (UNDP, 
2001:53-54; Vu, 2004: 230).
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The level of wealth is important because it may be indicate access to physical assets 
which affect not only people income but also access to community decision-making. 
Relating to theories of agency, wealth level in part represents the agent’s resources, which 
form the 'vehicle’ or ‘media’ for the exercise of power (Giddens, 1979: 91). More 
specifically, control over land, assets, and capital features the economic resources of power 
(Uphoff, 2005: 225). Furthermore, at a practical level, a number of studies of Social Fund -  
a branch of CDD approach -  found that the elite dominated the decision-making at local 
level (Babajanian, 2005: 457; Rao and Ibanez, 2003: 33).
The extent of participation in local organizations in part reflects the social networks 
which is important to economic development of a household (Kozen and Parker, 2000: 66; 
Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 232). Further, group processes can provide the member with 
support, resources, and a sense of empowerment with the groups (Drury and Reicher, 1999: 
383; Kroeker, 1996: 124). In the context of Vietnam’s rural societies, impact of the local 
organizations may be even more important because they play a key role in facilitating the 
provision of government services to people. In addition, being members of local 
organizations should have positive impacts on people’s social and political skills. 
Therefore, participation in local organization should have a significant bearing on 
empowerment.
Material support is one common type of individual-level benefit provided by the 
CDD programs. The important role of economic support in empowerment has been widely 
recognized (Osmani, 2000: 23; Vijalakshmi, 2002: 282). Material benefit was important 
because ‘an economically insecure group of people can hardly be expected to exercise 
effective bargaining power against the powers-that-be’ (Osmani, 2000: 23). Further, in the 
context of Vietnamese villages where the material deprivation is pervasive, material
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support may be even more significant in influencing empowerment outcome.
As discussed above, empowerment involves both changes in cognitive processes, 
and control over resources (Sen G., 1997: 2). Therefore, training can be a potential 
determinant of empowerment in that it can raise awareness, confidence, and a sense of self- 
efficacy among the poor people. At a practical level, in poverty reduction programs, the 
training courses often focus on a number of poverty-related themes, such as production 
skills, health, and gender equality, therefore, it can be expected that the more training 
courses a respondent attends the higher awareness and confidence he/shc has in dealing 
with issues in different life domains.
According to Goetz and Jenkins (2002: 5), accountability denotes a specific type of 
power: the capacity to demand someone to be answerable for past actions, and/or the 
capacity to impose a sanction for poor performance. Therefore, a lack of accountability -  
the inability to make someone accountable for their actions - is synonymous with the lack 
of power (Day and Klein, 1987: 21). This suggests that in a democratic system, downward 
accountability of the public body is closely related to the empowerment of the citizens. 
Empirical studies of decentralized systems find that the effectiveness of a decentralization 
system is in part determined by the accountability relations the local power holders have to 
the constituents (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 478; Blair, 2000: 27; Kilby, 2006b: 960). The 
above theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence together strongly support a correlation 
between empowerment outcome and downward accountability of the public body. The 
CDD approach is basically a democratic decentralization system which is characterized by 
the partnership between the local communities, who control the decision-making and 
resources for local development, and the local government who is responsible for creating 
facilitative environment, monitoring and facilitating the local development process.
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Therefore, the downward accountability of the local government may be important to the 
empowerment effect of the CDD programs.
1.3. Research Questions and Scope of the Research
The objective of this study is to examine the effectiveness of the Chiase program in
empowering poor people, and to identify the measures to improve the performance of the 
program in this respect. This objective involves two broad questions: how and to what 
extent the Chiase program empowers poor people in the socio-political context of Vietnam; 
and, what are the factors affecting empowerment in this program. To explore these broad 
questions, three sub-questions are posed:
(1) What does empowerment mean to the people in the Chiase program?
(2) How effective is the Chiase program in transforming local power relations?
(3) What are the factors affecting empowerment in the Chiase program?
While the CDD approach involves different institutional arrangements, this study 
focuses on only those CDD programs relying on the partnership between the community 
and local government because of its popularity in development practice generally, and in 
Vietnam particularly. The analysis of the meaning of empowerment in the Chiase program 
was used to provide a direct subjective measurement of the empowerment phenomenon in 
the program and indicate its strengths and limitations in this respect. The transformation of 
local power relations is assessed through examining the change in the people’s participation 
in local decision-making and social networks, while at the same time exploring the tensions 
arising from the poverty targeting policies and their effects on people’s motivation for 
participation and community cohesion. The combination of these two sources of analysis 
allows a cross-validation of the issue of concern and provides a nuanced explanation of the 
empowerment of the poor in this program.
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The analysis of factors affecting empowerment in this program examined six 
potential factors; these are: educational attainment, wealth level, extent of participation in 
local organizations, amount of material support received, number of training courses 
attended, and downward accountability of the commune-level government, which is the key 
partner responsible for facilitating community development activities in the Chiase 
program.
1.4. Rationale and Limitations
The rationale of this study is the persistence of poverty in developing countries in 
general and in Vietnam particularly; the importance of empowerment as a key dimension of 
poverty reduction; and thus to examine the CDD approach as an effective mechanism for 
empowering the poor. These three elements together form the significance of the potential 
contribution of this study.
The study has two key limitations. First, due to time and financial constraints, the 
study relies on data collected from one case CDD program. This limitation certainly affects 
the generalizability of the findings of this study. However, as the goal of this study is to 
examine the theoretical arguments about the CDD approach, this limitation does not 
seriously affect the validity of the study. According to De Vaus (2001), a study relying on a 
single case can be ‘appropriate when we have a clear theory with well-formulated 
propositions and we have a single case that meets all the requirements of the theory’ 
(p.227). Though the single case study is by no means statistically representative, its 
findings can be theoretically generalized to help ‘refine, develop, and test theory’ (De Vaus, 
2001: 237). In this context, reliance on the Chiase program, which features a typical CDD 
program, is justified.
Second, as the survey of this study was carried out when the Chiase program was in
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its fourth year of implementation, the duration of time might not be long enough for 
empowerment effects of the program to have matured. However, the design of this study 
has gone some way to remedying this problem. First, the study focuses on both people’s 
self-evaluation of empowerment outcomes and factual data about program impacts in order 
to explore not only matured effects but also the subtle implications for people’s 
empowerment. Second, the use of two sources of analysis also increases the reliability of 
findings.
1.5. Organization of the Thesis
Chapter One identifies the key issues of empowerment, the CDD as an 
empowerment mechanism, the factors affecting empowerment, and sets out the scope, 
research questions, rationale and limitation of the study. Chapters Two and Three provide 
the theoretical background for the thesis. Chapter Two looks at the theories which informs 
empowerment and how it may be measured. Chapters Three examines the characteristics of 
the CDD and how it can be an empowering mechanism, and it relates the CDD approach to 
decentralization in order to highlight the importance of downward accountability in this 
development approach.
Chapter Four looks at Vietnam context with the emphases on four themes: poverty 
and inequality; current strategy for poverty reduction in Vietnam which involves the CDD; 
socio-economic and institutional context of the CDD approach in the country; and a profile 
of the Chiase program. Chapter Five presents the research design and methodology, 
including a description of the study area -  Gio Linh district of Quang Tri province in 
Vietnam. Chapter Six presents the results of data analysis which include: meaning of 
empowerment in the Chiase program and implications for change in local power relations, 
effectiveness of this program in transforming local power relations, and factors affecting 
empowerment in this program.
19
Chapters Seven discuss the findings of the study in relation to the related theories 
presented in chapters Two and Three, and contextual issues in Chapter Four. Chapter Eight 
summarizes the research findings and highlights the recommendations for the design and 
practice of the CDD approach in Vietnam.
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Chapter Two: Empowerment
2.1. Introduction
The term ‘empowerment’ is used to ‘represent a wide range of concepts, and to 
describe a proliferation of outcomes’ (Malhotra et al., 2002: 4). It is used in different fields 
of social science, such as business management, education, public health, politics and 
international development, to the point the concept and its application seem to blur (Page 
and Czuba, 1999: 2; Rowland, 1995: 9). In the field of poverty alleviation and international 
development, empowerment is a central strategy pursued by many international 
development agencies (World Bank, 2002: 1). However, despite the central role of the term 
‘empowerment’ in development today, its meaning varies among different social, cultural 
and political contexts. Some examples are self-strength, control, self-reliance, own choice, 
being capable of fighting for one’s rights, independence, being free, and life of dignity in 
accordance with one’s values (World Bank, 2002: 10). To some extent it has become a 
buzzword in development practice referring to activities and processes often unrelated to 
changes in power relations among various actors or groups in society (Cheater, 1999: 7; 
Page and Czuba, 1999: 1).
In order to avoid the generalized definition of the term empowerment, this thesis -  
following Kabeer (1999: 436) and Kilby (2006a: 2) - defines empowerment by relating it 
directly to the concept of ‘agency’: the expansion of an individual’s choices and their 
ability to act on them. Therefore, by definition, the empowerment of an individual is 
inescapably tied to their status of disempowerment, and so refers to a process of change. 
Through empowerment processes, those who have been denied the ability to make choices 
acquire such ability. This definition is important as it provides the basis for the 
measurement of empowerment in this study. The following sections examine three broad
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issues: theories of empowerment, transformation of power relations, and the measurement
of empowerment.
2.2. Theories of Empowerment 
2.2.1. Conceptions of Empowerment
Although empowerment is often used with a diverse range of meanings, Mosedale 
(2005: 244) contends that, there are four aspects of empowerment which are generally 
accepted.
• First, to be empowered, one must be disempowered at least in certain 
aspects in the first place;
• Second, empowerment cannot be bestowed by an external actor; the most 
that development agencies can do is to facilitate people empowering 
themselves;
• Third, empowerment is about capacity to make decisions on matters which 
are important in one’s life and capacity carry them out; and
• Finally, empowerment is an ongoing process rather than a product.
These four dimensions can be seen as defining features of the concept. As well as 
these four dimensions of empowerment, in development there are two broad views of 
empowerment: first empowerment is about changes in individual capacities primarily 
through cognitive changes; and second, empowerment is related to political issues and 
rights (Kilby, 2006a: 3). For those who see empowerment as about increasing capacity, 
then it is less related to the direct exercise of power (Korten, 1981b: 214; Zimmerman and 
Rappaport, 1988: 726). Empowerment is described as ‘a construct that links individual 
strength and competencies, natural helping systems, and proactive behaviors to matters of 
social policy and social change’ (Zimmerman and Rappaport, 1988: 726), or ‘the
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connection between a sense of personal competence, desire for, and a willingness to take 
action in public domain’ (Zimmerman and Rappaport, 1988: 746). Similarly, Korten 
(1981b) stressed that helping the poor to develop the ‘understanding of their needs’ and ‘the 
opportunities and constraints they face’ is critical to people’s self development (p.214). 
This view of empowerment eschews the notion of power relations and equality, and is 
based on the model of power which is termed ‘power to’, and is often explained by the 
metaphor of human development (Nelson and Wright, 1995: 8). It suggests that power can 
grow infinitely when we work at it, and the ‘growth’ of one person does not necessarily 
negatively affect another (Nelson and Wright, 1995: 8), and it is also closely related to the 
notion of human capability (Sen G., 1997: 3)
The second view of empowerment focuses on the changes in social relationship 
and the role of the individual in social relations, and by definition it is political (Kabeer, 
1999: 436; Riger, 1993: 283). It is based on a power model described as ‘power over’ in 
which, power is treated as ‘a property of a social community, a medium where community 
interest and class interest are realized’ (Giddens, 1979: 89-92). In the other words, power is 
directly related to domination and is treated as a finite amount in a closed system, or in 
other words a zero-sum game, so that, if one party gains more power, other parties would 
gain less (Nelson and Wright, 1995: 9). In this empowerment framework, empowerment is 
more about changes in social, institutional relations and directly link to political issues, 
which can be in the realms of family , organization or community power structures 
(Kabeer, 1999: 436). It suggests that empowerment has a collective dimension.
These two views of empowerment can live together as empowerment has both 
cognitive and political components (Goetz, 2001: 35). Expanded awareness is a 
precondition for people to question and initiate action. Conversely, increase of awareness
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without corresponding changes in opportunities to act is just a 'sense of empowerment’ 
(Riger, 1993: 281). According to Gita Sen (1997: 2), increased self-confidence and a 
transformation of consciousness can enable one to overcome external barriers to access 
resources. On the other hand, control over resources and external world also gives one with 
an increase of awareness and confidence. Further, Gita Sen contends that genuine 
empowerment includes both elements, and is less likely to be sustainable without either. An 
improvement in the control of access to external resources without consciousness-raising 
can leave people ‘without resilience, motivation and awareness to retain and build on that 
control’, and the control is rarely secured. Conversely, programs that aim at raising 
consciousness but are unable to deliver more control over resources can lead to ‘frustration 
and high dropout rates’ (Sen G., 1997: 2). The next sections examine the notion of 
empowerment at individual level.
2.2.2. Individual Empowerment
Individual empowerment is generally defined as the development of understanding 
and influence over personal, economic, social, and political forces impacting people’s life 
(Schulz et al., 1995: 310). Individual empowerment is contextual; first is that it takes 
different forms for different people because individual characteristics influence the process 
and meaning of empowerment; second, individual empowerment varies based on contexts, 
as the environments where people live modify the form of empowerment; and finally, 
individual empowerment varies over time (Speer, 2000: 52). Further, according to Schulz 
and Israel (1991: 10), empowerment can be conceptualized as a multi-level construct and 
can occur at individual, organizational and community levels. At an individual level, 
empowerment involves the improvement of ‘personal power’, characterized by the 
development of basic skills and a sense of self-efficacy. At organizational level, 
empowerment involves the enhancement o f ‘social power’ or the ability to influence others,
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and at the community level, empowerment involves the increase o f ‘political power’, which 
is characterized by the ability to influence the allocation of social and economic resources 
(Schulz and Israel, 1991: 10). These are by their nature related to power structures.
There are three ways through which power structures can be constituted: as ‘a 
network of decision-making’ through which the superiors made the subordinate to do what 
they would not otherwise have done; or it can be an ‘institutional phenomenon’ -  where 
power is exercised by confining an individual’s decision-making space (Bachrach and 
Barantz, 1970: 18)4 5; or power is exercised where the interests of dominant party are taken 
to be natural (or God-given), and thus, supports the status quo (Lukes, 1974: 17)\ These 
explanations of the constitution of power structure suggest various strategies through which 
empowerment can be achieved. The next section discusses a theoretical framework for 
empowerment, the relationship between empowerment and agency, and then the 
relationship between individual and collective empowerment
2.2.3. A Theoretical Framework for Empowerment
Giddens (1979) establishes a theoretical background for understanding
empowerment and its relationships with collective and structural processes. He argues that 
power is ‘logically tied to that of action’ and can be ‘understood as a transformative 
capacity’ (p.88), and power is ‘the capacity or likelihood of actors to achieve desired or 
intended outcomes’ (p.88). As power is exercised, structured properties of social systems 
are drawn upon and at the same time reproduced through the activities of the participants in
4 Bachrach and Barantz refer to power as the 'mobilization of bias’ -  the establishing barriers (political values 
and institutional practices) which prevent others voicing their interests. This results in ‘non decision-making’ 
on key issues.
5 According to Lukes, power may be exercised more subtly through manipulation and involves confining the 
scope of decision-making to the ‘relatively safe’ issues, and power is essentially about influencing, shaping 
and determining the wants of another.
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the system of interactions (p.88). In that sense, power has a transformative nature (p.88). 
Furthermore, power in social system can be treated as ‘involving reproduced relations of 
autonomy and dependency in social interaction' (p.93). Power relationships are always 
two-way, even if the power of one actor in a social relation is minimal as compared to 
another (p.6). That means ‘however subordinate an actor may be in a social relationship, 
the very fact of involvement in that relationship gives him or her certain amount of power 
over the other’ (p.6). In the other words, the subordinates in power relationships are adept 
at mobilizing whatever resources they possess to increase their control over ‘the conditions 
of reproduction of those social systems’ (p.6). Therefore, power is multidirectional and lies 
in social relationships.
In addition, Giddens (1979) argues that power can be exercised at collective level, 
that is ‘a property of the social community’, ‘a network of decision-making’ or ‘an 
institutional phenomenon' (p.89). Individuals can draw on the collective resources such as a 
collectivity of support and an institutional framework to maximize the effectiveness of their 
actions as Giddens (1984) states: ‘Power within social system, which enjoy some continuity 
over time and space, presumes regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between 
actors and collectivities in contexts of social interaction’ (p. 16). Finally is the concept of ‘a 
duality of structure’ in which a social system is a ‘structured totality’ and involves 
‘reproduced relations between actors and collectives’ (Giddens, 1979: 64). Thus, social 
systems are constituted by regular social practices (Giddens, 1979: 65) and structure does 
not exist in time and space except in the moment social system is constituted. Structure, in 
this view, is about ‘structured property' which can be understood as rules and resources, 
that are recursively implicated in the reproduction of social system, and is a mix of rules -  
the properties that govern transformation (Giddens, 1982: 35). One feature of the ‘duality
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of structure’ is that power has two interrelated dimensions: ‘capacity of an actor to achieve 
his or her wilf, and (2) ‘a property of the collectivity’ (Giddens, 1979: 69). That means 
power is concurrently the transformative capacity of actors or collectives, and at the same 
time, a structural resource of a community.
What emerge from the points made by Giddens is that power is a social resource 
with structural and collective aspects, lying in social relationships and being multi­
directional, and is characterized by the capacity to achieve outcome -  or in the other words, 
a transformation process. The next section establishes the relationship between concept of 
empowerment and that of agency.
2.245. Agency and Empowerment
Agency is conceptualized by Giddens (1979: 55) as a ‘stream of actual or 
contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in- 
the-world’, a ‘continuous flow of conducts’ and as such, a feature of being human. For 
Giddens (1984: 3): ‘to be a human being is to be a purposive agent’, who both has reason 
for her activities and is able to elaborate on them. Further, agency is also a ‘continuous 
process by which action transforms both structures and individuals’(1984: 14), and so, an 
intervention. Agency refers to both the range of choices (Kabeer, 1999: 436) and ability to 
exercise them (Giddens, 1984: 9).
As the concept of power is characterized by a capacity to reach outcome (Giddens, 
1979: 92) and a process of change by which ‘those who have been denied the ability to 
make choices acquire such an ability’ (Kabeer, 1999: 437), it directly related to a 
transformative capacity of the human. Therefore, the concept of power is tied to that of 
agency. However, agency is more than a simple action or choice as (Kabeer, 1999: 438) 
explains:
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Agency is about more than observable action; it also encompasses the meaning, 
motivation and purpose which individual bring to their activity ... [agency] can take 
the form of bargaining and negotiation, deception and manipulation, subversion and 
resistance as well as more intangible, cognitive processes of reflection and analysis.
It can be exercised by individual as well as collectives (p.438).
Furthermore, it is not that all choices are equally relevant to the definition of power 
(Kabeer, 1999: 437). Some choices may have more significant impacts on people’s lives 
than others. Therefore, it is necessary to make a distinction between strategic life choices, 
and second-order choices, where the former are those which are critical for people to live 
the life they want while the latter, though important to people’s lives, do not constitute the 
defining characteristics of power.
Power -  defined as the capability to reach outcome, is related to the access to and 
the performance in certain socio-political domains. Studying the empowerment of Adivasi 
women in India, Vijayalakshmi (2002) finds that power is in part determined by access to 
five domains: the household, local institutional structure, political community, broader 
economy, and civil society, and the ability to mobilize resources in these domains (p.271). 
Similarly, Jandhyala (1998) argues that power is related to access to ‘new spaces’ (p.205). 
This point is inline with Bachrach and Barantz (1970: 18) and Lukes (1974: 17) who see 
the exercise of power as defining or confining decision-making spaces. This view of power 
as access to and performance in decision-making spaces suggests the areas that 
empowerment programs can focus.
2.2.5. Collective Dimension of Empowerment
Though individual empowerment refers to an individual’s ability to make life
choices and is related to personal self-efficacy and competence, the construction of 
individual empowerment moves beyond personal change and is related to a critical 
understanding of social and political context and the increased skills for social change
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(Schulz et al., 1995: 310). Such critical understanding and skills can be effectively achieved 
through changes in structures and forms of interaction. Structures can shape individual 
resources, agency, and achievements, and thus, individual interest (Kabeer, 1999: 461). 
Therefore, individual empowerment may involve societal transformation by challenging 
powerful people and institutions either through confrontation or collaboration. Such 
processes can be facilitated by organizational changes (Kroeker, 1996: 124).
There is also an interrelationship between individual empowerment and collective 
empowerment which is defined as collective processes derived from psychological 
empowerment of individuals (Pilisuk et al., 1996: 17-18; Rissel, 1994: 39). According to 
Pilisuk, when several members are psychologically empowered and share their empowering 
experiences, then a collective self-efficacy emerges (p. 18). This means objectives which 
were previously seen beyond the power of individuals now may be seen within the 
collective grasp. Conversely, the collective processes can significantly affect individual 
empowerment. In the group, one gains voice, value and support (Kroeker, 1996: 124). The 
collective processes facilitate ones’ access to social and economic resources and to arenas 
of decision-making (Schulz et al., 1995: 310). In a nutshell, the collective processes, on the 
one hand, can provide members the organizational resources, such as the communication 
and ability to co-ordinate collective actions, and on the other hand, transform the self of the 
participants and increase their confidence (Drury and Reicher, 1999: 383).
The concept of ‘critical consciousness’ provides the basis for linking collective and 
individual empowerment (Schulz and Israel, 1991: 11). Critical consciousness has two key 
components: (1) the strengthening of feeling of identification with a group; and (2) a sense 
of self and collective efficacy. The second component involves both the belief that effective 
action is possible and the ability to make effective strategies for actions. Therefore, when
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the level of critical consciousness is increased, the individual as well as group together 
develop the capacity to act more effectively. Thus, through the building of 'critical 
consciousness’, both individual and communities develop their capacity to act to promote 
development.
Critical consciousness grows through an interactive process Freire’s (1973: 18-19) 
which is characterized by two aspects. The first aspect of interactive process involves 
constructive dialogue with other in similar situations and the opportunity to connect 
personal experience with larger social processes. The second aspect involves the 
combination of action and reflection. As group members initiate action and discuss results 
with other members, insights gained promote the development of skills for effective action. 
This dialogic process of reflection and action is the basis of the individual and collective 
empowerment.
In community development, collective empowerment is often referred to as 
community empowerment, however, community empowerment is not the sum of individual 
empowerment. Community empowerment is defined as a mixture of a raised level of 
psychological empowerment among its members, a political action in which people actively 
participated, and a redistribution of decision-making authority favorable to this community 
(Rissel, 1994: 41). The distinction between individual and community empowerment is that 
community empowerment is comprised of three components: the subjective experience of 
psychological empowerment; the objective reality of structural changes for reallocating 
resources; and the existence of successful collective actions. Individual empowerment 
defined as perceived greater control over their lives can be experienced through 
participation in group processes in the absence of structural change.
Riger (1993: 285) does not support the notion of the interrelationship between
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individual and collective empowerment, and argues that there is a tension between 
individual and collective action. For Riger, the situation that fosters collective values, say 
connectedness and consolidation, contrasts with those foster individual agency, masters and 
control which feature individual empowerment. Therefore, psychological empowerment 
may undermine community empowerment as the empowered individual acts more 
autonomously. She argues that: ‘finding one’s voice, controlling one’s resources, becoming 
empowered may reduce the interdependence that produces a strong sense of community’ 
(Riger, 1993: 289). That is empowering efforts which increase people’s voice and control 
over their own lives may lead to conflict and reduce the interdependence and cohesion 
between people. The above tensions points to an important task of development agencies 
aiming at empowering the poor: to balance personal empowerment and the community 
solidarity. Riger (1993) argues that:
Competition among groups for dominance and control without the simultaneous 
acknowledgement of common interests can lead to conflict ... One of the primary 
tasks ... is to articulate the relationship between empowerment and community 
(p.290).
2.2.6. Resources for Empowerment
As discussed previously, empowerment can be conceptualized as agency -  the 
ability to reach outcomes. This conception suggests a concern about the factors that affect a 
person’s chance of achieving his/her desired objectives. These factors are termed by Uphoff 
(2005: 225) as power bases or power resources which can be categorized into six types. 
First, economic resources refer to the control over land, labor, capital as well as the goods 
and services produced from them. This category includes not only economic form of 
production but also such goods and services as influence on public policies and access to 
higher education.
Further, social resources refer to social status, which is achieved based on the social
31
roles or meeting social values. These resources can provide the owner with personal 
satisfaction, esteem, respect, or deference. They can be drawn upon to achieve further goals 
such as getting public service or employment. In addition, political resources are basically a 
consequence of authority that entitle the employment of the resources of the state 
institutions possess to enforce decisions. The ability to influence the exercise of authority 
by voting or other means also can be seen as a political resource. Furthermore, 
informational resources are related to the knowledge which is productive and beneficial to 
the owner. Next is moral resource, which means the legitimacy accorded to the decision­
makers, their roles, and the decisions they made. Finally, is physical resource, or the 
physical force that people can exert against people to compel their compliance 
(Uphoff,2005: 225).
2.2.7, Gender Dimension of Empowerment
While empowerment applies to all disadvantaged or socially excluded groups,
women’s empowerment, encompasses some unique additional elements (Malhotra and 
Schuler, 2006: 71-72): women are a cross-cutting category of individuals that overlaps with 
other disadvantaged subsets of society, such as the poor or ethnic minorities; household 
relations are the central locus of women's disempowerment in a way that is not the case for 
other disempowered groups, therefore, the policies or interventions aiming at gender 
equality must be cognizant of their household-level implications (p.71); and while 
empowerment in general requires institutional transformations, women's empowerment 
requires specific changes of those institutions supporting patriarchal structures (p.72).
A theoretical framework for analyzing women’s empowerment is proposed by 
Deshmukh-Ranadive (2006: 109-1 13). In this framework, women’s empowerment is 
characterized by the improvement of their position in domestic units, which is significantly
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affected by the access to and control over key spaces within the domestic arena: physical, 
economic, socio-cultural, and political. There is a feedback loop between one’s position in 
domestic hierarchy and access to these spaces, that is when a woman’s position in domestic 
hierarchy changes (for instance, through marriage, birth of a child, or death of a family 
member), her access to spaces may increase or decrease, and conversely, new access to the 
above spaces can influence a woman’s capacity to act and thus her position.
Each of these spaces can affect the empowerment of women in particular way. 
Physical space refers to women’s access to and control of their houses, immovable property 
outside the home and place of work, and also includes personal mobility and control over 
their body and its reproductive, productive, and consumptive functions (Deshmukh- 
Ranadive, 2006: 110). Economic space is determined by the ownership of immovable and 
movable, access to both tangible and non-tangible asset, and income, which thereby can 
enhance a woman’s economic independence (p.l 11). Socio-cultural space is closely related 
to a woman’s position within kin-based hierarchies, which is influenced by a number of 
social and cultural factors: type of family (nuclear or extended), kinship structure 
(unilateral or bi-lineal), marital status, child bearing capacity, caste, class, religion, and 
ethnic origin (p.l 12). Finally, political space can be perceived at two levels: private 
political space refers to political situation within a domestic unit, which correlates to 
hierarchal allocations of authority and responsibility; and public political space relates to 
access and control of public offices and the participation in political processes (p.l 12).
However, expansion of the above spaces does not always result in empowerment. 
For example, increases of women’s income through micro-credit projects in Bangladesh 
can lead to rising gender-related tensions (Goetz and Gupta, 1996: 61). Deshmukh- 
Ranadive (2006: 113) argues that the prerequisite for women’s empowerment to take place
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is an expansion of their cognitive space which can be achieved through two processes: to 
bring the women together in new settings, such as collectives organized around issues of 
women's concern; and to raise people’s awareness of rights and duties both as citizen of 
civic society and members of families which mainly involve the knowledge about legal 
processes, human rights and entitlements.
In addition, Narayan et al. (2000: 205) highlight a common problem associated with 
the approach to women’s empowerment of development agencies, that is the emphasis on 
‘women in development’ rather than developing approaches to both poor men and women, 
and propose a women’s empowerment strategy which targets both men and women. As 
women’s and men’s well-beings are intertwined, to help women, it is also critical to 
understand men’s role and reach men. Thus, women’s empowerment efforts must address 
two key issues: greater access to economic opportunities should be provided to both men 
and women; and awareness of both men and women about their worth of human beings 
should be improved (Narayan et al., 2000: 205). At practical level, gender equality must be 
reflected in ‘institutional goals, designs, incentives, and criteria of success that are 
monitored and evaluated' in poverty reduction programs; and discussion of gender issues 
must include both men and women to increase the probability of less traumatic transition 
toward gender equity.
2.2.8. Empowerment of the Poor
Empowerment, first and foremost, is basically about changing power relations in 
favor of those who previously exercise little power over their own lives (Sen G.,1997: 2). 
Therefore empowerment of the poor must be characterized by the transformation in power 
relations between the poof people and powerful actors. According to Chambers (1995), a 
human society can been thought of as patterned into hierarchical relationships, many of
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which are vertical, between ‘uppers' and ‘lowers’. Therefore, individuals are multiple 
uppers or multiple lowers, and one person can be an upper in one context and a lower in 
another (p.33). The poor, while making a living within existing unequal economic and 
political relationships, are engaged in two upper-lower relations: with the rich and the 
political patrons. Therefore, for Chambers, the empowerment of the poor involves the 
changes in these two power relationships (Chambers, 1995: 42).
Though being central to discourses on participatory development, the basis upon 
which evaluation of ‘transformation’ can be done is often overlooked. One realistic 
approach to assess the transformation in power relations, or empowerment of the poor, is to 
focus on participation’s political impacts, that is, as put forward by Whitehead and Gray- 
Molina (1999: 6), the change in ‘political capabilities’ of the poor. In line with Whitehead 
and Gray-Molina, Moore and Putzen (1999: 8-10) also emphasize the importance of 
political mobilization in poverty reduction. They argue that important criteria for the 
success of development programs are the degree to which they contribute to the 
mobilization and sustained political action of the poor and
‘it is useful to think of empowerment in terms of increasing the political capabilities 
of the poor ... It is the political capabilities of the poor that will determine whether 
they can employ social capital ... constructively or create social capital where is 
lacking’ (p.8)
‘Political capabilities’ is broadly regarded as ‘institutional and organizational 
resources as well as the collective ideas available to support effective political action’. 
Critically, political capabilities are defined as the ability to ‘create new rules, transform 
social preferences, as well as secure new resources as they become available’ (Whitehead 
and Gray-Molina, 1999: 6-7). Therefore, building ‘political capabilities’ for the poor is 
about enhancing personal political capabilities, capacity for community organization,
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confidence and recognition of dignity as well as the distribution of material resources (p.6).
2.3. Measurement of Empowerment
In this study, empowerment is basically measured in terms of the change in agency 
which is defined as the expansion in the range of choices and capacity to make them. In 
development, agency is often measured through the roles individuals play in relation to 
specific decisions (Kabeer, 1999: 445). However, the measurement of agency on the basis 
of the ability to make choice is problematic for a number of reasons. The first is that 
choices are not equally important to people (Kabeer, 1999: 437); that is distinction can be 
made between strategic life choices and what can be called second-order choices, but it is 
difficult to make such a distinction through objective assessment. Then there is the issue of 
the inequality in people’s capacity to make choices, and the difference in the choices they 
make (Kabeer, 1999: 439), for instance, while participation in public meeting is often seen 
as an indicator of empowerment, one may opt out just because the issues being decided at 
that meeting are not of his/her interest. This is important because it is unlikely that all 
members of a society give equal value for a wide range of actions.
Kabeer (1999: 447-448) also highlights a number of problems associated with 
measuring agency: developing common indicators across different social situations, and the 
subtlety of personal choice, touched on above. Indicators of agency are often context 
specific, and they are related to strategic life choices that have been denied in the past. For 
example, a poor rural woman may see the change in her agency as being able to equally 
discuss with her husband about household issues while another poor man may describe his 
improved agency as being able to discuss community decisions. But the context-specific 
measurements of agency are not comparable across social situations as these indicators vary 
considerably among socio-cultural situations. Also, changes are often subtle and can occur 
in the informal rather than the formal domain. Therefore, empirical studies may fail to
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capture this subtlety in which women are: ‘opting for private forms of empowerment, 
which retain intact the public image, and honor, of the traditional decision-maker but which 
nevertheless increase women’s ‘backstage influence’ in decision-making processes’ 
(Kabeer, 1999: 448). One way to overcome this problem is to let people self identify the 
important changes that have occurred in their lives as a result of what may be seen as an 
empowerment intervention (Murthi, 2001: 350). However, one problem still exists as to 
evaluate marginal change in empowerment, people’s responses need to be assessed 
according to a set of normative judgments developed by the researchers, other than that of 
the respondents (Kabeer, 1999: 458). For example, researchers may see participation in 
community decision-making as an indication of a higher level of empowerment than say 
making decision about domestic issues, while the local people may see the priority as being 
the other way round.
A number of researchers have attempted to deal with this challenge in different 
ways. Zimmerman and Zahniser (1991: 191) developed a framework of ‘socio-political 
control' in order to break down the concept of agency into five components: policy control; 
leadership; a sense of community belonging; a sense of well-being; and, participation and 
decision-making. Agency is then measured by the changes in these five components. Naved 
(1994: 155) used self-identified indicators to measure agency in her study in Bangladesh, 
where she sought the changes that had occurred to women in their lives, which were then 
used as indicators of expanded choice and action. Broadly, the indicators include: increased 
mobility, the use of resources, and participation in public life. Similarly, Kilby (2006a: 9) 
also used self-identified indicators to measure women's empowerment through NGOs in 
India. The changes are categorized as: autonomy of action, dealing with officials, change in 
family decision making, participation in village political life, and advocacy on social issues.
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The discussion shows that it may be difficult to validly measure empowerment 
through pre-defined proxy indicators, and Gita Sen (1997: 18) contends that in evaluating 
empowerment effect, qualitative measures must be used as what is being measured is 
qualitative by its very nature, and therefore, the evaluation method should be based on the 
response and feedback of the concerned community (p.18). Some studies used open-ended 
questions and let the respondents identifying the important changes that have occurred in 
their lives (Kilby, 2006a: 9; Naved, 1994: 155). In this way the respondents are given the 
chance to make their own judgment relating to the important changes they experienced.
This study, whose main concern was to compare the empowerment impacts 
between the elite and non-elite groups in the Chiase program, focused on the likelihood a 
person was empowered, rather than the marginal change of power. In other words, the 
study looked at whether a person is empowered rather than how much she is empowered 
and thus, empowerment was measured at categorical level. Recognizing the inherent 
difficulty in measuring empowerment, following Naved (1994: 155) and Kilby (2006a: 9), 
this study relies on subjective measurement by the respondents of empowerment outcomes. 
This strategy of measurement overcame the problem in dealing with different contexts. 
That is, while there may be different indicators of expanded choices across cultures and 
communities, as this study looked at the change in indicators, the result is still comparable 
across communities in a local area.
2.4. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the concept of empowerment and the 
transformation of power relations which form a key part of this thesis. From the discussion, 
a number of theoretical points have emerged. First, power can be characterized by agency -  
a range of choice and ability to make choice, which is also related to access to and 
performance in domains of life which are previously denied.
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Second, power has a collective dimension and there is an interrelationship between 
individual and collective empowerment. Empowerment begins at individual level and 
involves increased self-esteem and self-efficacy. When several members are 
psychologically empowered and share their empowering experiences, then a collective self- 
efficacy emerges and greater participation in community action is achieved. Conversely, 
collective power is a collective resource which members of group can call upon. It can 
effectively empower the members by giving them voices and support as well as a sense of 
power. However, the emphasis on personal agency and control may negatively affect 
community solidarity, and so raises an important question for programs aiming as 
empowering the poor and marginalized, that is how personal empowerment and community 
cohesion should be balanced. Third, empowerment of the poor must be characterized by the 
transformation in existing power relations which can be measured in terms of their 
‘political capabilities'. This point is important as it provides the basis for the analysis of 
empowerment of the poor in this study.
Finally, this chapter has looked at how the change in agency is used to measure 
empowerment in this thesis and the issues involved. The key to this approach is to let the 
respondents identify the changes in their agency -  change in ability to make decisions 
which are important to their lives. Base on the respondent’s self-evaluation, empowerment 
is measured at categorical level, that is, whether people experience empowerment. This is 
further elaborated more detail in Chapter Five dealing with the methodology of this study. 
The next chapter looks at the conceptualization of the CDD approach, its typical processes 
and dynamics.
39
Chapter Three: Community-Driven Development as an Empowerment Mechanism
3.1. Introduction
Community-Driven Development (CDD) has emerged as one of the fastest-growing 
approach for channeling of development assistance at local level among multilateral 
development banks since mid 1990s (Tanaka et al., 2006: 1). While the World Bank funded 
192 the CDD projects in the period 1989 -  2003, the number of the CDD projects launched 
by the Bank in only 2005 grew up to 120 (Tanaka et al., 2006: 7). According to Mansuri 
and Rao (2004: 2), the World Bank’s lending for the CDD projects and their enabling 
environment has risen from $3 billion in 1996 to $7 billion in 2003. Further, the CDD is 
claimed by the former World Bank president James Wolfensohn as a key approach to meet 
the Millennium Development Goals (Wassenich and Whiteside, 2004: 2). The approach is 
widely advocated as an effective mechanism for tackling poverty with a range of 
advantages: complement market and public sector activities, enhance sustainability, make 
development more responsive to demand, increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
poverty reduction, build positive social capital and increase ‘voice’ of the local poor people 
(Dongier et al, 2001: 304). As empowerment is increasing seen as a key dimension of 
poverty reduction, the empowerment of the poor through this development approach is of 
importance to the development organizations.
This chapter aims to provide the theoretical background for the analysis of the 
empowerment of the poor in the CDD approach. The first part examines the 
conceptualization of the CDD with three main concerns: the defining features of CDD, 
underlying processes, and the institutional arrangements of this approach. The second part 
focuses on the strengths and limitations of the CDD approach in empowering the poor 
people. The final section discusses the nature of the CDD as a decentralization system, and
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a factor that is likely affect the effectiveness of the CDD approach - downward 
accountability of the local government. A framework for analyzing decentralization 
systems is also introduced to provide a tool for the analysis of institutional setting of the 
CDD program under study.
3.2. Conceptualization of the CDD Approach
The idea of self-reliance and treating the target groups as the masters of their own
development was introduced in participatory development or people-centered development 
approach in the 1970s (Oakley et al., 1991: 3). However, until the 1980s and 1990s, when 
the combination of the failures of both market and government in poverty reduction, the 
recognition of the multi-dimensional nature of poverty, and the contextual variability of 
grassroots-level realities proved that traditional state-led, top-down strategies would not be 
effective for tackling poverty. This provided the impetus for participatory development in 
development practice became a dominant idea (Tanaka et al., 2006: 5). Community-based 
development (CBD) and Community-Driven Development (CDD) projects were then 
adopted widely in development practice (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 1). CBD refers to the 
initiatives that actively include beneficiaries in their design and implementation, and the 
CDD refers to CBD projects in which local communities have direct control over decision­
making including development funding for their own development (Mansuri and Rao, 
2004: 2). A CDD project is distinguished from a CBD one in that the CDD emphasized the 
role that communities, or the locally-elected bodies, play in driving the development 
process, rather than being passive beneficiaries. One popular definition of the CDD given 
by World Bank has been commonly cited in development literature:
CDD gives control o f decision and resources to community groups. The groups often 
work in partnership with demand-responsive support organizations and service 
providers, including elected governments, the private sector, NGOs, and central 
government agencies, the CDD is a way to provide social and infrastructure services,
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organize economic activities and resource management, empower the poor, improve
the governance and enhance the security of the poorest ((Dongier et al., 2001: 303).
What emerges from the above definition is that the devolution of control over 
decision making and resources is the defining process in the CDD. The CDD program is 
basically a new participatory development model in which the control over decision making 
and resources is devolved to the local communities and their locally elected bodies. 
Although participatory development is a well-established idea in development literature, 
the CDD model is relatively new as it has only been promoted by international 
development agencies only since the late 1990s (Wong and Guggenheim, 2005: 254).
As the devolution of control may take multiple forms and people’s participation 
may take multiple levels, the CDD represents a broad set of participatory efforts. Therefore, 
the amount of power devolved, or in other words, the level of people’s participation 
informs the nature of a CDD initiative. Based on the levels of community control and 
people’s participation in stages of the project cycle, Tanaka et al. (2006: 7) highlights five 
defining characteristics of a community- driven development initiatives:
(1) Community focus: targeted beneficiary as well as implementing agent is some 
form of CBOs or representative local government of a community. The operation of the 
CDD essentially consists of various small-scaled subprojects at community level.
(2) Participation in planning: the design of the community level subprojects is done 
through participatory planning by the community or CBO itself. Through this 
characteristic, development is said to be driven by the local community.
(3) Participation in implementation: this involvement may take the form of direct 
inputs as local contribution, or indirect inputs as supervision of contractors and operation 
and maintenance functions.
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(4) Community control of resources: there are some forms of resource transfer from 
the donor to the community though the level of control by the community may vary, that is 
the control over decision-making is shared between the local communities and development 
agencies.
(5) Community-based monitoring and evaluation: Local community involves in 
monitoring and evaluating development activities either through direct participation or 
elected representatives.
These five characteristics indicate a continuum in the level of community 
participation in a CDD, however, only the most recent generations of the CDD programs 
have all these characteristics. Community control of resources is seen to be a distinguishing 
feature of CDD programs6, while Community-based monitoring and evaluation is only 
found in some of the new generation of the CDD programs (Dongier et al, 2001: 305-308; 
Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 2; Tanaka et al., 2006: 6).
The merit of the CDD as an effective mechanism for poverty reduction rests on 
three underlying processes of this approach: participatory decision-making, community 
organizing, and poverty targeting (Dongier et al, 2001: 304-308). First is the devolution of 
the control and decision to local communities so that poor people can be empowered 
immediately and directly (p.308). This is exercised through the direct participation of the 
poor in the local decision making. Second is the strengthening of local institutions to 
enhance networks of local people and their social ties, in other words, their social capital; 
that can positively affect both long-term development and the economic security of the 
local people (p.308). Finally, local knowledge mobilized through the CDD approach can
6 Early generations of the CDD programs pre-1990s did not have this feature, and the first three features have 
been part of participatory development and community development projects since the 1970s.
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effectively improve poverty targeting to enhance the economic security of the local people 
(p.307).
For the institutional arrangements between community and demand-responsive 
agency in the CDD approach, three broad sets have been used in development practice: 
partnership between the community and local government; partnership between the 
community and private support organizations including NGOs or private firms; and direct 
partnership between the community and higher-level government or the controlling body of 
a central fund and this may be a large NGO. In each set of institutional arrangement, there 
is a great variation regarding exact role of the range of players; and there are also CDD 
initiatives which do not rely on external resources at all (Dongier et cil, 2003:308). 
Nowadays, the first institutional arrangement of the CDD approach is of great interest of 
governments and development agencies because of its scope for combining democratic 
decentralization and poverty reduction. Therefore, this study focuses exclusively on a CDD 
program relying on partnerships between local communities and local government.
3.3. Transformation of Power Relations in the CDD Approach
The discussion in Chapter Two indicates that empowerment of the poor must
involve the transformation of existing power relations which can be characterized by the 
creation of 'political capabilities’ for the poor. As the ‘political capabilities’ refers to 
‘institutional and organizational resources ... to support effective political action’, or in the 
other words, the ability to ‘create new rules, transform social preferences, ... secure new 
resources as they become available’ (Whitehead and Gray-Molina, 1999: 7), the CDD 
approach, with underlying processes discussed in previous section, can create ‘political 
capabilities’ for the poor through two processes: participatory decision-making process can 
directly impact on existing pattern of political representation of the poor and increase their 
ability to influence on the local rules and decisions (Dongier et al, 2001: 308); and
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community organizing process can improve people's networks which are important to both 
individual development and collective actions of the local communities (Dongier et al, 
2001: 308; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 226). Therefore, the creation of ‘political 
capabilities' of the poor in the CDD approach can be assessed by examining the 
improvements in social networks of local people, and their participation in local decision­
making.
In addition, poverty targeting while being not directly related to the ‘political 
capabilities’ of the poor, can affect the economic security of the poor and their mobilization 
(Osmani, 2000: 23). The design of poverty targeting mechanisms can significantly affect 
the competition between local groups and community solidarity (Dupar and Radenoch, 
2002: 22). Therefore, the performance of poverty targeting is likely to have important 
impacts on the creation of the ‘political capabilities' of the poor. This suggests that an 
understanding of poverty targeting scheme is essential for the assessment of transformation 
in the CDD approach. The next section examines the conceptions, problems, and 
limitations of three underlying processes of the CDD approach: poverty targeting, 
community organizing and participatory decision-making.
3.3.1. Poverty Targeting
Poverty targeting refers to the extent to which scarce resources provided by the 
donor or government, are targeted to the poorest group. According to the proponents of the 
CDD (Chebil and Haque, 2003: 126; Dongier et al, 2001: 307), this approach is much more 
effective in poverty targeting than other top-down approaches. The improvement in the 
poverty targeting effects of the CDD approach is mainly attributed to the community
7 Dupar and Badenock (2002: 22) studied a rural development project in Vietnam and found that the exclusion 
of wealthier households from receiving direct support raised competition among the villagers to qualify as 
poor and precluded the formulation of holistic plans that would be socially and economically sustainable.
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involvement in selecting the beneficiaries, or in the other words, participatory targeting. 
Each targeting mechanism is mainly characterized by two factors: the method of targeting 
and the intermediary agent who implement the targeting (Conning and Kevene, 2002: 378). 
The intermediary agent is in charge of assessing the eligibility and implementing the 
delivery. The agents can be the program officials, local government staff, locally-elected 
bodies, or the whole community. Obviously, the internal structure, accountability relations, 
and value system of the implementing agents are important to the targeting outcomes.
The targeting methods that have been applied in development and poverty reduction 
are of three types (Grosh, 1994: 34): individual assessment, categorical targeting, and self­
targeting. Individual assessment methods require the program agent to decide the eligibility 
on the case-by-case basis. It may involve a direct means testing, an evaluation based on 
proxy indicators, or a subjective evaluation (Conning and Kevene, 2002: 378; Glewwe, 
1992: 303-305; Ravallion and Sen, 1994: 813). Categorical targeting gives the eligibility to 
all members of a group defined by easily identifiable characteristics or traits. The traits can 
be location (geographic targeting) or the restrictions of benefits to disadvantaged groups: 
elderly, ethnic, or invalid groups and the like. Self-targeting relies on the individual 
decision of a potential candidate to participate or not. Though the benefit or service is in 
principle available to all, but it is designed in such a way that discourages the non-poor’s 
participation. The costs of time, labor requirements, or a low quality service can be tools of 
self-targeting. A suitable targeting mechanism may involve one, or a combination of more 
than one of these targeting methods.
Participatory targeting is increasingly popular in poverty reduction. The key 
advantage is that it can target the poor in the absence of reliable information for means 
testing (Dongier et al, 2001: 307) and it reduces the likelihood of adverse selection
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problems (Chebil and Haque, 2003: 126). Local communities often have better information 
on household characteristics, needs, and recent events upon which the beneficiary 
eligibility is determined than do the external agencies that must rely on crude proxy 
indicators. Better information also helps to enhance the enforcement, reduce administration 
costs, and increase benefits delivered to the poor (Conning and Kevene, 2002: 382). 
Generally, the donor or government agencies work in partnership with the local 
communities to implement the targeting. The responsibility of setting the criteria by which 
eligibility and assistance level will be judged is to a certain extent devolved to the 
community agents. Complete devolution is not common and most participatory targeting 
mechanisms give local communities a varying level of discretion within a set of rules and 
regulations (Conning and Kevene, 2002: 381).
There is empirical evidence to confirm the advantage of using local level agents in 
targeting. Alderman (2000) evaluates a safety-net program in Albany which covers some 
20 per cent it populations, providing block grants to the local governments, and gave them 
the right to determine eligibility and the amount of transfer to beneficiaries. It found that 
the poverty targeting based on local staff judgment exceeded what could be expected from 
targeting on the basis of proxy indicators done by the center. Further, local authorities 
appeared to have access to information that is less likely captured in household surveys and 
to effectively allocated program benefits among the households under their jurisdiction 
(Alderman, 2002: 399). Similarly, Adams et al. tested the validity of a Rapid Rural 
Appraisal wealth-ranking technique by comparing its results with that of typical 
socioeconomic indicators from a standardized household survey in rural Bangladesh. The 
key informants were asked to classify 1,637 households into three wealth groups according 
to a number of predetermined criteria. A questionnaire survey was subsequently
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administered to each household. It was found that health, demographic and economic 
variables derived from the questionnaire differed significantly according to wealth groups 
categorized by the key informants. This finding proves the validity of measuring poverty 
through RRA (Adams etal., 1997: 1169-1171).
On the other hand, literature points to four broad problems of using local 
knowledge for targeting: the weak reliability of local knowledge; the variation of local 
preference; the elite capture; and the tensions arising from the design of participatory 
program. Several studies raised the issue of weak reliability of using local knowledge in 
wealth ranking; for example, Bergeron et al.'s (1998: 1989-1901) study8 of a agricultural 
development project in Honduras found that the consistency of results from different 
groups of people doing the ranking was alarmingly low. This suggests that rankings by 
local informants should be used with caution as there are many factors which may affect 
the reliability of this technique: training of informants, choice of ranking criteria, informant 
selection, and definition of target population.
Further, apart from the technical problems in using local knowledge, participatory 
targeting may be ineffective if the local preference is not pro-poor, which is often the case. 
That is principles of social justice and the understanding about poverty reduction of the 
local communities may vary among communities and not be the same as what development 
and welfare agencies might assume (Conning and Kevene, 2002: 384). This variation may 
affect the level of willingness the communities target the benefits to the poor, for example,
8 Bergeron et al.( 1998: 1999-1901) study assesses the reliability of food security ranking by local informants 
in the context of a agricultural development project in Honduras. The study was conducted among members 
of poor farmer’s groups in 13 different communities. Participants were split into small sets of three to five 
persons, and each set was asked to classify all households in their group into one of three predefined 
categories of household food security. The groups were rather homogeneous as all members are poor.
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King’s (1997: 361) study found a significant variation in the practice of Poor Law - a poor 
relief program in England - among local communities. Chan et a V s (1992: 189) study of 
the welfare for the childless elderly in Chinese villages reported:
Though production teams were required by law to provide food, shelter, clothing and 
a coffin for any needy childless elderly, the amount was a pittance, providing only 
for the barest subsistence. Other team members looked down upon such welfare 
recipients as a drain on the production team’s resources (p. 189).
In addition, elite capture is another common problem in participatory initiatives, 
where decentralized power is used to influence political outcomes through manipulation of 
information and perceptions, or by limiting the voice of other in order to gain resources 
(Conning and Kevene, 2002: 384). While participation has become a mainstream in 
development, Abraham and Platteau (2000: 20) are skeptical about the potential benefits of 
decentralized social programs in ‘repressive societies where mutual control is constantly 
exercised, suspicions are continuously entertained about others’ intentions, inter-personal 
conflicts are pervasive, and a rigid rank-based hierarchical structure governs people’s life’. 
This concern is supported by several empirical studies. For example, Galasso and 
Ravallion’s (2000: 25-26) study^ of the Bangladesh Food-for-Education Program found 
that inequality within villages affected the relative power of the poor in local decision 
making; in this case, the effectiveness in targeting the poor of the communities under this 
program was lower when the village inequality was highest.
Finally, the design of participatory programs may create tensions between achieving 
poverty targeting and other objectives. The evaluation of performance is often relies on
9 Galasso and Ravallion's (2000: 25-26) study examines the targeting performance of Bangladesh Food-for- 
Education Program which aimed at increasing school attendance rate for poor children by providing food to 
selected households. In this program, the center -  ministry and district government -  chose the participating 
communities but the selection of beneficiary households within each community was left to the local 
committees.
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readily measured and observed variables, such as the number of clients attended, the 
number of clients who find jobs, or repayment rate. However, these criteria may provide 
incentives against reaching the poorest or most vulnerable, whose participation and 
performance in economic activities are often less than the better-offs. For example, the 
Grameen Bank, whose success in terms of targeting outcomes10, seem to have been 
achieved by insisting on categorical targeting, such as targeting women, and imposing 
wealth ceiling eligibility requirements (Conning and Kevene, 2002: 388).
In summary, the above discussion has reflected three important points about 
targeting with local involvement. First, better access to information about local situation 
provides participatory targeting a great potential to effectively target the poor. In addition, 
the targeting performance is to a considerable extent affected by the local preference, local 
power relationship, and ability of local agents in making their superior information 
operational. Finally, the design of development program itself can affect the targeting 
performance of the local communities.
3.3.2. Community Organizing
Strengthening of Community-based organizations (CBOs) is an important process 
in the CDD approach (Dongier et al, 2001: 308). For the proponents of this approach, the 
strengthening of the CBOs and the devolution of control over decisions and resources to 
these organizations give the communities the opportunity to develop social capital of local 
people through enhancing social ties among local people and building linkages with people 
at positions of power outside their network. The improved social capital can facilitate long­
term development as well as enhance economic security of the poor (Dongier et al, 2001: 
308).
111 The success of Grameen Bank is, however, contested.
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In development literature, social capital is a vexed term as it means ‘many things to 
many people’ (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999: 872). Social capital can be conceptualized as 
the resources, such as ideas, information, support, that individuals can acquire as a result of 
their relationships with other people (Grootaert, et al., 2004: 3). The underlying idea of 
social capital is that a person’s families, friends, or associations, constitute an important 
asset which can be mobilized for material gains. Further, this idea also holds for groups or 
communities (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 226).
One way to analyze social capital is to distinguish between two complementary 
forms: structural and cognitive. While the former is directly based on structural processes, 
the latter is to do with people’s minds and thus less amenable to measurement (Uphoff and 
Wiyayaratna, 2000: 1876). Structural social capital includes the roles, rules, procedures, 
and social networks that establish patterns of social interactions, and thus more objective 
and observable. Structural forms of social capital facilitate people’s involvement in 
collective action by lowering transaction costs and accumulating social learning (p.1876). 
Cognitive social capital refers to shared norms, values, attitudes and beliefs that induce 
people to cooperate, therefore, they are a more subjective and intangible concept, and so 
difficult to measure.
Social capital in either form has two components: bonding and bridging social 
capital (Grootaert, et al., 2004: 4; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 231-233). Bonding social 
capital refers to the social ties between people who are similar in terms of their 
demographic characteristics, such as family members, neighbors, close friends, work 
colleagues, or group members; while bridging social capital is characterized by the ties that 
transcend different social divides -  groups of people with different characteristics and 
views, often across communities. Both components of social capital are important for
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economic development in local communities. Granovetter (1995: 156-157) argues that 
economic development depends on both the benefits of close community membership and 
the networks that transcend their community. However, there is a difference between the 
effects of these two types of social capital. While the within-community social ties are 
crucial for the ability of people to cope with risks and vulnerability, the bridging social 
capital can be used for strategic advantage and advancement of material interests (Kozel 
and Parker, 2000: 66). This discussion suggests a strategy for poverty reduction in general 
and empowerment of the poor particularly: ‘finding ways and means by which to transcend 
social divides and build social cohesion’ for the poor people (Woolcock and Narayan, 
2000: 242).
However, social capital can be destructive as well as constructive. Portes (1998: 15- 
18) identified at least four negative consequences of social capital. First, the strong ties 
among group members that bring benefits to the insiders can prevent the outsiders from 
access (p. 15). Second is that the closed community may prevent the success of business 
initiatives by their members, that is, ‘cozy intergroup relations of the kind found in 
solidarity communities can give rise to gigantic free-riding problem, as less diligent 
members enforce on the more successful all kinds of demands backed by the shared 
normative structure’ (p. 16). This can make the opportunities for entrepreneurial 
accumulation and success dissipate. Third, community and group participation necessarily 
creates demand for the conformity of the members which results in a strong social control 
and restrictive personal freedom (p.16). This may lead to negative economic consequences 
as ‘group loyalties may be so strong that they isolate members from information about 
employment opportunities, foster a climate of ridicule toward efforts to study and work 
hard, or siphon off hard-won assets (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000: 231). Finally, in the
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situations where group solidarity is created by a common experience of adversity and 
opposition to mainstream society, group cohesion obstructs individual success, keep 
members of a downtrodden group in place, and force the more ambitious to escape from it 
(Portes, 1998: 17). In a nutshell, it is noteworthy that social capital, in the form of social 
control, can cause effects which are exactly the opposite of its benefits commonly 
celebrated in the literature, that is, while the bounded solidarity facilitates economic 
development among some groups, they may have negative effects for other groups.
Further, the notion that community organizing process in the CDD approach can 
empower the poor is challenged by a criticism that the operationalization of social capital 
through the enhancement of local area-based association as advocated by development 
agencies obscures both class differentiation and power relations (Fine, 2001: 57; Flarriss, 
2001: 113-115). Harriss argues that social capital is an aspect of the differentiation of 
classes, and by its nature is part of power relations in a social system. Though it is possible 
for the resource-poor groups of people to have strong social networks, they can deliver only 
few benefits to their members (p. 115). As social capital emphasizes the social networks 
that people can access and mobilize resources, it can contribute to inequality because the 
elites ‘are able to access internal and external social networks that are more powerful and 
wealthy’ (Rao and Walton, 2004: 16). Conversely, the poor have less influential networks 
which, while helping them cope with the shocks of life, restrict the resources they can 
mobilize (p. 16). In this scheme, different groups in a social system have different types of 
social capital, and so it can perpetuate an inequality (Rao and Walton, 2004: 16).
So at practical level, the effectiveness of the CDD programs in building social 
capital for local communities is controversial. Empirical studies show both success and 
failure in this respect. For example, Fox’s (1996: 1097-1098) study, which looks at
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indigenous communities in rural Mexico, found that social capital can be produced through 
decentralization and is enhanced through the interaction of local societal actors and external 
actors in civil society. Though it may also be produced from below, external allies still 
appear crucial in the ability of such organizations to survive. The example of the Jamaica 
Social Investment Fund (JSIF)11 found that though decision-making at community level 
had been dominated by local leaders, the program had increased the trust between people 
and built a good feeling within the communities (Rao and Ibanez, 2003: 33).
On the other hand, a study of the Armenia Social Investment Fund (ASIF), found 
that the program did not change the nature of the existing institutions and social relations in 
Armenia, but rather strengthened and reinforced the existing positions and dominant roles 
of local leaders and created no change in social relations (Babajanian, 2005: 457). A World 
Bank study of the Social Fund in Zambia and Malawi found that social fund ‘operated as 
users rather than producers of social capital’, that is the social networking skills developed 
through Social Fund, tend to help the elite attract external resources, rather than empower 
the poor (World Bank OED, 2002: 43). In other words, the rich may attract most resources 
from enhanced networking and further strengthen their power. This points to a central 
concern in analyzing the transformation impacts of the Chiase: whether the program creates 
equal impacts on the networks of the elite and that of the ordinary people. In the next 
section, the last underlying process of the CDD approach -  participatory decision-making is 
examined.
3.3.3. People’s participation in local decision-making
While being a popular term, participation is vexed. In development paradigms, it is
a very ambiguous concept which is one of the most overused but least understood (Botes 
' 1 Social Fund is a form o f the CDD approach.
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and Rensburg, 2000:41). For recent decades, the concept of participation has gained a 
spectrum of meanings and a rise in the diversity of practices (Cornwall and Gaventa, 
2001:3). According to Pretty (1995: 1251), the term 'participation’ has become a ‘fashion’ 
in development and that has created many paradoxes: It has been used to justify the 
extension of state’s control as well as to build local capacity and self-reliance; it has been 
used to justify external decision as well as to devolve power and decision making away 
from external donors; it has been used for data collection as well as for interactive analysis.
There are many ways can be used to differentiate alternatives within the concept of 
participation. One important form of differentiation is to see participation as a means or 
participation as an end (Oakley, 1991:7). The former stands for the use participation to 
achieve some predetermined goals. In the other words, participation is a way of mobilizing 
the existing physical, economic and social resources of rural people with a view to achieve 
objectives of development programs and projects. Participation as a means considers the 
result of participation more important than the act of participation. Participation as an end is 
entirely different concept. Participation is seen as a process which unfolds over time and 
whose purpose is to develop the capacities of rural people to intervene more directly in 
development efforts (Oakley, 1991:8). Such a participatory process might not have 
predetermined measurable objectives or even direction. .
Participation is also commonly interpreted by relating to key stages of development 
programs including decision-making, implementation, benefit sharing and evaluation 
(Oakley et. al., 1991:6). This form of differentiation is useful as it suggests the structure 
and functions of people’s participation in development efforts which are essential for the 
design and implementation of participatory development programs. Arnstein (1969) puts 
forward a ladder of citizen participation including eight rungs namely manipulation,
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therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power and citizen 
control. The position in the ladder of participation is characterized by the degree of 
decision-making people experience. Similarly, Pretty (1995:1253) differentiates 
participation into seven types, ranging from manipulative and passive participation, at 
which people are informed what is to happen and perform the predetermined role, to self­
mobilization where people take initiatives which is independent of external agencies (see 
table 1). This way of analysis of participation is less tied to immediate economic benefits 
and is concerned more with the control over resources and institutional issues. The 
progression from lower participation (type 1 and type 2) to higher participation (type 6 and 
type 7) is characterized by the increase in the amount of power being devolved to the local 
people, the formation of local organizations and the use of participatory methodologies.
Table 3.1: Typology of Participation
Typology Characteristics
1. M a n i p u l a t i v e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  is s i m p l y  p r e t e n c e ;  p e o p l e  h a v e  n o  p o w e r .
2 .  P a s s i v e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n
P a r t i c i p a t e  b y  b e i n g  to l d  w h a t  h a s  b e e n  d e c i d e d  o r  h a s  a l r e a d y  h a p p e n e d
3 . P a r t i c i p a t i o n  b y  
c o n s u l t a t i o n
P e o p l e  p a r t i c i p a t e  b y  b e i n g  c o n s u l t e d  o r  b y  a n s w e r i n g  q u e s t i o n s .
4 .  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  f o r  
m a t e r i a l  i n c e n t i v e s
P e o p l e  p a r t i c i p a t e  b y  c o n t r i b u t i n g  r e s o u r c e s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  l a b o r ,  in r e t u r n  f o r  
f o o d ,  c a s h  o r  o t h e r  m a t e r i a l  i n c e n t i v e s .
5. F u n c t i o n a l  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  s e e n  b y  e x t e r n a l  a g e n c i e s  a s  a  m e a n  to  a c h i e v e  p r o j e c t  g o a l s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  r e d u c e d  c o s t .  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  a s  a  m e a n .
6 .  I n t e r a c t i v e  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n
P a r t i c i p a t i o n  b y  j o i n i n g  a n a l y s i s ,  p l a n n i n g ,  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a c t i o n  p l a n s  a n d  
f o r m a t i o n  o r  s t r e n g t h e n i n g  o f  l o c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  is s e e n  a s  a 
r i g h t .
7 . S e l f - M o b i l i z a t i o n P e o p l e  p a r t i c i p a t e  b y  t a k i n g  i n i t i a t i v e s  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  e x t e r n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
to  c h a n g e  s y s t e m s .
Source: Pretty (1995:1253).
Participation, then, can be understood as a process which enables people to organize
themselves, to identify needs, and to share in the design, implementation, monitoring and
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evaluation of activities as well as in the benefits from them. The activities should be
generated from the resources which local people have access to and may be promoted 
through external supports. Further, without holding adequate power people can not make 
effective decisions. Therefore, the significance of people’s participation lies at the level 
where decisions are taken. Thus, distribution of power is essential to provide momentum in 
participation.
In the CDD approach, people’s participation is one of underpinning mechanisms. 
According to Dongier et al (2001: 308) a distinguished feature of the newer form of the 
CDD is the incorporation of local knowledge into the decision making process which 
controls the local development and resources. It is expected that through this participatory 
decision-making process, the local development is driven by the local needs and demands -  
what can be seen as the exercise of ‘voice’ and ‘choice’, or in the other word, 
empowerment. Regarding the level of participation, these CDD projects often promote a 
high level participation, as ‘partnership’ or ‘interactive participation’ (see above 
discussion), and get people involved in all key decision-making processes. The benefits of 
participatory decision-making are diverse; the most notable ones include more relevant 
activities selection, better targeted effects, more cost-effectiveness, more equitably 
distributed program benefits, smaller leakages of development funds, and thus more 
sustainable development (Dongier et al, 2001: 305-308).
However, the development literature has highlighted a number of problems that 
may obstruct direct participatory decision-making. One key obstacle to participatory 
decision making is dependency, which is often ingrained in the rural poor (Oakley et al., 
1991: 13), and the lack of organizational skills (Korten, 1981a: 191). At practical level, this 
means that as the rural poor like most people, who have been accustomed to leaving
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decision making to their leaders, may not take up the opportunity when decision-making 
power is given to them. The lack of experience with participatory activities, and the lack of 
skills in ‘organizing meeting, reaching consensus, choosing competent leadership, keeping 
records, and handling organizational fund’ may leave many poor communities incapable of 
responding to the demands of participation (Korten, 1981a: 191). Second, direct 
participatory decision-making may entail high costs on local people, such as the amount of 
time required for participation, and emotional stress for the socially and economically 
disadvantaged, since genuine participation for such groups may take the positions that are 
contrary to the interests of more powerful groups (Johnson, 2001: 525; Mansuri and Rao, 
2004: 6; Moore and Putzel, 1999: 10). And so, when people judge that the projects do not 
suit their interests, or the costs outweigh the benefits, they may opt out (White, 1996: 14). 
Third, while the CDD is often promoted at an administrative unit referred to as a 
community, which in fact may not constitute a homogenous economic and social entity 
(Korten, 1981a: 193; Oakley et al., 1991: 13). The use of administrative boundaries can be 
meaningless where settlement patterns are distinct from such boundaries. In many cases, 
existing factional, ethnic or religious identities complicate the picture, so any unqualified 
use of the term ‘community’ can obscure local structures of power.
Finally, the attitudes and implementation styles of bureaucratic government bodies 
will not change by exposing to participation (Mansuri and Rao, 2004: 7). To embrace the 
participatory planning exercises into the work of public bodies, further complicates the 
accountability relations that control them. Participatory processes are often unpredictable 
and may leave the officials vulnerable to criticism by the principals. The conflicts between 
lines of accountability may affect the commitment to participatory approach of public 
bodies supporting participation. The situation is even worse if the public bodies themselves
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lack participatory skills, experience, or practice.
Given above limitations, what is often labeled as ‘local knowledge’ in participatory 
development projects may be just a construct of the planning context, which is shaped by 
the power relations between local elite and the people, and between communities and the 
development agencies. In an examination of several participatory projects in India, Mosse 
(2001: 19-25) identified four aspects of this problem: first, knowledge may be shaped by 
the local relations of power, that is the asymmetrical access to information and capabilities 
between the local elite and the poor may lead to the dominance by the elite in decision­
making to reflect their interest. Second, outsider agendas may be expressed as local 
knowledge, whereby project facilitators being the most influential actor in local decision­
making process, direct and shape the PRA processes. Villager’s ‘needs’ are therefore often 
shaped by perceptions of what the project can deliver and what can be considered 
legitimate. There may be also local collusion in the planning consensus, so that “local 
knowledge’ is shaped by both locally dominant groups and project interests. Powerful local 
people actively concur in the process of problem definition and planning because it allows 
them to manipulate the program to serve their own interests, and suppresses difference and 
encourages consensus and action over detailed planning. Finally, the concept of 
participation may be used just to legitimize the project’s previously established priorities 
and needs. Since the long-term goals of participatory approach have little real support from 
either the community or the project staff, the processes of participatory decision-making 
may be an exercise to satisfy the operational demands of the project.
Two important points emerge from the above discussion. First, participatory 
decision-making may be strongly influenced by local power relations where local 
communities may be heterogeneous and different groups have different levels of
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capabilities and information accessibility. Given various limitations of the poor and 
marginalized, it is likely that the better-off would dominate the local democratic decision 
making. Second, the mobilization o f ‘local knowledge1 and the performance of villagers in 
participatory decision-making are strongly influenced by the pre-existing relationship 
between the development agency and the local communities. Therefore, promoting 
meaningful participation in local decision-makingto facilitate the creation of ‘indigenous 
knowledge’ rather than ‘planning knowledge’, the commitment and to people’s 
participation of the development agency is essential.
The three underlying processes in the CDD feature a democratic decentralization 
system . The next section examines the nature and dynamics of the democratic 
decentralization system in order to gain the insight on the performance of the CDD 
approach. This sheds light into the downward accountability of the local government, a 
factor that may be important in the empowerment of the poor.
3.4. Downward Accountability as a Key Factor of Empowerment through the CDD 
3.4.1. CDD as a Decentralization System
Democratic decentralization now is a dominant strategy in community development
and poverty reduction. This strategy is widely claimed as the effective tool for promoting 
people’s participation and making the local governance more responsive (Kingsley, 1996:
12 Decentralization is a broad term which generally can be separated into three broad types. Administrative 
decentralization (Deconcentration) is said to occur when power is devolved from higher levels in a system to 
their appointees at lower levels. In deconcentration, the agents of higher levels of system move to lower level 
arenas but remain accountable only to higher level in the system. Fiscal decentralization is said to occur when 
higher levels in a system cede influence over budget and financial decisions to lower levels. Finally, 
democratic decentralization (devolution) refers to the transfer of power controlling decision and resources 
from higher level to lower level authorities, and is largely or wholly independent of higher levels of the 
system. In devolution, the local power holders maintain both upward and downward accountability (Manor: 
1999: 5). Crucially, democratic decentralization entails a system of governance in which citizens possess the 
right to hold local officials to be accountable to them.
60
420; Manor, 1999: 88-93). The importance of democratic decentralization in poverty 
reduction is affirmed by the World Bank (1995);
There is no feasible substitute to an approach in which local governments, with the 
active participation of their communities, take the initiative and responsibility for the 
actions conducive to their institutional development (p.27).
Democratic decentralization is now pervasive in developing countries and the CDD 
approach, or in other words, democratic local governance, is widely seen as an effective 
mechanism to promote decentralization to reach down into communities, enable informed 
input into public decisions, and provide incentives to local governments to empower local 
communities and be accountable to their input (Silver, 2003: 422; Wong and Guggenheim, 
2005: 257-258). The CDD approach creates a decentralization system in which the control 
over decision making and resources is devolved to the communities and is exercised by the 
people themselves -  through participation, or by locally-elected bodies. The institutional 
arrangement of the CDD programs involves the partnership between the local government 
and the community with the local communities controlling the use and management of a 
development fund, while the local government is in charge of creating enabling 
environment, supporting and facilitating the planning and implementation of development 
activities (Dongier et al, 2001: 311).
On the other hand, devolution is susceptible to a number of problems; among the 
most serious are elite capture, the cost of direct participation, and rising inequality. Elite 
capture refers to whether the local decision-making reflects the disproportionate influence 
by the elite group and devolution may simply empower local elites, and perpetuate the 
existing unequal relationships, especially in rural areas where large numbers of people are 
dependent on small numbers of local elite (Johnson, 2001: 525; Moore and Putzel, 1999: 
15; Wong and Guggenheim, 2005: 253). Direct participation in political issues may also
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entail a heavy cost to poor people (Johnson, 2001: 525; Moore and Putzel, 1999: 10; Wong 
and Guggenheim, 2005: 253), when a polarized community erupts into conflict as 
devolution leads to the exclusion of one group from government. Then there is the direct 
cost of political action, such as cost of travel and communication, which can deter the poor 
from sustaining coherent political movement. Multiple and potentially contradictory 
loyalties may undermine the solidarity of marginal groups, together with the inequality 
between the constituents can affect people’s engagement in formal political processes. The 
extents to which the constituents have ‘political tools’ -  such as, money, time, information, 
and literacy -  may influence their performance in democratic processes (Johnson, 2001: 
525).
Finally, decentralization theories emphasize the accountability relations the local 
power holders have to their constituents as the factor determining the effectiveness of 
decentralized systems (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 476; Blair, 2000: 27). The importance of 
accountability is reflected in Blair’s (2000: 21) definition of democratic decentralization
[Democratic decentralization] can be defined as meaningful authority devolved to 
local units of governance that are accessible and accountable to the local citizenry, 
who enjoy full political rights and liberty.
Therefore, regarding specifically to the CDD programs which rely on the 
partnership between the communities and the local government, the downward 
accountability of the local government is a potential determinant of the effectiveness of this 
approach. The following sections focus on the downward accountability of local 
government in the CDD approach.
3.4.2. Downward Accountability as an Empowerment Process
Accountability can be defined simply as ‘an obligation or willingness to accept
responsibility or to account for one's actions’ (Online Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2008).
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Accountability refers to the conduct and performance of an actor and the criteria that should 
be used in assessing that conduct and performance (Day and Klein, 1987: 2). It concerns a 
relationship between two parties A and B, where A is accountable to B if they must explain 
their actions to B, and could be adversely affected by B if B doesn’t like the account (Goetz 
and Jenkins, 2002: 5), and so is ‘a social and political process’ and directly related to power 
relations (Day and Klein, 1987: 2). In a nutshell, accountability denotes a specific type of 
power: the capacity to demand someone to be answerable for past actions, and/or the 
capacity to impose a sanction for poor performance (Goetz and Jenkins, 2002: 6). As 
accountability denotes a power relation, ‘the inability to make someone accountable for 
their actions is synonymous with the lack of power’ (Day and Klein, 1987: 21). This raises 
an implication: in democratic systems where public bodies hold power on behalf of the 
citizenry, the empowerment of the constituents is directly linked to the extent to which 
these public bodies are accountable to them. Therefore, enforcing downward accountability 
of public bodies can be a mechanism to empower the citizens.
There are multiple accountability relations between the one obliged to account for 
their actions and to face sanction (accountability ‘holdee’), and the one entitled to demand 
answers or impose punishments the (accountability ‘holder’) (Behn, 2001: 1). These 
relations together control the performance of public actors. This section addresses two 
questions: for what is a public body held downwardly accountable? And how is the 
downward accountability enforced?
For what is a Public Body held Downwardly Accountable
Accountability of an public body has three dimensions: accountability for finance; 
fairness; or performance (Behn, 2001: 6). First, accountability for finance is about being 
accountable for ‘how the books are kept and how the money is spent’ and can be dictated or
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13implied by law, regulations, or agreement . As the financial rules, procedures and 
standards are clear and detailed, fiscal accountability can be achieved through auditing with 
specific benchmarks (Behn, 2001: 6). Second, accountability for fairness is about making 
sure that the public bodies observe ‘the well-established norms of democratic government -  
specifically, for fairness’. These norms are codified into rules, what create process and 
procedures, that if properly followed, assure the fairness and equity of the public bodies 
(Behn, 2001: 8). If the public organization is found not following the rules, it may be 
sanctioned. Since the meaning of fairness can be transferred into specific rules, the 
accountability for fairness is relatively straightforward and can be achieved through 
auditing, oversight, and evaluation (Behn, 2001: 8).
Third, while accountability for finance and fairness reflects concerns for how the 
public body does its tasks, accountability for performance cares for the consequences of its 
actions. Accountability for performance of a public organization is characterized by the 
extent its expected outcomes are achieved (Behn, 2001: 10). Therefore, to hold a public 
body to be accountable for performance, the establishment of expectations for the outcomes 
it will create is essential. However, as the expectations for outcomes can be diverse, 
significantly different among different actors in a society, the crucial question regarding 
accountability for performance is: whose expectations should be taken into account? The 
answer could be that, in democratic systems, the public body holds the power on behalf of 
the constituents; therefore its accountability for performance must be based on the
13 The establishment of accountability for finance involves clearly-defined steps: (1) to decide what values the 
public actor need to uphold; (2) to specify what it means to uphold these values by codifying them into 
specific rules, procedures and standards; (3) to create reporting mechanisms to demonstrate that the rules, 
procedures and standards have been observed; (4) give a separate organization the task of auditing these 
records to check whether the rules, procedures, and standards have been followed; and (5) if the failures or 
discrepancies are discovered, the actors may be punished.
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expectations of the citizenry. Therefore, accountability for performance should mean 
accountability to the entire citizenry, or in other words, downward accountability (Behn, 
2001: 10).
The above discussion suggests that downward accountability of the public body in 
democratic systems can be characterized by the extent to which the expectation of the 
constituents is satisfied. As this expectation may be contextual and vary over time, an 
effective way for the public body to meet the citizenry’s expectation is to involve them into 
its decision-making process. Therefore, downward accountability of the public body can be 
measured through its efforts in facilitating people’s participation in public decision-making 
and the implementation of these decisions.
How the Downward Accountability is Ensured
Accountability of the public actors is enforced by the accountability mechanisms. 
The importance of these mechanisms is reflected in Goetz and Jenkins’s (2002: 6) 
definition of accountability which claims that the meaning of this concept involved not only 
the capacity to demand answerability but also the capacity to impose sanction. This 
suggests that in analyzing the accountability of an actor, we should be concerned ‘not only 
with missing links but also with overloaded or ineffective ones' (Day and Klein, 1987: 22). 
Accountability mechanisms not only require the public bodies to face the consequences of 
their decisions but also give the sanctioning power to those most affected by the decisions -  
the constituents (Beutz, 2003: 402). The ability of the constituents to sanction the leaders 
creates a strong incentive for responsible and responsive decision making. This ability is 
important because the governmental response to the people’s needs often depends on the 
pressure that is put on the government. These mechanisms make the decision makers 
respond effectively to the demands and needs of the grassroots people. The assessment of
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the effectiveness of a downward accountability mechanism relies on an institutional 
analysis. Beutz (2003: 406) sees the effectiveness of an accountability relation as an 
institutional issue: ‘[accountability relation] can be understood as an institutional 
arrangement in which individuals affected by decisions have the power to hold the 
decision-makers responsible for their actions’ (p.406). In short, a relation can be seen 
downwardly accountable if the governed can effectively sanction the rulers14.
Although realizing that the measurement of downward accountability is non- 
exhaustive and context-specific, Beutz (2003: 409) proposes three themes that the 
assessment of an accountability relation can based on. First is the institutional ability of 
constituent of sanctioning leaders. This involves the following questions: Do the 
constituents have the power to sanction the leaders? Are decision-makers who cannot be 
sanctioned accountable to the constituents? Are the sanctions severe enough to provide a 
deterrent effect? Are the constituents given the power to sanction but then punished for its 
use? Second is the actual ability to sanction and the corresponding willingness to sanction, 
which involved the questions as follows: Are the constituents informed about the leader’s 
decision? Are they interested in the decisions? Do the constituents hold sufficient 
sanctioning power to ensure that their voice is heard? How do they exercise power 
(individually or collectively)? Third, is the extent to which the public body is responsive to 
the constituents, that is to what extent is the sanctioning power of constituents been 
internalized by decision-makers. The above themes provide a useful guideline for analyzing
14 John Dunn (cited by Beutz, 2003: 407) proposes four criteria for a relation being seen downwardly 
accountable: persons exercising decentralized powers are liable for their actions in exercising those powers; 
persons exercising decentralized powers are predictably identifiable as agents in the exercise of these powers 
to those to whom they are liable; persons exercising decentralized powers are effectively sanctionable for 
those acts once performed, and persons exercising decentralized powers are knowably so sanctionable for 
them in advance’
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and assessing downward accountability in this study.
In summary, accountability can be conceptualized as a power relationship. In 
democratic systems, downward accountability of the public body is enforced through 
accountability relations, and directly affects the citizen’s empowerment. Downward 
accountability of a public body may be measured through the efforts of this body to 
facilitate people’s participation in public decision-making and the implementation of these 
decisions. The next section discusses a framework for analyzing decentralization systems.
3.4.3. A Framework for Analyzing Decentralization Systems
Decentralization is usually involved the transfer of powers in three dimensions:
fiscal, administrative and democratic, as argued by Manor (1999: 7): ‘if it is to have 
significant promise, decentralization must entail a mixture of all three types: democratic, 
fiscal, and administrative’. However, this complex framework does not allow for an easy 
systematic analysis of the effectiveness or extent of decentralized efforts. This study relies 
on Agrawal and Ribot’s (1999: 474-479) framework for analyzing the extent to which 
decentralization has actually taken place in the CDD programs and any shortcomings of 
this approach. This framework suggests three dimensions underlying any act of 
decentralization namely, the powers of various actors, the domains in which they exercise 
powers, and to whom and how they are accountable. Hereunder, three perspectives of the 
framework are discussed.
Actors in Decentralization
The actors in the local arena may include appointed or elected officials, local
NGOs, powerful individuals, or corporate bodies such as cooperatives, communities, and
committees. Each of these actors is located in particular relations of accountability with
certain types of power. These accountability relations depend on the constitution of powers
of each actor, which can be based on ideology, wealth, election, appointment or other
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means (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 476). Actors may be differentiated from each other by 
their beliefs and objectives; internal structure of their organization; membership base; 
funding sources; and the laws to which they are subject to. Because the dealings of a 
particular actor are impelled by their interest, it is likely that the same types of power 
devolved to different actors will lead to different outcomes. As a result, the nature of 
decentralization significantly depends on who exercise power, and the accountability 
relationships of which they are subject (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 476).
Type o f Power
This frame work classifies decision making powers in decentralization systems 
into four broad types of powers of decision-making (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 476-477). 
The first power is to create rules or modify old ones. Power to ‘create new rules’ allows 
decentralized actors to legislate principles that structure decisions and actions concerning 
the opportunity, how, and to what extent ones can gain benefit from a given resource 
(Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 476). Further is the power to make decisions about resources 
allocation. It increases autonomy, a form of discretionary authority, of the decentralized 
actor. Next is the power to implement and ensure compliance to the new and altered rules. 
It implies the power to execute and monitor whether actors are carrying out the roles they 
are supposed to perform, and also includes the power to impose sanctions and enforce 
them. Finally, the power to adjudicate disputes that arise in the effort to create rules and 
ensure compliance is important whenever new rules are created as contests and negotiations 
will require adjudication. Two important aspects of adjudication are accessibility and 
independence; that is people who are influenced by devolved power should have access to 
channels of adjudication and these channels should be independent from the power holders. 
If any of these decision-making powers change at the lower levels of the political- 
administrative hierarchy then we can say decentralization has occurred (p.477).
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Accountability Re l at ions
The transfer of power to lower-level actors is a defining feature of decentralization. 
The effectiveness of decentralization hinges on the accountability of the actor holding 
decentralized powers. To understand the accountability of the local actor, it is necessary to 
examine the relations of accountability existing between the actors (Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999: 478). In devolution, as decision-making powers are devolved to the local actor on 
behalf of the constituents, the relations holding such actors downwardly accountable to 
their constituencies are of importance.
There are many ways to hold the local government downwardly accountable to their 
constituencies. While the most common ways are through electoral processes, other 
effective mechanisms include: procedures for recall; referenda; monitoring by media and 
NGOs; auditing and evaluation; public reporting by government; community education; the 
embeddedness of leaders in communities; the change of beliefs system of leader and 
community; performance awards; social movements; and government oversight of lower 
level of government (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 479).
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter has raised two important points regarding the effectiveness of the CDD 
as a mechanism for empowering the poor. The empowerment of the poor in the CDD 
approach can be characterized by the creation of ‘political capabilities’ for the poor which 
is mainly relied on and affected by three underlying processes: poverty targeting, 
participatory decision-making, and strengthening local organizations. However, all these 
three processes have limitations which, if not properly managed, may affect the 
empowerment outcomes. This suggests that to understand the empowerment of the poor in 
the CDD approach, examining these underlying processes of this approach is essential. 
Second, as the CDD is basically a democratic decentralization system, its effectiveness is
69
determined by the downward accountability of the local government -  the actor in charge 
of supporting the performance of local communities. Therefore, downward accountability 
of the local government is likely to have significant impacts on the performance of this 
development approach.
The next chapter establishes the context of poverty alleviation and the CDD 
approach in Vietnam. Initially, the chapter outlines the overview of poverty reduction in 
Vietnam and introduces the CPRGS. Further, it discusses the institutional context of 
Vietnamese village communities that provides the basis for an understanding of the 
implementation of the CDD approach in Vietnam. Finally, the key characteristics of the 
Chiase CDD program are presented.
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Chapter Four: Context of the CDD Approach in Vietnam
4.1. Introduction
The previous chapters review the literature on the notion of empowerment and 
key characteristics of the CDD approach as an empowerment mechanism which inform the 
theoretical basis for analyzing the effectiveness of the Chiase program in empowering the 
poor people. This chapter will examine the context of the CDD approach in Vietnam 
generally, and the Chiase program particularly. Specifically, four themes being discussed in 
this chapter include: the situation of poverty alleviation and inequality in Vietnam; the key 
contents of the Comprehensive Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (CPRGS), which 
relies on the CDD as a key approach to poverty alleviation at local level; the context of the 
CDD approach in Vietnam; and the profile of the Chiase program as well as an analysis of 
its decentralization system.
While economic growth has achieved remarkable success in Vietnam, some issues 
of poverty and inequality have also been experienced. Since the 1990s, poverty reduction 
has become a central concern of the government as well as many international agencies. 
However, while the achievements in economic growth and overall poverty reduction were 
encouraging, by the turn of the 21st century, inequality appeared as a pressing problem that 
may affect economic growth as well as the socio-economic stability of the country (Vo and 
Pham, 2004: 83). This chapter finds that inequality increased in multiple relations: between 
the rich and the poor, between rural and urban areas, between regions, between 
occupations, and between ethnic groups.
To cope with the problems, in 2002 the government of Vietnam issued the 
Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy which rest on fours pillars: 'pro-
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poor’ economic growth; empowerment of the poor through decentralization; human 
resource and environmental development; and social protection for vulnerable groups. The 
Vietnamese government’s empowerment approach to poverty reduction prescribes a radical 
change in the design and implementation of poverty reduction programs to have a strong 
focus on people’s empowerment in the economic and political spheres (Government of 
Vietnam, 2002: 63). This approach was characterized by the devolution of control over 
decision-making and resources to the local community in order to empower the poor and 
enhance local governance. The Chiase program -  the focus of this study -  is an example of 
this empowerment approach to poverty reduction.
Acknowledging the contextual nature of the CDD approach (Mansuri and Rao, 
2004: 30), this Chapter attempts to examine the existing socio-economic and institutional 
context of the CDD approach in Vietnam with the emphases being placed on the social 
stratification, community autonomy, and people’s participation in local decision-making. 
Finally, key characteristics of the Chiase program, including goals, vision, principles, 
organizational structure, planning and management procedures, are discussed and the 
decentralization system in this program is analyzed.
4.2. Poverty and Inequality in Vietnam in Early 2000s
Following the reunification of the country in 1975 until the mid 1980s, Vietnam
was one of the poorest countries in the world. The country’s per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 1985 was estimated to be 130USD per year making it ‘one of the World’s 
five poorest countries’b (Glewwe, 2004: 1). About seven out of every ten Vietnamese 
people were living in poverty (World Bank. 1999: ii). The national economy was stagnant,
15 This assessment may be misleading as it does not take in to account the social wages, i.e. the subsidization 
of health and education and other services provided by the State. For example, according to Kerkvliet and 
Porter (1995: 17), the costs of health care are often the single most important cause of chronic indebtedness 
for the bottom 15 percent of the population.
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agricultural production had low productivity, and was insufficient to feed the growing 
population, and the country was heavily dependant on subsidized imports of essential goods 
and industrial products from the Soviet Union. However, since the launch of economic 
Reform in the 1980s, and particularly the market-oriented reform of 1989, Vietnam has 
transformed itself into one of the successful economies in the world in terms of economic 
growth, poverty reduction and household welfare (Do et al., 2006: 13; Glewwe, 2004: 1; 
Vo and Pham, 2004: 63). Stable and high GDP growth rate, which was about 7.4 per cent 
(in the period 1995-2000) and 7.04 per cent (in the period 2001-2003), provided a strong 
basis for poverty reduction and the improvement of social welfare on a large scale (Vu, 
2004: 210).
Poverty data16, gathered through the Household Living Standard Survey, showed 
that Viet Nam had achieved remarkable success in poverty reduction over the 1990s. The 
incidence of absolute poverty as measured according to the Poverty Line based on the 
international standard substantially decreased over the period 1993-2002 (Do et al, 2006: 
19; Vo and Pham, 2004: 83). The poverty rate went down from 58.1 per cent 1993 to 28.9 
per cent 2002. The fact that the poverty incidence in 2002 was only approximately half of 
1993 levels represents an impressive success in poverty reduction if it is compared to a 
major United Nations’ Millennium Development Goal of halving extreme poverty over a 
longer period from 1990 to 201517 (Poverty Task Force, 2002: 31). If the depth of poverty 
is of concern, poverty reduction is also evident as the poverty
16 Details about the measurement of poverty in Vietnam are presented in Box 1.
17 The ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs) is a comprehensive agenda for reducing the poverty by 
2015 which includes eight goals, with a total of eighteen specific targets': Eradicate extreme poverty and 
hunger; Achieve universal primary education; Promote gender equality and empower women; Reduce child 
mortality; Improve maternal health; Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; Ensure environmental 
sustainability; Develop a global partnership for development.
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Box 4.1 Estimating Poverty in Vietnam
There have been two approaches to the measurement of poverty in Vietnam: one was 
calculated by the GSO which is often referred to as the international poverty line, and the other 
was calculated by MOLISA which is often referred to as the national poverty line. Both poverty 
lines are explicitly acknowledged in the “CPRGS’ which was approved in May 21, 2002.
The international poverty line is based on the Viet Nam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) 
undertaken by the GSO with support from international development agencies. This poverty line 
includes the minimum consumption level of both food (70%) and non-food items (30%) and is 
determined by a two-step procedure. The first step is to establish the price of a Vietnamese basket 
of food items deemed to be necessary for good nutritional status. This is estimated internationally 
at an average of 2100 calories per person per day. The actual consumption of the third quintile 
(the sample households were equally divided into five quintiles according to their per capital 
consumption expenditures) was closest to this level of minimum food intake. The second step is 
to add the costs of the non-food items, which were then derived from the actual levels of the 
consumption of non-food items of the third quintile. The general international poverty line 
amounts to the equivalent of US$109 and US$127 per capita per year in 1993 and 2002 
respectively.
The poverty lines used by MOLISA are more in the nature of a relative poverty line. 
Their level tends to be influenced by the amount of resources that MOLISA has available for 
special assistance programs for the poor. MOLISA surveys poor households at the commune 
level and is able to produce a detailed picture of where the poor live and what their needs are. The 
national poverty line in the period 2001-2005 is: VND 960 000 per year in rural mountainous and 
island regions; VND 1.2 million per year in rural plain areas; and VND 1.8 million per year in 
urban areas. The national poverty line in the period 2006-2008 is: VND 2.4 million per year in 
rural areas; and VND 3.0 million per year in urban areas.
Source: National Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities, 2001; Decision 
170/2005/QD-TTg; Decision 143/2001/QD-TTg.
18index gap of the poor decreased sharply from 19 per cent in 1993 to 7 per cent in 2002. 
This indicator shows that not only the proportion of poor people decreased but also their 
consumption shortfall relative to the poverty line also did.
18 Poverty index gap reflects the distance between the average consumption expenditures of people living 
below the poverty line and the poverty line itself.
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The Household Living Standard Surveys also showed a significant improvement 
during this period in non-income indicators such as: education enrolment rates, life 
expectancy, health insurance coverage, access to electricity, clean water, sanitation and the 
possession of durable goods (see table 4.1). Enrolment rates impressively increased for all 
levels of education. The enrolment rate for upper secondary school was doubled between 
1998 and 2002 from 29 per cent to 42 per cent. Over the same period, the rate for lower 
secondary school rose from 62 per cent to 72 per cent. The primary school enrolment rate 
already high in 1993 with 87 per cent continued to increase to 90 per cent in 2002. Life 
expectancy at birth also increased to 71.3 years in 2002. The coverage of health care 
insurance, the percentage of households who have health insurance or free health care cards 
almost doubled in four years: from 16 per cent in 1998 to approximately 31 per cent in 
2002. Access to electricity, clean water and sanitation all showed a marked improvement. 
The percentage of households having access to electricity doubled between 1993 and 2002 
with 49 per cent and 87 per cent of population respectively. The percentage of population 
with access to clean water almost doubled during the same period, rising from 26 per cent 
in 1993 to 49 per cent in 2002. Improvement was also evident in access to sanitation with 
the increases of the percentage of population with access to hygienic latrines from 10 per 
cent in 1993 to 25 per cent in 2002. Data on the possession of durable goods such as 
televisions and motorbikes also showed a substantial improvement. The percentage of 
households owning a television set rose significantly from 22 per cent in 1993 to 78 per 
cent in 2004 while the percentage of households possessing a motorcycle climbed from 7 
per cent to 45 per cent during this period (Do et al., 2006: 24; Vu, 2004: 210).
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Table 4.1: Selected Social Indicators in 1993-2004 Period
Non-Income Indicators 1993 1998 2002
Education and Healthcare
P r im a r y  e n r o l m e n t  R a te 87 91 9 0
L o w e r  S e c o n d a r y  E n r o l lm e n t 30 62 72
U p p e r  S e c o n d a r y  E n r o l lm e n t - 2 9 4 2
%  o f  p o p u la t io n  w i th  H e a l th  in s u r a n c e  o r  f ree  
H e a l th c a r e  c a rd
- 16 30
Access to infrastructure
%  p o p u la t io n  l iv in g  in c o m m u n e  h a v i n g  c l in ic 93 9 7 9 9
%  p o p u la t io n  u s in g  e l e c t r i c i t y  a s  a  m a in  s o u r c e  o f  
l ig h t in g
4 9 78 87
%  p o p u la t io n  w i th  a c c e s s  to  c l e a n  w a te r 26 41 4 9
%  p o p u la t io n  h a v i n g  a c c e s s  to  h y g ie n ic  la t r in e 10 17 25
Possession of durable goods
%  o f  p o p u la t io n  o w n i n g  a t e l e v i s io n  se t 22 56 68
%  o f  p o p u la t io n  o w n i n g  a  m o to r b ik e 1 1 20 4 0
Source: Do Hoai Nam et al. (2006: 24).
Although Vietnam had achieved overall success in economic growth and social 
development, by the turn of this century, poverty was still arguably a central issue facing 
the country in medium terms of both absolute poverty and growing disparity between the 
rich and poor. In 2002, about a little less than one third of the population was still living in 
poverty. Moreover, a large component of Vietnam’s population was just above poverty 
line, which means that a social or natural shock can considerably increase the number of 
poor people indicating a high level of vulnerability (Vo and Pham, 2004: 83). Although 
non-income development indicators, like the education enrolment rates, health insurance 
coverage or the percentage of communes with clinic, show impressive progress, the quality 
of public services, especially education and health care, has been a frequent topic in public 
debate including in sessions of the National Assembly (Do et al., 2006: 22).
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However, despite this strong story on poverty, inequality increased in many aspects 
of Vietnam society over the period 1993-2002. This was reflected in the rising disparity 
between the richest and the poorest groups, between rural and urban areas, between 
economic regions, and between ethnic groups (see Table 4.2). With the gap between rich 
and poor, the ratio between per capita expenditure of the 20 per cent richest and that of the 
20 per cent poorest substantially increased from 4.6 in 1993 up to 6 in 2002 (Vo and Pham, 
2004: 84), and the Gini coefficient went up ten per cent from 0.33 to 0.37 between 1993 
and 2002 indicating that the income gap between the rich and the poor was widened14 (Vo 
and Pham, 2004: 84).
With regard to the rural-urban disparity (see Table 4.2), the ratio of urban to rural 
per capita expenditures increased from 1.91 in 1993 to 2.35 in 2002 (Do et al., 2006: 30). 
Poverty was further concentrated in rural areas during the 1990s with about 95 per cent of 
Vietnam’s poor living in rural areas in 2002 as compared to 90 per cent in 1998 (Vo and 
Pham, 2004: 83). Poverty reduction in urban areas is much more substantial than that in 
rural areas, with urban poverty rate reduced by 75 per cent from 25.1 per cent to 6.6 per 
cent in 1993-2002 while in the same period rural poverty rate decreased by only half from 
66.4 per cent to 35.6 per cent. In 1993, the ratio between the poverty rate in rural areas and 
that of urban areas was about 2.6. In 2002, this ratio went up to 5.4 indicating a much lower 
rate of poverty reduction in rural area (See Table 4.2). The high poverty rate in rural areas 
was mainly attributable to the dominance of agriculture as the primary occupation in this 
sector. Farming in rural Vietnam was lowly-diversified, vulnerable to natural calamities 
and therefore tended to be less productive as compared to off-farm employment. Further, as
19 However, it is noteworthy that the Gini coefficient of Vietnam is just a bit larger than those of the countries 
having a similar level of Purchasing Parity Power-based per capita income with Vietnam such as Indonesia 
and Pakistan with the coefficients of 0.34 and 0.3 I respectively (Do et a l 2006: 25).
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the level of rural industrialization in Vietnam was relatively low, the opportunity for off-
farm income in rural areas was very limited (Steffanie and Truong, 2004: 112).
Tabic 4.2: Poverty Incidence by Regions and Ethnie Groups
Area 1993 2002
W h o l e  C o u n t r y 58.1 % 2 8 .9  %
U rb a n 25.1 % 6 .6  %
R u ra l 6 6 .4  % 3 5 . 6 %
R e g i o n
N o r t h e r n  U p l a n d s 7 8 .6  % 4 3 . 9 %
R e d  R i v e r  D e l ta 6 2 .9  % 2 2 .4  %
N o r t h  C e n t r a l  C o a s t 7 4 .5  % 4 3 . 9 %
S o u th  C e n t r a l  C o a s t 4 9 .5  % 2 5 . 2 %
C e n t r a l  H ig h la n d 6 9 .9  % 5 1 . 8 %
S o u th e a s t 3 2 .7  % 10.6 %
M e k o n g  R iv e r  D e l ta 47.1 % 2 3 . 4 %
E t h n i c i t y
K in h  a n d  C h i n e s e 5 3 . 9 % 2 3 4  %
O t h e r  m in o r i t y  g r o u p s 8 6 .4  % 6 9 .3  %
Source: Adapted from Vo Tri Thanh and Pham Hoang Ha (2004:83).
Inequality was also observed between seven economic regions of Vietnam (see 
Table 4.2). In 1993, the three poorest regions were North Mountainous, North Central 
Coast and Central Highland with poverty incidences of 78.6 per cent, 74.5 per cent and 
69.9 per cent respectively. In 2002 these three regions still had the highest poverty incident 
with 43.9 per cent, 43.9 per cent and 51.8 per cent respectively. The most well-off region is 
Southeast with a poverty incidence of 32.7 per cent in 1993 and 10.6 per cent in 2002. In 
addition, this region contributed 42 per cent to the top expenditure quintile (Steffanie and 
Truong, 2004: 104). In terms of poverty reduction achievements, the best performer was the 
Red River Delta region whose poverty incidence decreased by 40.5 percentage points
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during the period from 1993 to 2002 while the lowest poverty reduction rate was 18.1 
percentage points experienced by the Central Highland. The rate of poverty incidence was 
lowest for lowland regions with big economic centers, relatively developed physical and 
social infrastructure, better human resources and greater number of off-farm income 
generation opportunities like Southeast and Red River Delta. As the table indicated, the 
poverty rate was highest for highland and mountainous regions, with inadequate 
infrastructure, poor human resources, lack of access to marketing channels and limited off- 
farm income-generation opportunities, such as North Mountainous, North Central Coast 
and Central Highland.
Parallel to regional differentiation is the differentiation based on ethnicity (Steffanie 
and Truong, 2004: 109-110). While the Kinh and Chinese reside in the lowland area, 
mainly in Red River Delta and Southeast regions, most other ethnic minorities reside in 
Northern Upland and Central Highland with the exception of only Khmer and Cham. The 
poverty incidence of Kinh or Chinese ethnic group was much lower than that of other 
ethnic minority groups while the poverty reduction rate in Kinh and Chinese groups was far 
higher than that of the other groups. In 1993, more than four-fifths of households belonging 
to the ethnic minority group were poor as compared to about half of households belonging 
to Kinh and Chinese ethnic groups. In 2002, the situation was replicated with poverty 
incidence of 23.1 per cent for Kinh and Chinese ethnic groups and 69.3 per cent for other 
minority group. Over this nine-year period, while poverty incidence of Kinh and Chinese 
ethnic group decreased by more than half from 53.9 per cent to 23.1 per cent, that of other 
ethnic minority groups decreased only by about one-fifth, from 86.4 per cent to 69.3 per 
cent (see Table 4.2).
What appears from the above statistics is that along with the impressive economic
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growth and overall poverty reduction at a national scale, poverty has been concentrated in 
rural, remote, and mountainous areas. Within these areas, the poverty incidence was even 
more acute for ethnic minority groups and those people solely relying on farming 
employment. The persistence of poverty can be attributed to a range of interrelated 
problems: inadequate infrastructure, lack of investment and economic activities, lack of 
employment, and low level of human resources (Vu, 2004: 215). The key point that 
emerges is that although the shortcomings of a market-based economy were thoroughly 
recognized by the government of Vietnam, state intervention is not effective enough to 
tackle them. This raises the importance of devising a more effective poverty strategy for the 
country. The information about poverty reduction effort of Vietnam government in the 
1990s and the introduction of the CPRGS is presented in the next section.
4.3. Poverty Reduction in Vietnam
Since the 1990s, when the market-oriented economy has resulted in the growing 
disparity between different sections of population, reducing poverty and inequality has 
become the central concerns of development partners in Vietnam including the government, 
Multilateral Organizations, and NGOs. Initially, the government of Vietnam tackled 
poverty and inequality by launching targeted poverty reduction programs. Vietnam’s 
poverty reduction interventions comprised two separated groups of programs: Hunger 
Eradication and Poverty Reduction (HEPR) Program and Program for Socio-Economic 
Development in Communes Faced with Extreme Difficulties which is normally abbreviated 
as Program 135.
HEPR was institutionalized as a component of Vietnam’s national development 
policy at the 8th National Congress of Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) in 1996. In 1998, 
HEPR was set up as a national targeted program with the objective to eliminate chronic 
hunger and reduce poverty incidence. Later, the program's objective was extended to cover
80
employment creation. The HEPR program comprised six policies and eight sub-programs. 
The six policies dealt with the support given to the poor people in terms of: free healthcare, 
school tuition waiver, support for ethnic minorities, support for vulnerable people, funding 
for housing and funding for production tools. Then there were eight sub-programs that dealt 
with credit provision, agriculture extension, infrastructure, production assistance, training 
of local officials, settlement of migrants into new economic zone, sedentarization and 
settlement in poor communes, and model for replication. Program 135 was approved by 
Prime Minister and launched in 1998, and in 2000, the HEPR’s component of 
‘Sedentarization1 and ‘Support for ethnic minorities’ were integrated into Program 135. 
Now it comprises 5 sub-programs: commune’s infrastructure development, inter-commune 
centers infrastructure development, resettlement, agriculture and forestry extension, and 
training for commune staff in remote and mountainous areas, and targets only 
disadvantaged remote and mountainous areas.
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, it appeared from the data of Household Living 
Standard Surveys that although socio-economic development achievements of Renovation 
[Doi moi] were impressive, inequality increased in Vietnam. With the support of World 
Bank and other international donors, the CPRGS was formulated and came into force in 
2002. This is a set of policies that center on four key approaches to poverty reduction:
• promoting a sustainable pro-poor economic growth;
• facilitating empowerment of the poor people by ensuring people’s basic 
needs and promoting good governance through decentralization and 
people’s participation;
20 The key contents of the CPRGS are presented in Appendix 5.
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• enhancing human capital and reduce inequality through improvement in 
access to and quality of healthcare and education, environmental protection, 
disease prevention, gender equality, and the life of ethnic minorities; and
• establishing ‘social safety nets’ or ‘social protection measures’ for those 
marginal to or adversely affected by adjustment processes.
The approaches to poverty reduction at local level of the CPRGS are detailed in 
Box 4.2.
What emerged from the guiding principles of the CPRGS is the central role of the 
empowerment of the poor which is facilitated through improved people’s access to basic 
needs and participation in local decision-making, strengthened local organizations and 
enhanced transparency and responsiveness of the local government. The above 
characteristics of the poverty reduction strategy at local level of the CPRGS feature a CDD 
approach being widely advocated by international development agencies (see Chapter 3). 
The next sections examine the socio-economic and institutional characteristics of rural 
communities in Vietnam in order to provide background for an understanding of the 
implementation of the CDD approach in this country.
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Box 4.2: Approaches to Poverty Reduction at Local Level of the CPRGS
Improve the quality of life for all with respect of food, clothing, housing, transportation, 
health, training, work, access to information ... (Government of Vietnam, 2002: 62).
Ensure the transparency of the local budget; define clearly the process for preparing the 
budget and for allocating expenditures in each sector in order to make sure a pro-poor approach is 
adopted (Government of Vietnam, 2002: 53).
Develop a legal framework for civil society and community organizations at the local 
level to improve the participation of the poor in the development process and improve their 
capacity to get rid of poverty (Government of Vietnam, 2002: 62).
Pay a particular attention to improving gender equity, the advancement of women and the 
development of children.... (Government of Vietnam, 2002: 62).
Promote the participation of the people, including the poor, in the policy planning and 
policy implementation by advancing the application of the Grassroots Democracy Decree at the 
district and commune levels (Government of Vietnam, 2002: 62).
Ensure that people will be given adequate information about economic activities, plan 
targets, and financial resources for development projects and programs in their localities; they are 
entitled to comment on and contribute to the development of these projects and programs, to take 
part in their implementation, operation, and maintenance, to contribute their labor to these 
projects and programs, and to express their role as the owners of those projects and programs 
with a view to increasing their responsibilities in utilizing and managing infrastructure projects 
(Government of Vietnam, 2002: 63).
Carry out mechanism to enable communication officers to deliver information in 
education, technological training, marketing, state policies and regulations and administrative 
procedures in order to empower local people politically and economically, taking into account the 
roles of tribal heads in remote areas. Make sure grassroots democracy rules are applied to national 
targeted programs such as Program 135 and others (Government of Vietnam, 2002: 63).
In developing participatory mechanisms, attention must be given to vulnerable groups 
like elderly, women, disabled and ethnic minority people. It is necessary to take into 
consideration the specific work and aspiration of both men and women, so that all members of the 
community can voice their opinions and priorities easily (Government of Vietnam, 2002: 63).
Source: Government o f Vietnam, 2002.
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4.4. Socio-Economic and Institutional Context of the CDD Approach in Vietnam
This section examines the socio-economic and institutional context of the CDD
approach in Vietnam. Given the contextual nature of the CDD approach, this discussion is 
important for the analysis of the effectiveness of this approach to poverty reduction, being 
advocated by the CPRGS of the country. The discussion focuses on the key themes which 
have important implications for the democratic decentralization nature of this development 
approach: social stratification, community autonomy and people’s participation in local 
decision-makingin Vietnamese villages. The discussion covers two historical periods: the 
Collectivization , lasting from the division of the country in 1954 up to early 1980s, and 
the Renovation, from the issuance of liberalization policies in 1980s onward.
4.4.1. Social Stratification
Following the defeat of the French in Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Vietnam was divided 
into two parts at the 17lh latitude. Northern Vietnam -  the Democratic Republic of Vietnam 
— was under the leadership of the Vietnamese Communist Party. In response to the highly- 
concentrated land holding throughout Northern Vietnam, land reform was carried out soon 
after the achievement of national independence. Land from the landlords and rich farmers 
was confiscated and redistributed to poor and landless peasants. This reflected a strong 
commitment of the government in adapting socialism, dismantling exploitative class 
structure and supporting poor peasants (Bhaduri, 1982: 34).
However, the private ownership of land was brief with collectivized farming being 
carried out in Northern Vietnam from the late 1950s and throughout the country as a whole 
from 1975 until the 1980s (Bhaduri, 1982: 35-38; Kerkvliet, 1995: 68). Under the
21 The Collectivization had been initiated in Northern Vietnam since the division of the country in 1954 and 
expanded to the whole country since the reunification of the country in 1975.
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collectivized farming, the peasant households pooled their paddy field, draught animals, 
and labor and worked together to raise crops and livestock. Only five per cent of the 
cooperative’s land was set for private use. The independent role of the household was 
replaced by the new structure of cooperatives and production brigades. The villagers were 
organized into production brigades which made up the cooperatives. The cooperatives were 
often managed by a committee typically led by Communist Party members (Kerkvliet, 
2003: 40). Initially, the cooperatives were rather small in scale, covering households in a 
single village but the size of cooperatives grew quickly to incorporate several villages 
enabling them to adopt large-scale specialized production and the use of modern 
technologies. The members of cooperatives were paid in rice and other faming products 
according to formulas which took into consideration the amount and quality of work the 
person did, the need to assure everyone had enough to eat, and the need to prevent large 
inequalities in living standard (Kervliet, 2003: 40). By the end of the 1960s, the 
cooperatives were established throughout the Northern Vietnam covering about 76 per cent 
of total paddy field and 86 per cent of total number of households (Ha, 1997: 103).
Following an initial success in the early 1960s when the cooperatives were small 
and mainly organized among extended families and close neighbors (Kerkvliet, 1995: 68), 
collectivization policies faced many complaints and opposition from the villagers. During 
the American war, the opposition was unobtrusive, perhaps because people largely believed 
that collectivized production was the most suitable system for the war efforts, and people 
tried as best as possible to achieve the sacred goal: liberation of the country. However, the 
post-war period experienced considerable objection of villagers on a large scale. Evidence 
of villagers’ objections was reflected through the poor performance of farming practices: 
land was left unplanted, animals and tools were not well cared for; and the low productive
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yield in cooperative land which was less than half of that in private plots. It was common 
that everybody tried to ‘gain as many work points as possible with a minimum amount of 
labor’ (Kerkvliet, 1995: 69). By the 1970s, many farmers derived about 60-70 per cent of 
their actual income from their privately tended land which occupied just about 5 per cent of 
total paddy fields. Many cooperatives contracted selected parts of cooperative production to 
the households, often referred as ‘sneaky contracts’. As long as the production improved, 
the local authorities ‘turned a blind eye or even encouraged’ these modifications (Kerkvliet, 
1995: 69).
During this period of time, while people’s income from the agricultural sector was 
relatively equal, the rural population was to a considerable extent differentiated in political 
terms (Tran, 2004a: 136). The differentiation was reflected through the power that the local 
authorities possessed in relation to the ordinary people. Given the dominant role of the 
cooperative, mass organization, local government and party in managing aspects of people 
lives, the unequal power relations between local officials and peasants were apparent (Tran 
and Nguyen, 1995: 210). In a study of a village in Northern Vietnam, Tran (2004a: 137) 
found that the control of the cooperative over subsistence activities, on which the villagers 
depended for their welfare, created favorable conditions for the abuse of power by officials. 
Through either privileges or corruption, the officials were able to benefit from the co­
operative system. As a result, the leaders of grass-roots-level political organizations formed 
the most powerful group in the villages in this period of time (Tran,2004a: 137).
Later on, the rising opposition to Collectivization in late 1970s provoked a 
fundamental change not only about the management of agricultural production, but also 
about the idea of centrally planned and controlled economy. Initially, a series of decisions 
by the Party and government were issued between 1979 and 1981 to legitimize individual
86
household’s farming (Kerkvliet, 1995: 70), of which, the most important was the Directive 
100/CT/TW of the Party’s Central Committee. This allowed cooperatives to assign unused 
land to individual household through ‘production contract’ [khoan san pham]. Although 
Directive 100/CT/TW merely legalized the practices that had been done in villages, it 
marked an important step toward the economic liberalization -  a key content of 
‘Renovation’ (Tran, 2004a: 139). Further, in 1986, the Vietnamese authorities launched the 
‘Renovation’ policy at the sixth National Congress of Communist Party legalizing the 
market economy in Vietnam in which private entrepreneurship was to be encouraged and 
private ownership of means of production was accepted. Then in 1988, the Party’s Central 
Committee issued the Resolution No. 10 which legitimized household contracts [khoan ho], 
allowed the cooperatives to distribute land to households for the term of fifteen years, while 
retaining the right to adjust land holding when demographic changes required. From that 
time on, households were free to decide on the procurement, production and marketing of 
their products while the cooperative’s responsibilities were limited to selected tasks like 
irrigation maintenance, allocation of land or collection of tax (Kleinen J., 1999: 110; Tran, 
2004a: 139).
The Renovation was further promoted in 1990s to facilitate the development of the 
market economy. Most notable were the implementation of Land law and grassroots 
democratization legislation. In 1993, the Land law was issued as a further step to economic 
liberalization. This law recognized the rights of households to sell, exchange, transfer, 
lease, inherit, and mortgage their land. This change was seen as ‘the most radical and 
determined step toward establishing private land-use rights’ (Hayami, 1994: 9). The 
acknowledgement of land use rights marked an important shift of Vietnam society from a 
centrally-planned system into a market economy.
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While the issuance of Land law led to strong economic diversification and 
development, in certain areas, it also contributed to land concentration and thus social and 
economic differentiation (Nguyen, 2004: 271-272).
In 1997, resentment over of the local officials' corruption and abuse of power burst 
into social unrest and uprisings in some provinces (Kerkvliet, 2004: 17). In response to the 
problem, Vietnamese authorities implemented a series of grassroots democracy policies, 
which basically aimed to improve the accountability of local government, particularly at the 
commune level through involving people in the decision-making, implementation and 
monitoring of local development activities. By its nature, it represented what could be 
called a CDD approach in that it involved the devolution of control and people’s 
participation in local decision-making. The issuance of Grassroots democratization 
legislation had resulted in a series of significant changes in the local institutions, 
particularly the state-village relations (Hoang, 2007: 131; Kerkvliet, 2004: 17; Mattner, 
2004: 122).
The Renovation policies, while giving people more freedom to develop their 
household’s economies, created social differentiation on a large scale (Kleinen J., 1999: 
155; Tran, 2004a: 140), characterized by two features: equality in agriculture sector was 
mainly attributed to the relatively equal distribution of land (Luong and Unger J., 1998: 
66); while the source of inequality mainly came from the off-farm sector, which included 
jobs in the government sector (Kerkvliet, 1997: 65; Luong and Unger J., 1998: 66) where 
political position and entrepreneurship enabled some households to take advantage of non­
farm activities (Luong and Unger J., 1998: 82). Households with political position, capital, 
skills and knowledge were more likely to succeed in taking advantage of opportunities 
created by the renovation process and left the resource-poor households far behind (Tran,
88
2004a: 158). Kleinen (1999: 151), in a study of a village in Northern Vietnam, found that 
this income differentiation significantly affected the local power relations. Extra wealth was 
used for maintaining good relationship with important officials, getting extra benefits from 
the fledgling ‘free’ market, and building the social networks in the village.
4.4.2, Community Autonomy and People’s participation in local decision-making
Under agricultural collectivization from 1958 until 1980s, former village
institutions were replaced by the structure of mass organizations, production brigades, 
cooperatives and local government under the leadership of the Commune Party Committee 
(Tran and Nguyen, 1995: 210). The autonomous role of the household economy was 
replaced by a new institution - the system of agriculture cooperative. The peasants were 
directly mobilized and controlled by the state bureaucracy, Communist Party, and various 
socio-political organizations under the Fatherland Front at local level (Kerkvliet, 2003: 40). 
The village was no longer an autonomous administrative entity as in past .
During this period, Vietnam adopted a centrally planned economy with a central 
bureaucracy allocating resources into what were seen as the priority areas of the national 
construction (Fforde and Vylder, 1996: 57). Development plans and projects at a grassroots 
level were planned and managed by higher-level authorities. At the local level, since the 
People’s Council and the Fatherland Front of the communes remained formalistic, the local 
government and cooperatives controlled most aspects of people lives and production. The
22 In the pre-colonial and colonial times, the village, particularly those in Northern Vietnam, was a relatively 
autonomous entity with powerful local institutions. The village Council of Notables served as the local court 
to adjudicate any disputes in the villages. The arbitration of disputes was done on the basis of village’s 
convention [huong uoc] which comprised a set of rules, procedures and customs that regulated social relations 
as well as people’s behaviors toward natural environment and resources, and collective action for disaster 
prevention and communal security (Bui, 2007:1 15-1 16; Gourou, 1955: 304; Shanks et al., 2003:25). This is 
reflected through such the adages as: ‘the law of the emperor stops at the village gate’ and ‘the mountains are 
high and the emperor is far’.
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cooperatives performed as ‘supplier of materials, managing money, and marketing produce’ 
and the role of the farmer in these matters was abolished (Tran and Nguyen, 1995: 210). In 
addition, mass organization, such as the Women’s Union and the Youth Union, also played 
a key role in managing people. All these organizations were under the management and 
supervision of commune-level Party Committee (Tran and Nguyen, 1995: 210). As a result, 
in this period people’s participation in local decision-making did not exist (To et al., 2003: 
90).
People’s participation in local decision-making was started to be institutionalized 
by the Article 6 in the 1992 Constitution, which specified that the principle guiding the 
people's participation in governance of state bureaucracy of different levels is ‘democratic 
centralism’. According to the Resolution of the Seventh Communist Party Congress, the 
‘centralism’ aspect rests on the party’s supervision of macroeconomic policies and actions 
to ensure their conformity to socialism principles. The ‘democratic’ aspect describes the 
freedom of individuals to participate in decisions through mechanisms of direct democracy, 
which are applied both to local communities and state agencies, and representative 
democracy though which elected representatives debate and reach consensus on matters of 
policy and direction. The ‘Democratic’ aspect also implies the power and responsibility 
devolved to local government authorities and sector agencies in the decision making 
process (Tran, 2004b: 140). In practice, ‘democratic centralism’ means while the lower 
administration levels might be consulted and invited to participate in policy formulation, 
the guiding rule is ‘the part submitting to the whole, the minority yielding to the majority, 
lower ranks obeying higher ranks, and localities obeying the center’ (Dixon, 2004: 17). 
Obviously, this rule makes the local authorities more attuned to the upper officials in the 
administrative apparatus than to the constituents below them (Me Elwee and Ly, 2006: 7).
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Up to the mid 1990s, the institutional structure at the local level -  province, district 
or commune — was comprised of local government and non-governmental organizations 
grouped under the umbrella of the Fatherland Front (National Constitution, 1992). Local 
government here consisted of institutions identified in Vietnam’s constitution as part of the 
political regime and responsible for implementing law and policies, including the Party 
Committee, the People’s Committee, and the People’s Council. While the Party Committee 
played the role of ‘the force leading the State and Society’, the People's Council and the 
People’s Committee were legislative and executive bodies respectively (Kerkvliet, 2004: 3- 
8; National Constitution, 1992). Local organizations included mass organizations and civic 
organizations (Vasavakul, 2006: 13) while the village was not recognized as an 
administrative level and did not have the People’s Council and the People’s Committee 
though village-level party cells and units of mass organizations existed.
The People’s Council at each level, as specified in 119th article 1992 Constitution, 
represents ‘the will, aspiration, and mastery’ of the local residents. In this sense, the 
People’s Council is a legislative body that makes decisions about all key matters within its 
jurisdiction and monitors the implementation of the People’s Committee, Court and 
Procurary. It is obliged to implement laws, policies, and resolutions of the councils at the 
upper levels and cannot issue resolutions and decisions that are contrary to the directions of 
higher levels. The members of the People’s Council are nominated by the Fatherland Front 
and directly elected by the local people through secret ballot. The chair of the People’s 
Council is often the secretary of the Party Committee at the same level and the Council 
maintains two accountability relationships: downwardly to its constituents and upwardly to 
the higher level councils (Kerkvliet, 2004: 7).
The People’s Committee is the executive arm of the People’s Council at that level
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and has the role of implementing decisions of the higher level committees. The People’s 
Committee also has a dual accountability relationship: horizontally to the People’s Council 
at the same level, and vertically to the People’s Committee at higher levels (Kerkvliet, 
2004: 7). For instance, the People’s Council's selection for chair and vice-chair of the 
People’s Committee in a commune must be approved by the District People’s Committee. 
The chair of the People’s Committee is often the prominent member of the Party committee 
at the same level, and has considerable power over lower level government. ‘The Chairman 
of the People's Committee can suspend or annul the wrong decisions of organs under the 
People's Committees and People's Councils of a lower rank; it can suspend wrong 
resolutions of People's Councils of a lower rank and at the same time propose to the 
People's Council at its own level to annul such resolutions’ (Article 124 National 
Constitution). People’s Committees are assisted by local offices of line agencies who are 
accountable to both the People’s Committee and the corresponding offices at higher level.
Local organizations, organized under the umbrella of the Fatherland Front, 
comprise of two groups: mass organizations and civic organizations. Fatherland Front and 
Mass organizations, roughly defined as organizations being established for the purpose of 
mobilizing mass population to support The Party’s policies, are considered an integral part 
of the political system. The mass organizations include: Vietnam Fatherland Front, 
Women's Union (WU), Farmers’ Association (FA), Youth Union and Veterans’ 
Association. Civic organizations consist of various types of groupings: union of 
associations, associations, issue-oriented organizations, and Community-based 
organizations. Overall, the civic organizations are more active in urban area and remain 
limited in rural area (Vasavakul, 2006: 13).
The reality of Vietnam in the 1990s highlighted the limitation of ‘democratic
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centralism’. This guiding principle failed to establish an accountable and transparent system 
of governance, especially at the commune level where the state-people interaction mainly 
takes place (Mattner, 2004: 123; Tran, 2004b: 141). The corruption and abuse of power by 
local officials caused rising resentment and discontent in the villages. The civil disturbance 
in Thaibinh province in 1997 was a well publicized example of corrupt local party members 
and officials (Mattner, 2004: 24). As this problem affected the legitimacy of the 
government and Communist Party, a change in local institutional setting appeared to 
become a pressing need (Tran, 2004b: 141).
Though many decentralization efforts were pursued in late 1990s, the system of 
governance remained relatively centralized. About 40 per cent of government expenditure 
was assigned to local levels, but it was primarily controlled by province level (Fritzen, 
2002: 22). The Provincial People’s Committee still controlled the ownership of land in the 
province, represented the State in enterprises with State participation, managed the 
establishment of units based on the guidelines for local line agencies, decided personnel 
issues of agencies under its authority, and ensured the training and re-training of district 
and commune officials. Only limited responsibilities were delegated to districts level, such 
as allowing them to organize their administrative services, and manage public services such 
as education, health care, sports and culture. However, decentralization had not reached the 
commune level. Communes did not raise their own revenue and mainly relied on the 
funding allocation from higher level government (Vasavakul, 2006: 10-11). It was 
commented by Fritzen (2006: 3) that the country still "does not at present have an 
overarching, consistent decentralization policy’ (p.3).
To improve the grassroots democracy and local governance, the government 
launched Decree 29/1998/ND_CP in 1998 and 79/2003/ND-CP in 2003 which promulgated
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a range of measures to promote ‘grassroots democracy’ mainly at commune's level. Among 
the most important objective of this strategy was ‘to make revenue, budgets and 
expenditure transparent and to enable citizens to oversee better local authorities’ activities’ 
(Kerkvliet, 2004: 17) or, in other words, to enhance the accountability of local governance. 
Grassroots democratization was intended to work through four mechanisms: the first 
mechanism being information sharing. Commune officials are obliged to provide adequate 
information about a range of issues, such as national laws and policies, commune 
development plans, the decisions of commune people’s councils as well as commune 
budgets, land use plans, results of investigations against corrupt officials, and the issues of 
people’s interest, to people. Information is to be disseminated in various forms including 
public meetings, written documents, public postings or public address systems.
The second mechanism refers to the work that must be directly approved by the 
people that include: public welfare works that require contributions from local residents; 
the raising and managing of funds; elaborating conventions, rules and order; and setting up 
boards to supervise construction projects. This decision-making can take place through 
public meetings or referendum^. However, if the Commune People’s Committee deems the 
majority decisions to be inconsistent with relevant laws, it can refer them to the District 
People’s Committee for review. The third mechanism is consultation. Many local initiatives 
are required to be consulted by the people before they are decided by the commune 
authorities. These initiatives include: the drafting of local development plans; land use 
plans; and plans on the implementation of national programs on health, water and 
environment; the compensation for ground clearance; and the nomination of candidates to 
stand for Commune People’s Council elections. The views of local residents are to be 
gathered through questionnaires, feedback boxes or public meetings. The last mechanism is
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supervision: local issues which are “to be supervised and inspected by the people”, include 
the commune budget, land management, results of investigations against corrupt officials 
and social services. This also applies to the general activities of the people’s committee and 
the implementation of its decisions. People’s supervision is carried out through the 
establishment of people’s inspection boards or through mass organizations. In addition, 
residents are entitled to make proposals and denunciation in accordance with the provision 
of law. People also are entitled to request local officials to clarify issues they suspect 
(Government of Vietnam, 1998: 2-7).
By issuing the grassroots democratization legislation, the government tried to 
enhance the democratic decentralization process at the grassroots level -  especially the 
commune level. The control over decision-making and monitoring of commune’s projects 
and issues were partly devolved to the villages aiming at enhancing local democracy and 
downward accountability of the local officials -  the power holders. Since participatory 
planning and information sharing is focused on the commune and village levels, the 
Commune People’s Committee leaders are the crucial implementers of the democracy 
legislation (Fritzen, 2003: 17).
To discuss the success of grassroots democratization legislation, this Chapter relies 
on Beutz’s (2003: 388) view of democracy, which holds that ‘the essential function of 
democracy is the creation and implementation of mechanisms that allow the citizens to hold 
the decision-makers accountable’. Therefore, the success of local democracy is a function 
of the effectiveness of mechanisms through which people can sanction the local power 
holders -  in this case the commune government. Grassroots democratization legislation set 
up four mechanisms through which commune-level officials can be sanctioned: monitoring 
by commune people’s council, monitoring by local organizations, monitoring by local
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people through grievance procedures, and public reporting in Village Meetings.
According to Law on the Organization of People’s Council and People’s 
Committee, the People’s Council is obliged to make decisions about key matters 
concerning local development and monitor the implementation of People's Committee, the 
People’s Court and People’s Procuracy at the same level. At the Commune level, a key 
obligation of Commune People’s Council is to monitor the implementation of People’s 
Committee. However, this institutional sanctioning ability does not necessarily reflect the 
actual ability of People’s Council to sanction the local officials. In practice, as People’s 
Councils meet so infrequently (often just two four-day sessions annually) (Me Elwee and 
Ly, 2006: 23), they have very limited time for serious elaboration and debate and, therefore, 
often ‘govern primarily by endorsing whatever is put before them’ (Kerkvliet, 2004: 8) and 
performed their duties in a formalistic manner (Nguyen V. Sau and Ho V. Thong cited by 
Me Elwee and Ly, 2006: 24). Similarly, Fritzen (2006: 10) claims that the executive branch 
of Vietnam government tended to overbear the legislative and judicial branches. Obviously, 
weak representative functions of People's Council should adversely affect democratic 
decentralization.
The 9th article 1992 Constitution states ‘The Vietnam Fatherland Front and its 
member organizations ... ensure the strict observance of the Constitution and the law, and 
supervise the activity of State organs, elected representatives, and State officials and 
employees’. So, the concern here is how effectively the local organizations supervise state 
organs, elected representatives and state officials. Norlund et al. (2006: 95) found that mass 
organizations and civic organizations do not see holding the government accountable as 
their main objective. In recent years, though the opportunities for local organizations to 
influence the local government through various channels were opening, it had not been
96
exploited (p.95). For now, the interactions between local organizations and the State are 
mainly characterized by cooperation rather than supervision. In an ethnographic study in a 
Northern village, Tran Thi Thu Trang (2004b: 146) found that mass organizations were 
more the instruments of top-down control, rather than the representatives of the interest 
groups. Overall, though mass organizations play an important role in rural development and 
poverty reduction, their performance in supervising local government is limited.
Monitoring by individuals through complaints and denunciations likewise, is 
difficult for a number of reasons. As there is currently no legal framework ensuring access 
to public information, people may not be well-informed about the policies and activities 
implemented in the local area (Me Elwee and Ly, 2006: 18). Also, effective monitoring 
requires professional knowledge and skills that people are unlikely to possess. Although in 
principle, complaints and denunciations [khieu nai va to cao] provide an avenue to local 
democracy , in practice they remain formalistic due to the weakness of complaint 
mechanism (Me Elwee and Ly, 2006: 20; Tran, 2004b: 146-47). According to the Law on 
Complaints and Denunciations, complaints must be lodged first with the office against 
which they are directed, not to higher offices. This also is not independent enough to play a 
referee role between complainants and the defendants, to the extent that the commune legal 
officer processes the complaints of people in the commune. Since this position is part of 
Commune People’s Committee, local people do not see him/her as an independent 
ombudsman. Further, as the law considers anonymous denunciation invalid, therefore the 
fear of reprisal makes people reluctant to complain about government officials.
Village Meetings are devised to give people the opportunities to be informed, to 
discuss, to comment and to make decisions on a wide range of local issues. Two times a
2j Law on Complaints and Denunciations
97
year, Village Meetings are held to disseminate important information and review activities 
of Commune's government, where activity reports and self-criticism statement by 
chairperson of People’ Committee and People’s Council are presented for people’s 
discussion (Government of Vietnam, 1998: 2-7). In a study of local democracy in a 
community in Hoa Binh province, Tran (2004b: 134-44) found that cadres often invited 
only well-off villagers and exclude the poor for the reason that they are ‘ignorant’ and 
‘inarticulate’. Further, the meetings were often accompanied by a drink or meal which the 
poor could not afford. In addition, the unequal relationship within society based on gender, 
age, and wealth meant a predomination of wealthy men in these meetings. Finally, given 
the peasant’s poor access to information, the cadres were able to manipulate the meetings 
and people were less likely to effectively query their leaders.
The problems and weaknesses highlighted above, though considerable, should not 
be taken as the total negation of the achievement of democratic decentralization efforts. 
Rather, they help understanding the localized nature of the decentralization in Vietnam. 
Fritzen (2006: 18) claims that strong local organizations and committed local government 
leadership, when being supported by grassroots democratization, could create significant 
change in local democracy. What emerges from this discussion is that the accountability of 
local government leaders is likely a significant factor affecting democracy at the grassroots 
level.
Following the reform policies in the 1980s and 1990s, the autonomy of the villages 
which was abolished in the Collectivization had been revitalized. The revival of village’s 
autonomy is reflected in three significant changes. The introduction of Village Heads 
position significantly enhanced the village’s autonomy, as they were directly elected by the 
villagers and served a dual role: as an outer-link between the villagers and the local
98
government authorities, and as a tool of self-management. For instance, they were 
responsible for disseminating essential information to people, mobilizing people, 
adjudicating disputes and ensuring security, convening village meetings to discuss local 
issues, and organizing labor for the maintenance of village infrastructure (Government of 
Vietnam, 1998: 8-9). Second was the reinstatement of village conventions [huong uoc]. 
This process, initiated in the early 1990s and further promoted by Grassroots 
democratization legislation since 1998, provided the basis for village self-management. 
However, it is noteworthy that while the ancient form of village conventions served as the 
‘charter’ for the administration of villages as administrative units, the village conventions 
today are more a social code of practice governing people’s behavior. The grassroots 
democratization legislation also institutionalized different levels of control of the villages 
over a series of local development issues through ensuring their rights to be informed, to 
discuss, to decide and to monitor them (Government of Vietnam, 1998: 2-7; Shanks et. al, 
2003: 27). In short, villages now have a relatively strong voice in policies and activities 
affecting their own development.
Further, people’s participation in local decision-making was also promoted, at least 
in principle. Since the implementation of renovation policies, especially the Grassroots 
Democratization legislation, people’s participation in local decision-making has been to a 
considerable extent promoted. People are now involved in, at least in principle, all 
decisions affecting their lives. Depending on the nature of the issue of concern, people’s 
participation is mobilized at different level: information sharing, consultation, decision­
making, and supervision. However, at practical level, the meaningful people’s participation 
in the local decision-making may be problematic for a number of reasons of which the 
downward accountability of the local governance is one of the most important.
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This section examines the context of the CDD approach in Vietnam with an 
emphasis on the three themes: social stratification, community control and people’s 
participation in local decision-making. The discussion highlights two key points with 
important implications for the CDD approach. On one hand, the existing institutional 
framework in Vietnam features a democratic decentralization system at grassroots level 
which is characterized by the increased community control over local issues and people’s 
participation in local decision-making, at least in principle. This forms a relatively ‘benign’ 
environment for the CDD approach. On the other hand, the stratification between the 
villagers is increasing, and challenges the key assumption of the CDD approach seeing 
community as a homogeneous entity. This suggests that elite capture can be a potential 
threat in the CDD approach in Vietnam and attention to this factor is of importance in this 
development approach. Further, the localized nature of grassroots democracy in the country 
may also affect the effectiveness of the CDD initiatives.
4.5. The Chiase Program
Chiase is a poverty reduction program implemented by Vietnamese Government 
and supported by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). 
The program was initiated in November 2003 and operated in 459 villages in three 
provinces of Quang Tri, Ha Giang and Yen Bai. The primary stakeholders in the Chiase are 
poor people and communities. The vision of the Chiase is ‘a just and fair society where the 
villagers take part in decision-making: their needs, demands and aspirations gear the 
development of the local society. Resources for poverty alleviation are 'managed by the 
local community' (Chiase Program Document, 2003: 36). This vision shows a strong 
orientation to the CDD approach with the central role of local people and communities. The 
role that government and development agencies play is to respond to local needs and 
facilitate their demands. This vision of the Chiase also indicates that it can be seen as an
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experiment of approach to poverty reduction at local level of the Vietnam CPRGS.
4.5.1. The Chiase Program Principles
Chiase adopts a CDD approach with all of its defining features24. The control over 
decision-making and resources for development is given to the local communities. All key 
decisions regarding the planning, implementation, and monitoring of village development 
activities are made by Village Meeting through broad-based people’s participation. The 
operation of the Chiase program at village level is based on the Local Planning and 
Management for Development (LPMD) cycle. In guiding the planning and management of 
village activities, the Chiase project has six principles: decentralization and local 
involvement, equality and equity, transparency and accountability, a poverty focus, 
sustainability, and multi-sector support. ‘Decentralization and local involvement’ are an 
underlying strategy of the Chiase. In this program, the villagers are involved in decision­
making regarding the planning and management of all activities financed by the Local 
Development Fund. The role of the program staff is to support and facilitate this 
involvement.
24 The defining characteristics of the CDD approach are discussed in chapter Three.
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Map 2: Location of the Chiase Program
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‘Equality and equity’ mean the equal opportunities for all groups of people. Given 
that women and very poor families often have fewer opportunities to take part in and 
benefit from development initiatives, interventions should be done to ensure that they have 
equal access to opportunities as other advantaged groups. ‘Accountability and 
transparency’ ensure that people are given adequate access to information about the 
program and the use of LDF. ‘Poverty in focus’ ensures that all the Chiase activities are 
directed to poverty reduction. It is noteworthy that, the Chiase program adopted two 
‘poverty targeting’ mechanisms during two periods 2004-2005 and 2006-2007. In the first 
phase, the local community was solely responsible for defining eligibility and selecting 
beneficiaries through majority voting. In the second phase, the program involved the local 
government in identifying ‘poor’ households based on national criteria , and involved the 
community in selecting beneficiaries for particular activities from the pre-defined list of 
‘poor' households. The problems associated with these targeting mechanisms are discussed 
in details in Chapter Six. Sustainability ensures that the Chiase activities shall not only 
cover the immediate needs of the villagers, but should have sustained effects. The 
development initiated by the Local Development Funds shall also benefit coming 
generations.
Finally, ‘multi-sector support’ reflects the conception that poverty is a complex 
issue that relates to many aspects in people’s living situation. Therefore, the Chiase 
activities should attack multiple aspects of poverty. Specifically, the project provides 
supports in six sectors: education, including adult education; health and sanitation; 
infrastructure; production including income generating activities; natural resources 
management; and social security to support cases of disability, prolonged illness, and social
25 Details about the national poverty line are presented in Box 4.1.
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and natural disasters.
4.5.2. The Chiase Program Structure and Responsibility
The Chiase program is managed with a structure of strategic oversight groups and
implementing units duplicated at national, provincial, district, commune and village levels. 
A Joint Steering Group (JSG) is the “lead-institution” which brings together key ministries 
and other national institutions relevant for the Chiase program as well as representatives 
from the provinces in which the program is implemented. The JSG meets periodically to 
discuss program implementation, including monitoring progress, providing strategic 
guidance, as well as to draw out lessons from the experiences that are relevant for the 
development of poverty alleviation policies. There is a Chiase Secretariat as an executive 
body responsible for monitoring, collating and summarizing reports and aggregating 
accounts from the different provincial projects for the JSG. It also provides coordination 
between the different Chiase provincial projects and distils learning from received reports 
and shares these within the Chiase Program. At provincial level, the projects are 
implemented under the supervision of the Provincial People’s Committees (PPC). This is 
guided by the Provincial Project Agreement between the PPC and SIDA. The Provincial 
Poverty Alleviation Steering Committee monitors the implementation of the local project in 
relation to the project document and the overall provincial development frameworks. This 
Provincial Steering Committee meets every quarter to discuss issues emerged, but has no 
direct management role. There is a secretariat at provincial level to collate reports, and 
accounts from district projects, and to prepare the reports for the provincial Steering 
Committee and the Chiase Secretariat at national level. They are are also responsible for 
drawing lessons from the implementation of the program and circulates them within the 
program.
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At a district level, the District People’s Committee (DPC) is supported by a District 
Project Management Unit (DPMU) which is led by the chairman of the DPC and 
responsible for facilitating and supporting local planning, implementation and monitoring 
of poverty alleviation activities in the district; and accounting for resources allocated to the 
district for these activities. The DPMU is also responsible for planning and implementing 
district (inter-commune) activities. The DPMU is under the direct supervision of the DPC. 
Relevant district departments second their staff to work as full time staff in the DPMU. The 
DPMU is divided into two sections: Financial and Program Management section, and 
Capacity Building and Facilitation. The first is in charge of processing and collating local 
development plans, reports and accounts, and managing the Chiase’s Management 
Information System; and the second is in charge of supporting planning, implementation 
and capacity building at the commune and village levels. At commune level, the Commune 
People’s Committee (CPC) creates a Commune Project Management Unit (CPMU) which 
is led by the Chairman of the CPC and responsible for facilitating and supporting local 
planning, management and monitoring of poverty alleviation activities in the commune, 
and accounting for resources allocated to villages and households for these activities. The 
CPMU is also in charge of planning and implementing commune (inter-village) activities. 
The CPMU is under the direct supervision of the CPC. It is at the commune level, that the 
day-to-day implementation of the program is enforced.
Finally, at the village level, the Village Meeting is the main consultative and 
decision making body regarding planning, implementing and funding of village 
development activities. For day-to-day management of activities each village selects a 
Village Management Group which is in charge of leading the local planning process, 
implementing activities, and reporting to the village as well as higher levels of
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management. The village also elects a Supervisory Group which is responsible for 
supervising the implementation of village activities. The management structure is presented 
in Diagram 4.1.
Diagram 4.1: Program Structure and Responsibility
National Level -------► Joint Steering Group
Chiase Secretariat
- Policy development
- Monitoring
Provincial Level Provincial People Committee
Chiase Provincial Secretariat
- Policy development
- Monitoring
- Coordination
^r
District Level -------► District People Committee
DPMU
- Implementation
- Coordination
- Monitoring
- Fund Allocation
Commune Level -------►Commune People Committee
CPMU
- Implementation
- Coordination
- Monitoring
- Fund Allocation
Village Level -------► Village Assembly
VMG and VSG
- Implementation
- Monitoring
T_______
Households
Source: Chiase Program Document, 2003.
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4.5.3. The Local Planning and Management for Development Cycle
In the Chiase program, the planning and management of development activities are
carried out according to the guidelines of the Local Planning and Management for 
Development (LPMD) cycle which is a series of steps a village under this program follows. 
The time it takes from the initiation of the first step to the completion of the last step is 
called a "LPMD Cycle" that is often implemented on a yearly basis. In the Chiase program, 
each village receives support for four consecutive LPMD cycles. The stages for each cycle 
are: introduction of the Program and analysis of the socio-economic situation of the village; 
formulation of village development plans and list of annual priority activities; preparation 
of detailed proposal for annual priority activities; implementation and monitoring of 
priority activities; and review and reporting about the activities implemented. The steps and 
corresponding tasks in a LPMD cycle are presented in Table 4.3.
Initially, there is an introduction step that is done at both commune and village 
levels. Meetings are held by the CPMU to inform the village representatives in the 
commune about the Chiase program, its visions, objectives, principle, methods, and 
regulations. Introductory meetings are then held in each village with the election of the 
Village Management Group (VMG) and Village Supervisory Group (VSG). In these 
meetings, key information about the program's visions, objectives, principle, methods, and 
regulations is disseminated, and an agreement on the fund allocation to each village is 
signed. The VMG and VSG are directly elected by the villagers through majority votes and 
responsible for implementing and supervising all village activities approved by the village 
meeting. These bodies also serve as a link between the CPMU and the village inhabitants. 
In village meetings, with the support of. the CPMU, the villagers are requested to analyze 
the socio-economic situations prevailing in the locality.
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Table 4.3: Steps of the LPMI) Cycle in the Chiase Program
Task Implementing Body Supporting Body
A .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  ( f i r s t  y e a r  o n l y )
A l .  I n t ro d u c t io n  M e e t i n g C P M U
A 2 . E le c t io n  o f  V M G  a n d  V S G V i l la g e  M e e t i n g C P M U
A 3 .  V i l l a g e  S i tu a t io n  A n a ly s i s V i l l a g e  M e e t i n g C P M U + V M G
B .  V i l l a g e  d e v e l o p m e n t  p l a n n i n g
B l .  P re p a r a t i o n  o f  V i l l a g e  V is io n V i l l a g e  M e e t i n g V M G + C P M U
B 2 . P re p a r a t i o n  o f  V i l l a g e  D e v e l o p m e n t  P lan V i l l a g e  M e e t i n g V M G + C P M U
B 3 . P r e p a r a t io n  o f  th e  a n n u a l  a c t iv i t ie s  lis t V i l l a g e  M e e t i n g V M G + C P M U
B 4 . R e v ie w  th e  a n n u a l  a c t iv i t ie s  lis t V M G  + C P M U
B 5. A p p r o v a l  o f  th e  a n n u a l  a c t iv i t i e s  lis t an d D P M U
fu n d  r e le a s e  to  th e  C P M U  a c c o u n t .
C .  A c t i v i t y  p r e p a r a t i o n s
C l .  D e ta i l e d  a c t iv i ty  p r o p o s a l  p r e p a ra t io n A c t i v i ty  o w n e r s  +  V M G C P M U
C 2 .  A p p r o v a l  o f  a c t iv i ty  p r o p o s a l V i l l a g e  M e e t i n g V M G + C P M U
C 3 .  A p p r o v a l  o f  a c t iv i t ie s  p r o p o s a l  b y  C P M U C P M U
C 4 .  S u b - c o n t r a c t in g V M G C P M U
C 5 .  F u n d  d i s b u r s e m e n t  to  a c t iv i t i e s  o w n e r s . C P M U
D . A c t i v i t y  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n
D l .  A c t iv i ty  i m p l e m e n ta t io n  a n d  m o n i t o r i n g V M G + C P M U
D 2 . S u b m is s i o n  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  d o c u m e n t s  to V M G C P M U
th e  C P M U
D 3. E v a lu a t io n  o f  a c t iv i t ie s V S G
E. Annual review V il la g e  M e e t i n g V M G + C P M U
Source: Chiase Program Field Manual, 2005.
The Second step — village planning -  comprises five tasks: the preparation of the 
vision, the preparation of the village development plan, the preparation of annual list of 
activities, a review the annual activity list, and the approval of annual activities. The first 
three tasks are done by local people with the facilitation of the CPMU. The village vision 
and development plan, developed in the first LPMD, covers the period of about four to five
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years and forms the basis for the selection of annual activities to be implemented in the 
planning year. The annual activity list must contain, for each proposed activity, the 
following: activity name, sector, regulation, list of beneficiary households, total number of 
beneficiaries, number of beneficiaries belonging to the poor group, number of beneficiaries 
who are women, estimated total cost, starting time, and estimated duration. The activities 
funded by the Chiase mainly include: provision of pigs, cows and other productive assets 
for poor households, house repairs for poor households, loans borrowed from a village 
revolving fund for various purposes; organization of training courses, health care activities; 
and construction of community centers, kindergartens, clinics, culverts, earthen roads and 
irrigation systems. After the annual list of activities is finalized by the villagers, it then will 
be reviewed by the CPMU and approved by the DPMU.
Third, is an 'activity preparation' step which includes five tasks: preparation of 
activity proposal, approval of activity proposal by the Village Meeting, approval of activity- 
proposal by the CPMU, sub-contracting, and fund disbursement. Activity proposals are 
prepared by the villagers and the VMG with the support of the CPMU. They are to be 
approved by the Village Meeting and the CPMU before any sub-contracting and funds 
disbursement is to be carried out by the VMG and CPMU.
Fourth step -  ‘activity implementation' - consisting of three tasks: implementation 
and monitoring, submission of accounting documents to the CPMU, and evaluation of 
activities. The village, led by their VMG and supported by the CPMU, is in charge of 
organizing the implementation of activities, using its own resources or engaging 
outsiders, depending on the nature of each activity. The VMG is responsible for 
submitting all related documents to the CPMU while the VSG is in charge of evaluating 
all activities in terms of quality and efficiency.
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Finally, by the end of each LPMD, the CPMU is to assist the villages in organizing 
meetings to review and evaluate all activities implemented during that LPMD cycle in 
order to identify successes and weaknesses. This enables the villages to revalidate, or if 
necessary, update their vision and development plans. Essential questions to be addressed 
in the meetings are the objectives and principles of the Chiase program and the 
responsibilities of relevant stakeholders.
For these steps it can be seen that people's participation is aimed at being mobilized 
in all steps in LPMD, including situation analysis, planning, preparation, implementation, 
and review of activities. People’s participation is mobilized at decision-making level, either 
directly or through representative bodies. People directly control the situation analysis, 
planning, preparation, and review stages through Village Meetings. The implementation of 
village activities is carried out by the VMG and VSG -  the representatives elected by the 
villagers in the first LPMD cycle. People’s participation in all stages of the LPMD is 
facilitated by the CPMU. It is the LPMD cycle which provides the framework for people’s 
participation in decision-making in the Chiase reflecting the democratic decentralization 
nature of this program.
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4.5.4. Analysis of Democratic Decentralization in the Chiase Program
Chiase is a decentralization system which is characterized by the transfer of control
over decision-making and resources to local levels: district, commune and village. The 
District Development Fund, which accounts for five per cent of LDF, is managed by the 
DPMU and representatives of CPMUs within its jurisdiction. The Commune Development 
Fund, which makes up fifteen per cent of LDF, is under control of the CPMU and 
representatives from its member villages. The Village Development Fund (VDF), which 
makes up eighty per cent of LDF, is controlled by village residents and their representative 
bodies: VMG and VSG. The Chiase program features a democratic decentralization system 
as the decentralized power is either exercised by the locally-elected body or directly 
exercised by the villagers. The expected outcome of the decentralization strategy is stated 
as ‘a demand-driven process in which planning and implementation processes are based on 
expressed local aspirations and needs’ and ‘resources for poverty alleviation are available 
and managed by local communities and local people’ (Chiase Program Document, 2003). 
In other words, the decentralization strategy in this program aims at promoting participation 
o f ‘local communities and local people’ in such a way that it ‘builds on, and strengthens the 
capacities of local communities to improve their livelihoods’. In the Chiase, the VDF is not 
only the largest share of LDF (80 per cent) but also the one whose management is 
decentralized to the largest extent with people’s participation being promoted at the 
decision-making level. Therefore, to understand the effectiveness of the decentralization in 
this program and identify its potential factors, this section focuses on the institutional 
arrangement governing the VDF and village activities.
The analysis of the institutional arrangement governing the VDF in the Chiase 
program is based on Agrawal and Ribot’s framework (1999: 474-477), which involves
1 1 2
three key dimensions: actors, distribution of power, and accountability relations (see 
Chapter Three). These dimensions of decentralization are reflected through the roles, rights, 
and responsibilities of different power holders involved in the Local Planning and 
Management for Development cycle (LPMD). The actors involving in the control of VDF 
comprise: the Village Meeting as a collective actor, the VMG, the VSG, and the CPMU. 
These actors hold different sets of decision-making power and are subject to a different 
accountability relations.
The Distribution o f Power among Local Actors
In the Chiase, a number of general rules are set up as a framework for the 
management of development funds at the local level rather than a defining strait-jacket. 
They create a domain of relatively autonomous decision-making in which local actors can 
operate. The rules of the Chiase comprise four groups: principles of support, sectors of 
support, regulations on administrative and financial management, and poverty targeting 
policies. Except for the poverty targeting rules being amended since 2Ü06, all other groups 
of rules remained consistent during the implementation of the program. First, the program 
has six support principles, which guide the planning and management of all activities. 
Further, the program activities must be confined in six sectors of support which comprise: 
education, health and sanitation, infrastructure, production, natural resources management, 
and social security . In addition, the regulations on administrative and financial 
management mainly focus on the accounting and auditing system, reporting 
responsibilities, and procedures for procurement and disbursement. Finally, poverty 
targeting policies specify the roles and tasks of the local government and community in 
formulating poverty criteria, assessing the eligibility and implementing the benefit delivery. 
These four groups of rules create the framework in which, different sets of decision making
2<> The elaboration of program principles and sectors of support is presented in section 4.5.1.
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authority are allocated to local actors, characterizing the decentralization in the Chiase
program.
The management of village activities involves all four types of power identified by 
Agrawal and Ribot (1999: 476-477) which include the power to ‘create rules’ on the 
management of VDF, to ‘make decisions’ on the use of VDF, to ’implement and ensure 
compliance’ to the program rules and village regulations, and to ‘adjudicate disputes’ 
arising from the effort to create rules and enforce compliance. These types of power are 
exercised by a number of actors: the Village Meeting, the VMG, the VSG, and the CPMU.
The power to ‘create rules’ is exclusively a privilege of the Village Meeting. At the 
commencement of the first LPMD cycle, the villages Assembly supported by the CPMU, 
forms a regulation on the management of VDF. This regulation is to be reviewed and 
revised in following LPMD cycles. The key information in the village regulation includes: 
types of support with corresponding level of funding, the procedures of fund disbursement, 
the amount of local contribution, the management of risks, the responsibilities of parties 
involving in the activities, and the terms of execution. One example of village regulation is 
presented in Appendix 7.
The power to ‘make decisions’ on the use of VDF is also solely exercised by the 
Village Meeting, mainly at three stages of the LPMD: planning, preparation and review. At 
planning stage of each LPMD cycle, the Village Meeting is to make decision on the village 
vision, village development plan (VDP), and annual activities list with corresponding 
beneficiaries. Later on, at preparation phase, the Village Meeting is to make decision on the 
approval of activities proposals which encompass the elaboration of the implementation 
and funding details of village activities. Finally, at Review stage, the Village Meeting is to 
evaluate the performance of village activities and may re-elect the VMG and VSG if their
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performance is seen by people as unsatisfactory. All the decisions of Village Meeting are 
made through direct people’s participation with the facilitation of the CPMU. Given the 
lack of information and capabilities of local people, the facilitation of the CPMU is crucial 
to the collective decision-making in all study villages.
The power to ‘implement and ensure compliance’ to decisions and rules are 
exercised by the three actors: the VMG, the VSG, and the CPMU. The VMG is responsible 
for implementing and supporting all collective and individual activities in the village. 
Specifically, the VMG is to facilitate village planning, allocate specific tasks to villagers, 
support and monitor individual activities, directly implement collective activities, receive 
accounting documents and reports from people, aggregate them and report to the VSG, the 
Village Meeting, and the CPMU. The VSG is responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of all Chiase activities in the village. At the end of implementation phase, 
the VSG is obliged to evaluate each VDF-funded village activity in terms of quality and 
efficiency. The VSG also has the right to reject the official closure of any activity file in 
those cases they believe that, the quality and efficiency are not satisfied. Furthermore, the 
VSG can decline its final approval if financial matters are not handled correctly. The 
CPMU is in charge of introducing information about the Chiase program to people, 
facilitating the planning and implementation of village activities, and ensuring the 
compliance of village activities to program rules. Specifically, at planning stage, the CPMU 
is to disseminate information about the Chiase, facilitate village planning, and review the 
annual plan of the village against the Chiase rules before sending them to the DPMU for 
approval. At preparation stage, the CPMU is to support the preparation and provide 
approval of activity proposals. At implementation stage, the CPMU is to work in 
partnership with the VMG, to directly manage and monitor all village activities. At review
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stage, the CPMU is to support local people in evaluating activities done in that LPMD 
cycle.
Finally, power to adjudicate the disputes arising from making rules and enforcing 
compliance rests with the Village Meeting. Any dispute arising from the planning and 
implementation of village activities is to be settled by the Village Meeting. Next section 
focuses on the characteristics of actors controlling the VDF in the Chiase program.
The Actors in the Decentralization
The actors involved in the management of the VDF and village activities can be 
indentified by looking at the roles and tasks of different development partners specified in 
the LPMD cycle. They include three groups of actors whose powers are discussed in 
previous section. The most important decision maker is the Village Meeting which is a 
collective actor whose decisions are made through direct people’s participation. All 
villagers over eighteen years old are entitled to join Village Meeting. The villages often 
seek consensus before making decision. However, where the consensus cannot be reached, 
decisions are made based on majority voting. Obviously, the performance of the Village 
Meeting is considerably dependent on the extent to which meaningful participation is 
achieved.
The second group of actor includes the VMG and VSG -  the elected representatives 
of the local residents. The VMG is comprised of three members and the VSG of two 
members democratically elected by the villagers. These groups may be reelected at the end 
of each LPMD cycle if required by the local people. A quota system is applied to ensure 
that each VMG includes a female member and a member belonging to the 'poor’ group. In 
the study villages, the members of the VMGs and VSGs are mostly the leaders of local 
organization branches in the villages or the village Head. The main barrier to the function
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of the VMGs and VSGs was the lack of technical skills and information about government 
procedures as well as service provides which made them, to a considerable extent, 
dependent on the CPMU staff.
The last group of actors is the commune project management unit (CPMU). This 
group includes a director, a vice-director, a secretary, an accountant, and two facilitators. 
The staff of the CPMU are recruited and appointed by the Commune People’s Committee 
(CPC). The director of this group is concurrently the Chairman of the CPC. In principle, the 
performance of the CPMU is monitored by the DPMU and the commune CPC. However, 
as the director of the CPMU is concurrently the chairman of commune CPC, the monitoring 
by commune CPC is just superficial. Because of long time involvement in central planning 
bureaucracy system, the leaders of the CPMU often have limited knowledge, skill, 
motivation and experience of participatory development.
The Accountability Mechanisms
The local actors in the Chiase program - the Village Meeting, VMG, VSG and 
CPMU are held accountable by a number of accountability relations. As these local actors 
control the decentralized power on behalf of the local people, their downward 
accountability is crucial for the effectiveness of decentralization. This section aims to 
assess the effectiveness of accountability relations controlling these actors with emphasis 
on their downward accountability.
First, the Village Meeting -  the most important decision-maker in the Chiase - is 
upwardly accountable to the CPMU and DPMU for the compliance of their decision­
making to the program rules. The accountability of the Village Meeting is ensured through 
the review of annual plan and activity proposal by the CPMU, and the system of reporting, 
auditing, and evaluation. As village decisions are made on participatory basis, downward
1 1 7
accountability of Village Meeting is automatically achieved.
Second, the VMG and the VSG, on behalf of the village residents exercise the 
power to ‘implement and ensure compliance’ to the program regulations. The VMG is 
downwardly accountable to their constituents for the implementation of village activities 
and the support given to people, and the VSG is downwardly accountable to the 
constituents for the monitoring of village activities. The downward accountability of these 
two groups is enforced through two formal mechanisms: election and the village meeting. 
The democratic election where people can vote and are entitled to contest for office on the 
basis of a simple majority vote, provides a strong tool for local people to sanction leaders. 
The performance of the VMG and VSG, who are elected at the beginning of the 
implementation of the Chiase, are reviewed and assessed at the end of each LPMD cycle. 
The villagers can sanction unaccountable VMG and VSG members by calling for the re- 
election of these positions. Local people can also hold the leaders accountable through the 
meetings organized along the steps of LPMD cycle. In these meetings, the constituents can 
question and demand explanations for the past actions of the leaders. This accountability 
mechanism supplements the mechanism of election and constitutes a specific and timely 
constraint on the arbitrary use of power by the VMG and VSG. The village meeting 
mechanism effectively provides a refining tool to redress the weaknesses of election which 
have been highlighted in theory of accountability (Ackerman, 2005: 7; Mulgan and Uhr, 
2000: 3): the information asymmetry between villagers and local leaders; the time-lag of 
sanction; the scope of decisions made may be too small to stimulate a change of leader; and 
there is not always more than one viable candidate running for a particular position. 
Moreover, since the VMG and VSG are selected among the local villagers, there is also an 
informal accountability mechanism which is maintained through the day-to-day meetings.
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To the local leaders, this mechanism is also important. It is likely that the above-mentioned 
mechanisms are sufficiently effective to enforce the downward accountability of these two 
groups of local leaders.
The VMG is also horizontally accountable to the VSG for the fiscal regularity and 
quality of the village activities. This accountability relation is enforced through the VSG’s 
monitoring and evaluation of all VDF-funded activities. In addition, both the VMG and 
VSG are also upwardly accountable to the CPMU for accurate record keeping, reporting 
and enforcement of the general rules of the program. This upward accountability is, to a 
certain extent, ensured as the CPMU works in partnership with the local communities in all 
activities and closely oversees the performance of the VMG and VSG.
Finally, the CPMU is also subject to a number of accountability relations. It is 
upwardly accountable to the DPMU for timely and accurate record keeping, accounting, 
reporting, and the conformity of village decisions to the general rules of the program. Its 
upward accountability is enforced through the system of reporting, auditing, evaluation and 
the oversight of the DPMU. Specifically, the DPMU is obliged to review all village 
development plans and annual activity list which had been prepared by the villages and the 
CPMUs. In addition, mid-term evaluation and audit are important in holding the CPMU 
accountable to the program rules and regulations. The CPMU is also required to submit 
progress report every month. Therefore, it is likely that the CPMU attached a great 
importance to the orders and requirement of the DPMU, and the upward accountability of 
the CPMU is relatively ensured.
On the other hand, the downward accountability of the CPMU is more problematic. 
In principle, the CPMU can be held downwardly accountable to the constituents by both 
accountability mechanisms created by the grassroots democratization legislation and by
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mechanisms created by the Chiase program. As specified in the grassroots democratization 
legislation, the accountability of this group can be enforced through a number of 
mechanisms: monitoring by the local People Council, monitoring by the local 
organizations, monitoring by people through complaint and denunciation, and monitoring 
through village meetings. However, in reality, as discussed in previous section, the 
implementation of these mechanisms is just superficial and less effective due to a number 
of reasons . This was also the case for the communities under this study: the local People’s 
Council and local organizations did not have any specific activities aiming at monitoring 
the local government; local people did not exercise the right of making ‘complaint and 
denunciation’; and the semi-annual village meetings were just information dissemination 
sessions without extensive discussion about the accountability of the local government.
Therefore, the downward accountability of the CPMU in the Chiase was mainly 
enforced through the village meetings along the LPMD cycle of this program. However, 
while these meetings, in principle, allowed the local communities to sanction the CPMU by 
demanding the explanation for its past actions, their effectiveness in ensuring downward 
accountability of this local actor was limited. The potential sanction in the form of question 
asked in village meetings is much less severe as compared to the sanction of the DPMU if 
the requirement for upward accountability is not met which can be the dismissal, delay of 
promotion, or criticisms of the lower-level staff. Thus, the CPMU is likely to prioritize the 
upward accountability relations when there is a contradiction between downward and 
upward accountability, which, unfortunately, is not unlikely in development practice.
Theories of accountability (see Chapter Three) show that downward accountability
2 The effectiveness of the accountability mechanisms created by the grassroots democracy legislations is 
discussed section 4.4.
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of a public actor can be characterized by the extent to which it promotes people’s 
participation in public decision-making and the implementation of the decisions. At the 
same time, upward accountability upholds the timely and accurate reports, accounting, and 
the conformity to the program rules and regulations. By its nature, the participatory 
processes often take time and result in unpredictable outputs that leave the CPMU 
vulnerable to criticism by upper level for inefficient planning, low quality of 
implementation, and ineffective enforcement of program provisions. Thus, the weaker 
sanction by village meeting may result in a disincentive for the CPMU in promoting 
people’s participation, or in other words, be downwardly accountable . One example of the 
disincentive of the CPMU in being downwardly accountable to people is the manner in 
which the CPMU deals with community infrastructure works. While people’s participation 
in small-scale infrastructure works was invariably of interest of all study communities, two 
CPMUs of Gio Binh and Gio Son advised the local people to contract these works out to 
external contractors. The CPMU staff attributed their hesitance in promoting people’s 
participation in infrastructure works to the concerns about the unpredictable quality, 
progress and much facilitation effort required for this type of activities.
The above discussion indicates that the effectiveness of the accountability 
mechanisms controlling the CPMU is problematic. This means the downward 
accountability of the CPMU cannot be ensured, and depends on contextual characteristics 
of the communities, such as people’s experience of participatory development, commitment 
to participation of local government leadership, and strength of the local organization. 
Thus, the downward accountability of the CPMU is likely to be a factors explaining 
empowerment in the CDD approach.
28 In this study, the downward accountability of the CPMU is defined by the extent to which the CPMU 
promotes the participation in decision-making and the implementation of these decisions.
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In summary, the Chiase program features a radical move toward democratic 
decentralization. Substantial decision making power is directly devolved to the local 
community which includes power to ‘create rules’, 'make decisions’, and ‘adjudicate 
disputes’. The power to ‘implement and ensure the compliance' is given to a number of 
actors: the VMG, the VSG, and the CPMU who are held accountable to the local 
communities through different accountability mechanisms. While the accountability of the 
VMG and the VSG are to a considerable extent ensured, the mechanisms controlling the 
downward accountability of the CPMU are not sufficiently effective. It, therefore, can be 
expected that the level of downward accountability of the CPMU would vary among 
communes depending the local context. Given the theoretical relationship between 
accountability and empowerment as discussed in chapter Three, this raises an important 
proposition of this thesis: whether there is a correlation between the levels of downward 
accountability of the CPMU and the empowerment impacts on the local people.
4.6. Conclusion
Although Vietnam has been experiencing impressive economic growth, poverty and 
inequality is still a big problem challenging the country. The Renovation during last two 
decades has unleashed the potential of the Vietnamese people and brought about economic 
growth and poverty reduction on a large scale for the country. At the same time, growing 
inequality has arisen in many aspects of Vietnamese society. Although the number of poor 
people at national scale has decreased, poverty is still highly concentrated in remote and 
rural areas, agricultural sectors, and ethnic minority groups. This means that there is a 
proportion of population lagging behind, or even excluded from, the impressive growth of 
the national economy and thus, a more effective poverty alleviation strategy is a pressing 
need. In response to the situation, in 2002, the CPRGS was put forward as an overarching 
poverty alleviation strategy for the country. The approach to poverty reduction at local level
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adopted by the CPRGS emphasizes the empowerment of the poor through decentralization 
of control and people’s participation in local decision-making which features a CDD 
strategy.
The context of the CDD approach in Vietnam is characterized by both types of 
facilitating and impeding features. On the one hand, the implementation of grassroots 
democratization legislation on a large scale creates an enabling institutional environment 
for the CDD approach. On the other hand, the ineffectiveness of the existing accountability 
mechanisms and the increasing social stratification may significantly affect the 
effectiveness of this development approach.
The Chiase program, with all typical defining features of the CDD approach, 
creates a democratic decentralization system, in which the development processes are 
managed and facilitated by the partnership between the local community, its elected 
representatives, and the CPMU - a part of commune government. While accountability 
mechanisms controlling the village-level elected bodies are relatively effective, the 
mechanisms controlling the CPMU’s accountability appear to be less effective. This points 
to a hypothetical correlation between the downward accountability of the CPMU and the 
empowerment impacts on the local people. The next chapter details the methodology for 
this study. Following, chapter Six details the results of the analysis. The findings are 
discussed and conclusions are drawn, in Chapters Seven and Eight.
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Chapter Five: Methodology
5.1. Introduction
This chapter describes the methodology used in this thesis in examining the 
following issues: the meaning of empowerment in the Chiase program, how and to what 
extent the program transforms the existing power relations between the elite and ordinary 
people, and the factors affecting empowerment. As discussed in Chapter Two, measuring 
empowerment is challenging due to its personal and subtle nature. The quantitative 
approach with pre-defined proxy indicators is not effective while a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative information may be more appropriate. Therefore, this study has 
employed a mixed-method approach involving the combination of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in different phases.
The fieldwork was undertaken in four communes under the Chiase CDD program in 
Quangtri province in Central Vietnam. In each commune, two villages were included for 
data collection. The Chiase program was chosen for this study because it possessed the 
typical characteristics of the CDD approach, the concern of this thesis. Quang Tri province, 
which is located on the North Central Coast -  a region with the second highest poverty 
incidence in Vietnam - represents a typical poor province in Vietnam. The data collection 
involved observation, group discussion, a questionnaire survey, key informant interviews, 
and secondary data. This chapter discusses four themes essential to the methodology of this 
thesis: the key methodological considerations in studying the defined research questions, 
the operation of data collection, the operation of data analysis, and the profile of the study 
area.
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5.2. Methodological Considerations
5.2.1. Combining the Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches
The idea of mixing quantitative and qualitative methods is increasingly popular in
social and human sciences (Creswell, 2003: 208), having the advantages of: enabling some 
level of triangulation as it seeks convergence of results; allowing an examination of 
overlapping and different facets of a phenomenon; using methods sequentially in the sense 
that one method is used to help inform another method; identifying contradictions and fresh 
perspectives; and adding both scope and breadth to a study (Greene, et al., 1989: 256-257). 
In addition, the mixed-method approach also helps the researcher avoid imposing ‘a priori 
conceptualization on the target phenomenon’ (Sandelowski, 2000: 247).
There are four factors affecting the selection of a mixed-method strategy of inquiry. 
First, is the implementation sequence of the qualitative and quantitative data collection in 
the proposed study. It can be ‘sequentially’, where two types of data are collected in 
different phases, or ‘concurrently’, where different types of data are gathered at a time. The 
second factor refers to the priority being given to the qualitative and quantitative data 
collection and analysis. Third, is the stage of the research where the qualitative and 
quantitative data are integrated. This may be at data collection or data analysis. In the data 
collection stage, the ‘mixing’ may involve combining closed-ended questions with open- 
ended questions in the questionnaire. ‘Mixing’ in the data analysis stage may involve 
transforming qualitative information into quantitative numbers. The final consideration is 
the extent to which the research is guided by a theoretical framework (Creswell, 2003: 211- 
213).
The methodology chosen by this study is a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches which can be termed the ‘concurrent transformative approach’ 
(Creswell, 2003: 217-219). This methodology is guided by the theoretical framework
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presented in Chapter One. The collection of qualitative and quantitative data was done 
concurrently during one phase of the research, and equal significances were given to 
qualitative and quantitative methods. The analysis of all research questions was facilitated 
by both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The integration of qualitative and 
quantitative data is done at both data collection and analysis phases. The rationale for using 
this combination approach, as put by Creswell (2003), is that it can ‘result in well-validated 
and substantiated findings’, as well as provide ‘perspectives from the different types of 
data' (p.217), though this type of research is not without its problems.
5.2.2. Problems Associated with Survey Research
During the course of survey research there are a number of problems which can
potentially affect the quality and accuracy of the data obtained. According to Hines (1993: 
732), the problems can be categorized into three areas: problems with linguistic and 
conceptual equivalence; problems with measurement; and problems arising from the nature 
of the survey/interview process. The first problem is that the concepts under study may not 
have any meaning or equivalent meaning for different groups being surveyed. In these 
cases, people’s responses would be unreliable. Second is the problem with the 
measurement. Even if the conceptual equivalence is assured, to measure the same concept 
across different groups may require different indicators. For example, measuring the degree 
of marital satisfaction may vary from culture to culture. In one culture it may be 
characterized by the level of intimacy but in another culture, it may be reflected through the 
extent to which a partner performs his/her social role (Hines, 1993: 732). Further, the 
importance of certain concepts may differ between groups or respondents. Topics of 
interview may be irrelevant if the respondents are asked for information on subjects about 
which they have no information or no opinion, or topics may be ‘taboo’ or culturally 
insensitive. In these cases, if being asked questions which are difficult to discuss, the
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respondents may avoid answering or give normative answers in terms of ‘what is 
preferred’, that is, the answers they think the researcher is looking for. In addition, 
measurement techniques, say the Likert scale or multiple choices, may be unfamiliar to the 
respondents and make them confused leading to the problem of ‘scale equivalence’ where a 
similar grade on a Likert scale may reflect quite different experiences. Finally, a ‘courtesy 
bias’ in which people try to be polite and helpful can also interfere with the way the 
respondents answer. All of these factors can affect the reliability of the information 
collected. Interviewer characteristics, such as gender, age, ethnicity, personality, and 
professional status, can affect the interviews; as do the place, timing, and presence of other 
people can also influence respondents’ response and also the verbal and nonverbal behavior 
of the researcher (Hines, 1993: 733). Respondents can be aware of the sponsoring agency 
or institution and its political ties, and so the very act of asking the question can set up a 
power relationship between the researcher and the respondents, which can lead to problems 
with the quality of the data being collected (Goetz, 2001: 100).
Recognizing the potential biases of the survey, this study made an effort to 
minimize them by how the discussion was conducted, how the questionnaire was 
formulated and how the variables were analyzed. The researcher lived in the villages and 
familiarized himself with the local context before conducting the survey. The 
communication was done in simple language understandable to all. The interview was 
conducted in villagers’ homes at the time most convenient for the respondents, with a mix 
of closed and open-ended questions, allowing enough time for the free discussion to grow. 
All survey questions, especially multiple-choice questions, were framed in a way that was 
contextually appropriate and understandable to people (Appendix 3). These measures went 
some way to overcome the problem of the unequal power relationship between the
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researcher and the respondents. The methodology used for data analysis also contributed to 
minimizing the bias, as discussed in data analysis section.
5.2.3. Establishing Causality in Cross-sectional Design
Establishing a causal relationship is of central concern in explanatory research.
However, establishing a causal relation is difficult because one cannot actually observe one 
event producing change in another (De Vaus, 2001: 34). Even though two variables are 
correlated, their changes may be induced by a third variable -  often termed a spurious 
variable. Therefore, the causal relationship must be inferred rather than observed (De Vaus, 
2001: 34). To find a causal relationship between two variables, two criteria must be met: a 
co-variation between the two variables exists, that is, a statistical correlation between two 
variables is confirmed; and second, the cause must come before the effect, the dependent 
variable must be capable of change, and there must be a plausible account for the 
connection between the two variables from either theory or other empirical research (De 
Vaus, 2001: 35-36).
With regard to cross-sectional research design, whereby data are collected at one 
point in time, establishing a causal direction is problematic. As discussed above, the 
correlation between two variables is not enough to establish a causal direction between 
them. One way to approach this dilemma is to develop a priori model, that is, a theory 
about the causal relationship being proposed on the basis of theoretical considerations and 
previous research, and test it (De Vaus, 2001: 180-181). While an accepted an a priory 
model does not prove causal direction, at least it provides a theoretical basis for arguing a 
relationship and provides empirical data that are consistent with the model. If the result of 
statistical analysis is consistent with the an a priory model, the next step would be to adopt 
a research design that can establish a causal direction. Even if the development of a new
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study to establish causal direction cannot be done, retrospective information or people’s 
responses about the causal relationship of concern can shed light on the direction (p. 1 8 1 ). 
However, in many cases, causal direction is clear if independent variables are fixed (e.g. 
gender and race), or are not subject to manipulation (e.g. age, religion and education), or 
time orders between the co-related variables are straightforward (e.g. education level and 
income) because the reverse direction is impossible.
This study relied on a cross-sectional design where data were collected at one point
in time. In order to establish a causal direction between empowerment and independent
variables, the study developed a priori model of empowerment in the form of a theoretical
framework. This model was tested by Logistic Regression Analysis. To establish the time
order between variables, retrospective information and people’s responses were used.
5.3. Data collection 
5.3.1. Pre-fieldwork Survey
The data collection in this study involved two stages: a pre-fieldwork survey and a 
survey. Initially, a pre-fieldwork survey was used to facilitate two objectives: identification 
of the study communes, and the development of the questionnaires. The pre-fieldwork 
survey involved several non-standardized interviews with key informants, group 
discussions with local people, observations, and testing of the questionnaire. The aim of 
data collection at this stage was to achieve a broad overview of the design features of the 
Chiase program, the performance of the Commune Project Management Unit (CPMU), the 
operation of village development activities, and to test the fitness of the interview 
questions. These sources of information, together with the theoretical background discussed 
in Chapters Two and Three, facilitated the selection of variables and formulation of 
interview questions, and the identification of study communes. These topics will now be 
discussed in detail.
129
Selection o f Study Communes
The selection of study communes was based on the downward accountability of 
their Commune Project Management Unit (CPMU). The intention was to select two 
communes that were ‘more downwardly accountable' and two communes that were ‘less 
downwardly accountable'. The inclusion of these two categories of the CPMU was aimed 
to facilitate the analysis of a key proposition in this thesis: the correlation between 
empowerment outcome and the downward accountability of the CPMU. The theories of 
accountability (see Chapter Three) hold that downward accountability of a public body in a 
democratic system can be characterized by the degree to which the expectation of the 
constituents under its jurisdiction is satisfied, and therefore, can be measured through its 
efforts to facilitate people's involvement in public decision-making and the implementation 
of these decisions. This theoretical background was important as it suggested indicators of 
downward accountability for this study.
Specifically, downward accountability of the CPMU was assessed on the basis of its 
performance regarding the following indicators: ‘providing information to local
communities', ‘facilitating technical tasks', ‘involving local people in poverty assessment’, 
and ‘supporting communities in self-performing community works'. The assessment of 
downward accountability of each CPMU was done through a group discussion with local 
people in that commune, and after that, the commune was categorized into ‘more 
downwardly accountable’ or ‘less downwardly accountable’. Here, it is noteworthy that the 
division between ‘more downwardly accountable' and ‘less downwardly accountable’ is 
arbitrary, and made solely for the purpose of categorizing the communes under study. 
These categories were determined following a pre-fieldwork survey.
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29 .  .  • •Four communes were selected for this study. Gio An and Gio Viet communes 
represented 'more downward accountable' communes, while Gio Son and Gio Binh 
communes represented the ‘less downward accountable' communes. Their performance 
regarding the above-mentioned accountability indicators is elaborated below. With regard 
to the ‘provision of information’ indicator, the performance of all four CPMUs was 
somewhat satisfactory. People in all communes acknowledged the importance of the 
CPMU in providing them with a wide range of information, that is, general information 
about the Chiase program, such as the funds available, the principles of support, sectors of 
support, operational procedures, rights and responsibilities of different partners; 
information about service providers; information about government procedures; and 
information about new production models. Likewise, all the CPMUs performed rather well 
in ‘facilitating technical tasks’. As lack of technical skills was a common problem among 
the communities under the Chiase program, the CPMUs were effective in facilitating 
technical tasks, such as minute-taking, reporting, filling the activity proposals, and selecting 
service providers.
There was a significant difference, however, between the performances of the four 
CPMUs regarding how they ‘involved people in poverty assessment’. During the period 
2006-2007 the Chiase program adopted an ‘explicit poverty targeting’ mechanism so that 
any material benefit was to be given only to the ‘poor’ and the Commune People’s 
Committee (CPC) was involved in identifying the ‘poor’ households. While the CPMUs of 
Gio An and Gio Viet communes arranged a meeting to consult people about the list of 
‘poor' before approval, the CPMUs of Gio Son and Gio Binh communes approved it 
without any meeting with the people! As the list of ‘poor' households identified by the CPC
24 This section focuses on only downward accountability of the communes. Background information about 
these communes is discussed in ‘Profile of Study Area’ section in this chapter.
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often contained cases which were seen by local people as ‘not deserving’, the arrangement 
of a consultative meeting was important in gaining ‘legitimacy’ for poverty assessment by 
the CPC, and considerably decreased the discontent among local people.
Finally, the extent to which the CPMUs facilitated the self-performance of 
community infrastructure work also varied significantly between the selected communes. 
The CPMUs of Gio Binh and Gio Son recommended the local communities to contract all 
community work out to professional contractors, even though the local people wanted to 
perform these tasks themselves. On the other hand, the CPMUs of Gio Viet and Gio An 
accepted and facilitated people’s involvement in small-scale infrastructure work. This 
participation was applied only to the technically straightforward components of work, such 
as ground leveling, soil excavation, water pipe installation, and fencing. The technically 
complex components were still contracted out to the contractors. Although all the CPMUs 
recognized that the beneficiary participation in infrastructure work could provide great 
scope for enhancing people’s capabilities and community capacity for collective action, 
they were cautious about this approach. Many staff attributed their hesitance toward the 
community participation in infrastructure works to the fact that it required much time and 
effort to organize people, and facilitate and supervise the construction processes. In 
addition, as the quality of participation was uncertain, therefore, it made them more 
vulnerable to criticisms from upper levels. The fact that the CPMUs of Gio An and Gio 
Viet supported people's participation in small-scale infrastructure work indicated their 
strong commitment to people’s participation, or in other words, their downward 
accountability.
Questionnaire Development
The pre-fieldwork survey was useful in that it indicated what information it was
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possible to collect from the respondents during the fieldwork and provided the direction for 
the development of the methodology and the questionnaire. Based on the understandings of 
the situation, the questionnaire and interview checklists were revised and further developed. 
A pre-survey test of the survey questionnaire and in-depth interview themes was 
undertaken for 20 respondents and two key informants in order to identify questions which 
were inconsistent, unclear or irrelevant to the respondents. Based on the result, corrections 
were done. Through this pre-fieldwork survey, the scale of this research was determined: 
the survey was administered to 216 respondents in two ‘more downward accountable’ 
communes and two ‘less downward accountable’ communes as determined in the pre- 
fieldwork analysis, and sixteen key informants, including eight ordinary villagers, four 
village leaders, and four staff of the CPMU, were involved in the in-depth interview.
The in-depth interviews emphasized the factual data, attitudes, and subjective 
exploration with the respondents about empowerment in the Chiase program and the 
cultivation of empowerment in particular social settings. These interviews gave a good 
insight into how the Chiase program affected local residents and how people’s 
empowerment was cultivated that could not be provided by survey data. The mix of the 
questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews complemented each other. The survey could 
describe the overall levels, rates, and differences between sub-groups and could be used for 
statistical analysis to establish relevance, while the qualitative interviews could give deeper 
understanding of the processes of change in the empowerment phenomena.
The questionnaire developed for this study (Appendix 3) was adopted and modified 
from the framework developed by Kabeer (1999) on measuring empowerment. 
Empowerment was primarily measured in terms of agency, that is, perceived changes in the 
range of choices and actions of the respondents. Further, information about the
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improvement in assets and capabilities, and consequences of empowerment was also 
collected in order to facilitate a nuanced understanding of three interrelated dimensions of 
empowerment and the operation of this concept '0. The study also sought factual data about 
ethnographic and socio-economic characteristics of the respondents. In addition, 
information about the performance of three empowering processes and factors which may 
affect empowerment was also collected. Specifically, the questions were grouped into six 
sections as follows (see Appendix 3):
• ethnographic information on the respondent;
• socio-economic information on the respondent;
• performance in poverty targeting;
• people's participation in local decision-making.
• social networks of the local people.
• empowerment outcomes for the local people.
5.3.2. Survey
Sampling and Sample Size
This study adopted a multi-staged sampling approach. Based on the performance of 
the CPMU, two ‘more downward accountable’ and two ‘less downward accountable’ 
communes were selected (see previous section). From the four selected communes, eight 
villages (two from each commune) were identified for the survey according to the 
following criteria: the villages have been involved in the Chiase program for similar
,0 According to Kabeer (1999: 437-438), empowerment has three interrelated dimensions. The first dimension 
is resources for empowerment, which include not only material resources but also human and social capital. 
The second dimension is agency, which refers to the ability to make choices and act on them. Finally, the 
achievement or outcome of empowerment is the actual manifestation of changes in people’s ‘being and 
doing’.
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periods of time; and the villages have similar poverty rates. Here, a similar timeframe for 
being involved in the Chiase program and similar poverty rates for the selected villages 
allowed this study to control for these two factors in analyzing the factors affecting 
empowerment outcomes for people. The control of timeframe and 'poverty rate’ factors 
was necessary because both of these potentially can affect the power resources, and thus, 
the empowerment outcomes.
Table 5.1: Summary of Sub-samples
N o C o m m u n e V illa g e V illa g e P o v e r ty V illa g e P o o r  g ro u p N o n -p o o r
P o p u la tio n rate su b -sa m p le (h o u se h o ld ) g ro u p
(h o u seh o ld ) (% ) (h o u se h o ld ) (h o u seh o ld )
1 Gio Viet Viet
Trung
96 44 30 13 17
Viet Loc 100 42 30 13 17
2 Gio An An Son 78 41 24 10 14
An Van 93 39 30 12 18
3 Gio Binh Binh Lieh 75 37 24 9 15
Binh Kim 64 36 22 8 14
4 Gio Son Son Dong 97 37 30 11 19
Son Khe 86 35 26 9 17
Total 689 216 85 131
Source: Field Survey 2007
In each village a sub-sample of 30 per cent 35 per cent of the village population 
was drawn. Based on the poverty rate of the villages , a stratified sampling was used to 
identify the number of poor and non-poor households to be included in each village sub­
sample. In 2007, when this survey was conducted, the poverty rate was determined based 
on the new MOLISA poverty line for the period 2006-2008 which was specified as: VND 
2.4 million per year in rural areas; and VND 3.0 million per year in urban areas. The
31 As the new MOLISA poverty line for the period 2006-2008 was significantly higher than the poverty line 
for the period 2001-2005, poverty rates in 2007 were much higher than that of the previous period.
135
poverty rates in the study villages are shown in table 5.1
Finally, in each sub-sample, systematic sampling was adopted to select respondents. 
The respondents were also selected in. a stratified sample on the basis of gender so an equal 
number of men and women were included in each village sub-sample. The final sample was 
216 cases. A summary of sub-samples is presented in Table 5.1.
Interview Process
A questionnaire survey was administered to 216 respondents in eight villages of 
four selected communes, and the interview was carried out solely by the principal 
researcher. From an understanding of the problems associated with the survey research 
there were three important concerns that were kept in mind in carrying out the interviews. 
The first was to make sure all respondents had the same understanding of the questions. 
Questions were asked in a language easily understood by local people and dialect was used 
when possible. Further, while the explanation and elaboration of questions were important 
to help the respondents have correct understanding of the questions they did not 'lead1 to a 
particular answer. For instance, regarding the question about the change in respondent’s 
agency, the researcher did not prompt the respondents with selection but rather checked the 
selection based on people’s narratives. Finally, acknowledging that if being asked questions 
which are sensitive to discuss, the respondents may give normative answers in terms of 
‘what is preferred’, the researcher attempted to seek examples and an explanation for the 
respondent’s answers or perceptions.
Secondary Data
Apart from the data collected from questionnaire and in-depth interviews, this study
also relied on secondary data, including: the Project Documents, the Project
Implementation Manual, Village Development Plans, reports, and statistical data. These
sources of data mainly served to provide background understanding of the rules and
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regulations, organizational structure, planning and management procedures, and operation
of the program under study.
5.4. Data Analysis
5.4.1. Meaning of Empowerment
The methodology in this study recognizes that the key concept being analyzed - 
empowerment — is contextual (Alsop et al., 2005: 19; Speer, 2000: 52), and can be 
explained differently in different cultural settings (Murthy, 2001: 30). This recognition 
significantly affects the methodology employed to measure empowerment outcomes. It is 
obvious that a survey based on predetermined indicators in which respondents are asked to 
select one of a series of possible or expected outcomes can lead to various biases. 
Therefore, an inductive approach was adopted to avoid manipulating or imposing a fixed 
conceptualization of this phenomenon.
This research question, exploring the meaning of empowerment and its 
consequences in the Chiase program, relied solely on a qualitative approach -  ‘free listing’ 
methodology, proposed by Hines ( 1993: 738-739). This is a methodology of Cognitive 
Anthropology which is often used to define culturally specific domains (Hines, 1993: 739). 
A domain here is defined as an organized set of words, concepts, or sentences that all relate 
to a single concept, and these can be organized into taxonomies, which are systems of 
classifications. The rationale for using this methodology is that it involves ‘... uncovering 
ways in which various cultural groups classify and divide concepts’, which provides 
‘valuable insight into the way a particular group defines and organizes reality’ (Hines, 
1993: 738). This involves two steps: a free listing in which the researcher asks the 
respondents to list all the items they believe are included in a particular domain; and then 
these lists can be categorized into taxonomies based on explicit or implicit priorities 
identified by the respondents (Hines, 1993: 739).
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The qualitative analysis provided data on the specific characteristics of the ‘agency’ 
of the respondents on the basis of how the respondents described the changes in their roles 
in relation to decisions important to them that they had experienced. People’s narratives of 
changes in their agency were organized into ‘categories’ or groups of related responses. In 
addition, people’s narratives were also used to explore the elements inducing the changes in 
agency and the consequences of these changes in order to corroborate the analysis of 
factors affecting empowerment. Further, the responses of empowerment were then 
summarized by ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ groups, male and female, and communes with ‘less 
accountable CPMU’ and communes with ‘more accountable CPMU’ in order to provide a 
nuanced understanding of the phenomenon.
This summary of empowerment responses by ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ groups 
inherently required a clearly-defined set of characteristics of the elite. Generally, the ‘elite’ 
can be defined as a relatively small subgroup of society whose members comprise: people 
who are much more highly educated than the average citizens, people who are much 
wealthier than the average citizens, and people who are recognized by other members of 
society as deserving privileges based on their birthright and/or by their performance of 
certain occupations (Ober, 1989: 11). This definition suggests a number of distinguishing 
characteristics of the elite: wealth, political status, membership in powerful social 
organizations, educational attainment, and profession. Further, Dasgupta and Beard (2007: 
238-240) in a study of a CDD program in Indonesia, identify two broad categories of the 
elite: ‘old’ elites are ‘long-time residents who have been active and have had leadership 
roles in the community for an extended time’ (p.239), and often ‘an older generation of 
civil servants, teachers, and retired military service personnel ... the leaders of the ward’ 
(p.238); and the ‘new’ elites who are often younger, better educated professionals whose
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Status derives from their professional occupations or their relatively high economic status 
(p. 238, 239).
In addition, several studies on Vietnamese rural communities found that the 
differentiation in rural communities during the Renovation period was mainly attributed to 
off-farm sector employment, which included jobs in the government sector (Kerkvliet, 
1997: 65; Luong and Unger J., 1998: 66). Political position and entrepreneurship were 
among the key factors that accounted for the success of rural households in non-farm 
activities (Luong and Unger J., 1998: 82). As a result, households with political positions, 
capital, skills, and knowledge were more likely to succeed in gaining benefits created by 
the renovation process and leave the resource-poor households far behind (Tran, 2004a: 
158).
Relying on the above theoretical definitions of the elite and the empirical findings 
about the differentiation in rural communities, this study defines the elite group as 
comprising the following categories: the local leaders including village head, party 
members and leaders of local organization branches; incumbent and retired government 
staff; the economic better-off, and professionals including teachers, nurses, technicians, and 
veterinarians. The following sections elaborate the methodology examining the 
transformation of local power relations.
5.4.2. Effectiveness of the Chiase Program in Transforming Local Power Relations
Following the theoretical discussion in Chapter Three, the effectiveness of the
Chiase program in transforming local power relations was assessed though examining the 
performance of poverty targeting mechanisms adopted by the program and the creation of 
the ‘political capabilities' of the poor, characterized by the improvements in people’s 
participation in local decision-making and their social networks. This examination of
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‘political capabilities” was facilitated through comparing ‘before intervention' and ‘after 
intervention' statuses. Further, these changes were at times broken down into categories of 
‘poor’, ‘middle’, and ‘elite’ in order to highlight the variation of program impacts on 
different groups of local people. The identification of the three groups was as follows: the 
‘poor’ group comprised the households formally identified by the Commune People’s 
Committee as poor households; the ‘elite’ included government staff, local leaders, better- 
off people, and professionals as discussed in detail in the previous section; and the ‘middle’ 
group comprised the households who did not belong to either the ‘elite’ or the ‘poor’ group.
Performance o f Poverty Targeting Mechanisms
The Chiase program employed two separable poverty-targeting schemes for two 
periods 2004-2005 and 2006-2007, discussed in detail in Chapter Four. The analysis of the 
poverty targeting schemes focused on three themes: description of the mechanism, 
particularly the targeting method, implementing agents and eligibility' criteria; targeting 
performance - the extent to which the program benefits were directed to the poor; and 
attendant effects of each targeting scheme on people’s motivation for participation and 
community cohesion. These themes were mainly qualitatively analyzed with the 
supplementation of some quantitative data. Specifically, the examination of targeting 
mechanisms was facilitated by secondary data and the key informant interview. The 
performance of the first targeting mechanism was mainly analyzed based on secondary data 
(Village Development Plans and Reports) while that of the second mechanism was assessed 
on the basis of the questionnaire survey. Further, the key informant interview was used to 
produce a nuanced interpretation of the performance of targeting mechanisms. Finally, the 
attendant effects of targeting mechanisms were sought through open-ended questions in the 
questionnaire survey and key informant interview.
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Change in People ’s participation in local decision-making
The Chiase program introduced a new decision-making structure in the study area 
which involved direct people’s participation in all key decisions of the communities. This 
process induced substantial change in people’s participation in local decision-making. As 
people’s participation in local decision-making is mainly characterized by two questions, 
who participates and to what level participation is promoted (White, 1996: 7), the analysis 
of the change in people’s participation in local decision-making focused on two 
dimensions: changes in level of participation, and the extent to which ‘elite’, ‘middle’ and 
‘poor’ groups participated. The change in level of people’s participation was facilitated 
through examining the change in the scope of issues decided by the local people between 
‘before intervention’ and ‘after intervention’ statuses, and mainly involved qualitative data 
collected from key informant interviews.
The extent of people’s participation was measured by two variables: ‘meeting 
attendance' and ‘activeness in the meeting’. The variable ‘meeting attendance' was rated 
against a four-point scale of 0-3: 0 if the respondent never attended a meeting; 1 if the 
respondent occasionally attended a meeting; 2 if the respondent often attended a meeting; 
and 3 if the respondent always attended a meeting. The variable ‘activeness in the meeting’ 
was rated against a four-point scale of 0-3: 0 if the respondent never took the floor; 1 if the 
respondent rarely took the floor; 2 if the respondent occasionally took the floor; and 3 if the 
respondent often took the floor. Further, qualitative data, including incentives for people’s 
participation, obstacles obstructing people’s participation, and impacts of poverty targeting 
policies on people's motivation for participation, were collected. In addition, the relevance 
of community decisions was also assessed by seeking people’s perception collected through 
the questionnaire survey.
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Change in People 's Network
Following the discussion in Chapter Three, this study assessed the change in the 
social capital of poor people by looking at their social networks rather than measuring 
change in level of trust or reciprocity as a community property. This is an attempt to 
overcome the criticisms holding that the focus on community social capital obscures both 
class differentiation and power relations (Fine, 2001: 57; Flarriss, 2001: 1 13-115). This also 
facilitated an exploration of the difference between the social networks of the elite and that 
of the non-elite villagers, as Rao and Wanton (2004) argued that the emphasis on 
community social capital can contribute to inequality because the elites ‘are able to access 
internal and external social networks that are more powerful and wealthy1 (p. 16).
In rural societies, ‘individual households are embedded in multiple institutional 
settings at the same time and ... [they are] related to household livelihood strategies’ and 
these institutional settings primarily consist of regularized practices between individuals 
that exist in a personal network with family members, friends and local elites (Nuijten, 
1999). Therefore, in this study, the social networks of the local people were explored 
through the interview question asking people about the most important sources of support 
that their well-being had relied on (for example: paid employment, assistance in crisis 
times, credit, provision of agricultural extension services). Then the information about 
sources of support was summarized by ‘elite’, ‘middle’ and ‘poor’ groups in order to 
highlight the differences in social networks between the elite and non-elite.
Further, the marginal change in people’s social networks was examined by looking 
at the changes in relationships with these sources of support. The change in relationships 
with the providers or intermediaries of support was rated against a three-point scale of: -1, 
0, +1: -1 if the change was negative; 0 if no change occurred; +1 if the change was positive.
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To differentiate the change in social networks caused by the Chiase program from those 
caused by other reasons, respondents reporting changes in their social networks were ask to 
give an example and explanation about how the change occurred.
5.4.3. Factors Affecting Empowerment in the Chiase Program
The analysis of the factors affecting empowerment was facilitated by two related
components: first, a logistic regression analysis of factors which might have some bearing 
on the empowerment of the local people; and second, a qualitative analysis of these factors 
which was relied on people’s responses and an analysis of democratic decentralization in 
this program as presented in Chapter Four. The outcome of the qualitative analysis was 
used to corroborate the findings of the logistic regression analysis.
The logistic regression analysis involved the empowerment outcome as the 
dependent variable and a number of independent variables. The dependent variable - 
empowerment - was examined in terms of the probability or likelihood a respondent 
experienced empowerment. It was measured on a categorical scale with two categories: 1 if 
the respondent experienced a change in his/her agency, and 0 if the respondent did not 
experience any change in his/her agency. Six independent variables were included in this 
analysis: education level, level of participation in local organizations, wealth level, amount 
of material support received, number of training courses attended, and downward 
accountability of the CPMU. Though these variables were measured against different scales 
the reliability of the analysis of this thesis was not affected because emphasis was placed on 
the direction of change rather than comparing the magnitude of change.
Educational Attainment
Education- is important for the empowerment of the people in the CDD approach
since educational attainment should give them favorable access to knowledge and basic
skills which are crucial for their performance in various domains of life. Poverty has been
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widely attributed to lack of education (UNDP, 2001: 53-54; Vu, 2004: 230). Johnson 
(2001: 525) also argues that the ability to ‘obtain and understand information about laws, 
policies, and the rights to which one is entitled’ is dependent on ability to read. Therefore, 
individual educational attainment can be seen as a potential determinant of empowerment. 
Education was measured by the number of years of schooling and treated as a numeric 
variable.
Participation in Local Organizations
Theories of empowerment show that participation in local organizations can affect 
the likelihood one is empowered because group processes provide members with important 
organizational resources and create a sense of empowerment with the groups (Drury and 
Reicher, 1999: 383; Kroeker, 1996: 124). The context of rural societies in Vietnam, where 
local organizations play an important role in facilitating people’s access to a range of 
government supports, such as: credit, extension services, subsidies and emergency aids, 
further increase the significance of this variable toward empowerment. The variable 
‘participation in local organizations’ was measured by the number of local organizations a 
respondent took membership in, and was analyzed as a numeric variable. Although this 
variable is related to the number of available organizations in a community, it does not 
affect the validity of the analysis because the Chiase program as well as other CDD 
programs in Vietnam exclusively targets poor rural communities where civil societies are 
under-developed, local organizations are mostly mass organizations and somehow identical 
among communities.
Wealth Level
Wealth level is important because it in part represents the agent’s resources which 
form the ‘vehicle’ or ‘media’ for the exercise of power (Giddens, 1979: 91). Given that data 
about income and expenditure are difficult to adequately collect, and the validity of using
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asset as an indicator of wealth level has been justified (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001: 128), 
this study measured the wealth level of the respondents in terms of household assets. The 
wealth level of a household was measured as a composite index. Based on local norms for 
poverty and the indicators local people used to define and measure poverty, this thesis 
measured household assets from three aspects (1) quality of house, (2) quality of household 
facilities, and (3) means of communication. In each aspect, an indicator was rated against a 
4-point-scale, with 3 being the highest and 0 the lowest. A cumulative score on 3 indicators 
reflects the score of wealth index, which ranged from 0 to 9.
The indicators were rated as follows. First, quality of house was measured as: 0 if 
living in temporary housing; 1 if living in a brick house with low-quality furniture; 2 if 
living in a brick house with average-quality furniture; 3 if living in brick house with 
concrete roofing. Quality of household facilities was measured as 0 if having no access to 
the following facilities: clean water, electricity, and toilet with septic tank; 1 if having 
access to only one of the three above facilities; 2 if having access to two of the above three 
facilities; 3 if having access to all of the above three facilities. Means of communication 
was measured as 0 if having none of the following assets: TV, telephone, and motorbike; 1 
if having one of the above three type of asset; 2 if having two of the above three types of 
asset; 3 if having all the above three types of asset.
Material Support
Increased control over resources is a key aspect of empowerment (Osmani, 2000: 
23; Sen G., 1997: 2). Therefore, the relationship between ‘material support' and 
empowerment is theoretically plausible. Further, in the context of poor rural villages where 
material deprivation is pervasive, the effects of economic support may be even more 
significant. In this study, the variable ‘material support' was measured by the number of
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occasions on which a respondent received material benefits from the Chiase program, and 
was treated as a numeric variable.
Training
Gita Sen (1997: 2) argues that empowerment involves two interrelated components: 
enhancement of cognitive strength and control over resources. As the training courses in 
Chiase focused on a number of themes ranging from production skills and health to gender 
equality, it can be expected that the number of training courses a respondent attended 
would be related to his/her awareness and confidence in dealing with household and 
community issues. Therefore, the correlation between empowerment and ‘Training’ is 
theoretically plausible. The variable ‘training’ was measured by the number of training 
courses a respondent attended and was processed as a numeric variable.
Downward Accountability o f the CPMU
In democratic systems, the effectiveness of decentralization is also to a considerable 
extent determined by the downward accountability of the public body (Agrawal and Ribot, 
1999: 476; Blair, 2000: 27). The Chiase program is basically a democratic decentralization 
system which is characterized by the partnership between the local communities who 
control the decision-making and resources for development, and the Commune Project 
Management Unit (CPMU) which is responsible for monitoring and facilitating the local 
development process. Therefore, downward accountability of the CPMU may be important 
to the empowerment effect of the Chiase program. Further, given the localized nature of the 
implementation of grassroots democracy in Vietnam as discussed in Chapter Four, the 
correlation of empowerment outcomes on people and downward accountability of the 
CPMU is likely. Based on the pre-fieldwork analysis, two ‘less downwardly accountable’ 
and two ‘more downwardly accountable’ communes were selected as discussed previously. 
Downward accountability of the CPMU was rated on a categorical scale, with two values: 0
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for ‘less downwardly accountable" communes; and 1 for ‘more downwardly accountable
communes.
5.5. Profile of Study Area
5.5.1. Quang Tri province
The fieldwork was carried out in four communes Gio An, Gio Binh, Gio Son, and 
Gio Viet of Gio Linh district, Quang Tri province. The province is located in the North 
Central Coast region, is approximately 600km to the South from Hanoi, and borders Quang 
Binh province to the North, Thua Thien Hue province to the South, the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Laos to the West and the East Sea to the East (See Map 1). This 
area suffered from serious damage during the American war and was almost completely in 
ruins after 1973. It has a total area of 4,651 square kilometers (465,100 ha) which is 
geographically divided into four zones: the coastal, the lowland, the midland, and the 
highland. The province has a coastline of 75 km with two estuaries, one island, and a 
territorial water of 84,000 km which forms a vast fishing field, and an in-land water 
surface of 1,400 ha of which 400 ha is brackish water, suitable for aquaculture 
development. The total population of the province was about 621,600 persons in 2005, of 
which rural population accounted for 75.5 per cent with 469,200 persons. Kinh is the ethnic 
majority group accounting for 85.9 per cent of total population. There are two ethnic 
minority groups of Van Kieu and Pa Co who live mostly in highland areas. The province 
has 2 towns and 7 districts with 117 communes (Quang Tri Statistical Yearbook 2005).
Quang Tri is one of poorest provinces in Vietnam. Based on the GSO poverty line, 
in 2002, it was ranked the 14th poorest out of 61 provinces in the country with a poverty 
incidence of 52.2 per cent while the country average is just 36.5 per cent (Minot and 
Baulch, 2002: 25). If the MOLISA poverty line is applied, the provincial poverty rate in 
2002 was 24.6 per cent (Chiase Quang Tri Project Document, 2003: 8).
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Map 3: Map of Quang Tri Province and Location of Study Area
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Based on the Human Development Index, which incorporates three dimensions of well­
being, income, health and education, the province was ranked 42nd out of 61 provinces 
(National Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities, 2001: 90). A poverty assessment 
study (Quang Tri DPI Annual Report, 2002: 21) found that poverty at household level was 
caused by the following factors: lack of knowledge and production experience; lack of 
capital for production; lack of labor, that is households with high dependence ratio or poor 
health; sickness and disability; lack of land for agricultural cultivation; and natural 
calamities (p.21).
5.5.2. Gio Linh District
Gio Linh district is located in the north of Quang Tri province (see Map 3) with a 
total area of 473 km divided into coastal, lowland, midland, and mountainous zones. The 
district consists of nineteen communes and one township, of which ten communes are 
incorporated in the Chiase program, with sixty-seven beneficiary villages. In 2005. it had a 
population of 77,888 persons, living in 16,573 households, of which 35,874 persons were at 
working age. Overall the labor force was poorly educated, with only 1.1 per cent having a 
college or university degree (District Statistical Yearbook 2005).
Local production is predominantly agriculture. Farming, husbandry, forest and 
fishery production play a vital role in the economic structure of the district, employing 81.1 
per cent of the total labor force, while industry, handicraft and construction attract 13.2 per 
cent, and trade and services employ 5.7 per cent (District Statistical Yearbook 2005). The 
agricultural production in the district is to a large extent influenced by the tropical monsoon 
climate: the hot and dry monsoon with Southwestern winds, during the period of March to 
August, which often causes drought; and the wet and cold monsoon with Northeastern 
winds, during the period September to February, which is often associated with heavy rains,
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storms, and tloods. Production is characterized by a low level of technology adoption and 
high susceptibility to frequent storms and typhoons. Off-farm employment, such as rural 
industry, services, and small business, are still at a rudimentary stage.
The poverty rate in Gio Linh district is a bit higher than the provincial average 
level. In 2002, based on the MOLISA poverty line, about 29.8 per cent of the local 
households were classified as poor, while if the GSO poverty line was applied, the poverty 
rate went up to 61.2 per cent. The average annual per capita income in 2002 was 95 USD, 
much lower the national average. Poverty is most acute in the coastal and highland areas 
(Chiase Quang Tri Project Document, 2003: 10).
5.5.3. Study Communes
Gio Viet is a coastal commune located in the southeast of Gio Linh district with a 
total area of 5.5 km . It has seven villages, of which the two villages Viet Trung and Viet 
Loc, were selected as sites for the survey. It is home to 1,477 households, of which 484 
households are classified as poor. The poverty rate “ was 32.8 per cent in 2006. The 
commune has one primary school, one secondary school, and one clinic and all the member 
villages have access to electricity. The main infrastructure problem is the bad condition of 
the transportation networks in winter. The commune residents mainly earn their living from 
near-shore aqua-product exploitation. The supplementary sources of income include paddy, 
sweet potato, cassava and husbandry (Gio Viet CPMU annual report 2006).
Gio An is a midland commune located in the west of the Gio Linh district. It covers 
an area of 27.8 km and consists of seven villages, of which the two villages of An Van and 
An Son are incorporated in the survey for this study. The commune has 759 households
’2 Poverty data for the study communes are based on the most up-to-date MOLISA Poverty Line for the 
period 2006-2008.
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with 3,282 persons. In 2006, the poverty rate was 27.1 per cent, with 206 households 
classified as poor. The commune has one primary school, one secondary school, a clinic, 
and a rather developed road network. Lack of access to clean water is one of the serious 
problems of the local people. Gio An is an agricultural commune with a diverse crop 
system. The main crop is paddy cultivation while secondary crops include been, sweet 
potato, cassava, and fruit trees. Industrial crops are also developed, with pepper and rubber 
plantation. Raising livestock and fresh-water fish are also important sources of local 
income (Gio An CPMU annual report 2006).
Gio Son is a midland commune located in the west of the Gio Linh district with a 
total area of 8.4 km . The commune consists of five villages, of which Son Dong and Son 
Khe were selected for the survey. It is home to 650 households, with 36.0 per cent of them 
or 234 households classified as poor. The commune has one primary school, one secondary 
school, and one clinic. Communication routes are mostly earth roads, some hamlets still do 
not have access to electricity, and many people lack access to clean water. Local people 
mainly earn their living from agricultural production. The crop system includes paddy, 
cassava, sweet potato, and beens, while husbandry is also an important income source (Gio 
Son CPMU annual report 2006).
Gio Binh commune is located next to the district township. The commune has 499 
households with 2185 persons, living in six villages. The two villages being incorporated in 
the survey for this thesis are Binh Kim and Binh Lieh. In 2006, the poverty rate in the 
commune was 34.1 per cent, with 170 households classified as poor. The commune has one 
primary school and one clinic with a relatively developed communication route. However, 
some hamlets of the communes still lack access to electricity. Most local residents make 
their living from a mixed crop system including paddy, been, sweet potato, cassava.
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vegetable, and fruit trees. Husbandry is a supplementary source of income. Some local 
residents work for a state-run rubber tree plantation nearby and have substantially higher 
incomes as compared to the average level of the commune (Gio Binh CPMU annual report 
2006). .
5.6. Conclusion
This chapter describes the methodology used in the thesis and gives a brief of socio­
economic status of the area where the field-work was conducted. The research adopted a 
mixed-method methodology involving both qualitative and quantitative data collection and 
analysis techniques. Given the contextual and subtle nature of the research issue of concern 
and the constraints on time and financial resources, the use of a mixed-method approach in 
this study was appropriate.
The methodology used for the analysis of the first research question -  meaning of 
empowerment -  was based on the methodology derived from Hines (1993: 738-739), in 
which people’s self-evaluation is used to determine categories of responses. Based on these 
categories, the meaning of empowerment in the Chiase program and the implications for 
the transformation in power relations were inferred. The examination of the second 
research question -  the effectiveness of the Chiase program in transforming local power 
relations - was based on factual data about the performance of this program and people’s 
attitudes. Implications for transformation of power relations were sought through 
measuring effects on people’s participation in local decision-making and social networks. 
Further, where relevant, the program effect was compared for the ‘elite’, ‘middle’ and 
‘poor’ groups. The last research question -  factors affecting empowerment of the poor - 
was mainly explored through a logistic regression analysis of the relationships between 
empowerment and six potential factors: education level extent of participation in local 
organizations, wealth level, amount of material support received, number of training
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courses attended, and downward accountability of the CPMU. The next chapter outlines
key findings of the study.
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Chapter Six: The Results
6.1. Introduction
This chapter presents the key results of this study achieved through three 
components of analysis. First, people’s perception of changes in agency and their 
consequences are explored in order to highlight the meaning of empowerment in the Chiase 
CDD program and some implications for power relations change. The main finding of this 
analysis is that empowerment in the Chiase program, in terms of the changes in agency, is 
experienced as improved performance in two broad domains of life: household and 
community; and further, while the ‘elite’ are more likely to achieve empowerment in the 
community domain, the ‘non-elite’ are more likely to achieve empowerment in the 
household domain. Further, the performance of poverty targeting mechanisms and the 
improvements in people’s participation in local decision-making and social networks are 
examined. While remarkable impacts on power relations are recorded, problems associated 
with program design and constraints of local people, which inhibit the empowerment, are 
identified as well. These findings have important implications for the implementation of the 
CDD approach in Vietnam.
The final finding is that there is a significant correlation between empowerment and 
the level of downward accountability of the CPMU - the government partner in the Chiase 
program. This finding supports the notion that the empowerment impact of the Chiase 
program is stronger if the CPMU is more accountable to the people. Other factors that are 
strongly correlated with empowerment are a respondent’s participation in local 
organizations and amount of benefits and training the respondent has received. The next 
section analyzes these findings in detail.
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6.2. Meaning of Empowerment 
6.2.1. Responses of Empowerment
A central concern of this study is the characteristics of empowerment experienced 
by the people under the Chiase CDD program. As discussed in Chapter Two, empowerment 
can be validly measured in terms of change in agency and based on people’s subjective 
measurement. The key question that the fieldwork looked at was how the respondent’s 
empowerment, in terms of change in agency, occurred during the implementation of the 
program. Then, the influencing factors and consequences of these changes in agency were 
also sought to facilitate a nuanced understanding of empowerment in this program.
This section focuses on people’s perception about the empowerment the villagers 
had experienced. The people’s perception about empowerment would include various 
forms of change in agency they had experienced, and their consequences. The responses to 
the questions asking about the changes in people’s agency in the survey are relative in that 
they are about the difference between present and past status of a person’s ability. Though 
the responses were very diverse, they can be grouped into five categories.
• ability to influence household decisions;
• ability to handle household issues more independently and efficiently;
• ability to have more voice in village issues;
• ability to query the local officials; and
• ability to influence the performance of community works.
As an important concern regarding decentralized development initiatives is whether 
elite capture occurs, this study examined the difference between the empowerment
33 Elite capture is defined as where decentralized power is used to influence political outcomes through
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Table 6.1: Responses of Empowerment
No Forms of Change in Agency Groups of respondents
Elite group ‘Middle’ and ‘Poor’
(n=37) group (n= 189)
F % F %
1 Influence household decisions 4 10.8 28 15.6
2 Handle household issues independently 
and efficiently
5 13.5 56 29.6
3 Influence community decisions 20 54.1 24 12.7
4 Query the commune-level staff 12 32.4 19 10.0
5 Influence the performance o f 
community works
11 29.8 6 3.1
Male (n=l 08) Female (n=108)
F % F %
1 Influence household decisions 0 0.0 32 29.6
2 Handle household issues independently 
and efficiently
32 29.6 29 26.1
3 Influence community decisions 28 25.9 16 14.8
4 Query the commune-level staff 19 17.6 12 11.1
5 Influence the performance of 
community works
15 13.9 2 1.9
Less accountable More accountable
CPMU (n= 102) CPMU (n = 114)
F % F %
1 Influence household decisions 15 14.7 17 14.9
2 Handle household issues independently 
and efficiently
28 27.5 33 28.9
3 Influence community decisions 14 13.7 30 26.3
4 Query the commune-level staff 13 12.7 18 15.8
5 Influence the performance o f 
community works
6 5.9 1 1 9.6
Source: Field Survey 2007.
impacts of the Chiase program on the elite and those on the other groups of local people. In
manipulation of information and perceptions, or by limiting the voice of others (Conning and Kevene, 2002: 
384).
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doing so, the responses were summarized by two groups: 'Elite' and 'Middle and Poor' 
which facilitated a comparison of changes in agency between these groups in study 
communities. In addition, the responses were compared between male and female, between 
'less accountable' and 'more accountable' communes. Further, for each form of change in 
agency, its affecting factors and consequences at both individual and community levels 
were examined. The responses of empowerment are summarized in Table 6.1
‘Influence Household Decisions ’
There were thirty-two female respondents regarding a range of changes which 
referred to the ability to ‘influence household decisions’. The respondents explained that 
before the implementation of the Chiase program, the husband would unilaterally take 
major decisions on key household issues, such as investment on production or purchase of 
assets. Through the implementation of this program, at the time of this survey, it was 
reported that many household decisions were either jointly made or being made after 
greater consultation with women. While the changes in family decision-making were very 
context-specific, the responses were mostly related to following issues: purchase of 
household assets, investment on household production, children’s education, and the 
practices of farming and livestock rearing. The implication of greater consultation was that 
the women could influence the important household decisions to a greater extent. The 
respondents largely attributed these changes to two factors: increase of women’s productive 
skills and their contribution to household income, and improvements in awareness about 
rights and entitlements by both men and women. That is, the increase in contribution to 
household income and productive skills created a sense of confidence for the women in 
dealing with the men, while the improved awareness about human rights and entitlements 
substantially enhanced their sense of self-worth. Further, through attending village 
meetings and training courses on gender equality, men also changed their perception about
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role of the women in the family life.
The consequence of this change in people’s agency was an increased sense of self­
esteem and more equal domestic relationships. More than one-fourth of female respondents 
mentioned being more respected by their husbands. For instance, a woman said:
The project increased my production skills and awareness of my rights. Now I feel 
much more confident in dealing with my husband. I can discuss with him about 
issues of our family and make a stand for my view if needed. He no longer disregards 
my opinions as before. (Field Survey, Viet Trung village, June 2007).
The respondents also mentioned being released from domestic violence as an
impact of the Chiase program. The ending of gender-based violence was also reported by
the key informants as a remarkable change through the implementation of the Chiase
program. On the other hand, men’s thought about the role of women also changed as about
two-thirds of the husbands of this group of female respondents said that through the
implementation of the Chiase program, they better understood and highly appreciated
women’s contribution to household living. Significantly, public concern about gender
equality was created in the study villages, which was reflected in the words of a village
Flead:
In this village, there was a man who, when he got drunk, often beat his wife and 
children. Before, we thought it was a family matter and did not get involved. After 
attending the training on gender equality, we understand that what conduct is 
unlawful and unacceptable. So, we [leaders of mass organizations in the village] 
talked to him seriously about this issue and he has stopped beating her though he still 
kept drinking (Field Survey, An Van village, March 2007).
In relation to theories of empowerment (see Chapter Two), as this form of 
empowerment - the ability to influence household decisions - is characterized by the 
development of a sense of self-esteem, confidence and improved skills, it refers to the 
increase o f ‘personal power’. Data in Table 6.1 indicates that the percentage o f ‘elite’ group
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experiencing this form of empowerment was much lower that that of the non-elite group, at 
10.8 per cent and 15.6 per cent respectively. This may be attributed to the fact that ‘elite’ 
women were less disempowered in this respect than the non-elite in the first place. That is, 
the ‘elite’, comprising government officials, local leaders, professionals and better-off 
people, are often more educated and socially connected, and likely to be better informed 
about gender equality and less influenced by traditional norms which mostly favor 
patriarchal structures. Both ‘less downwardly accountable’ and ‘more downwardly 
accountable’ groups of communes had a similar rate of people acquiring this form of 
empowerment, at 14.7 per cent and 14.9 per cent respectively.
‘Handle Household Issues Independently and Efficiently ’
This is the group of changes with the highest response rate, at 28.2 per cent. The 
respondents, mostly the ‘poor' and ‘middle’ farmers, reported a change in their ability to 
act independently and efficiently. They identified two types of change: first, the support of 
the Chiase program in terms of social infrastructure, for example the construction of a 
water supply system or the installation of an electricity network, had made them no longer 
dependent on their neighbors or relatives for essential living facilities. Through these 
improvements, the respondents could lead a more independent life. For example, a poor 
farmer in Gio An commune stated:
Thanks to the building of the water supply system, my family no longer has to fetch 
water from the neighbor’s well. Now I feel much more confident and independent in 
dealing with the folks (Field Survey, An Son, March 2007).
Second, the respondents also mentioned the ability to manage household production 
more independently as an important change they had experienced. These changes were 
attributed to the improvements in terms of access to productive assets and production skills. 
For instance, the respondents mentioned that the provision of oxen for poor farmers made
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them less dependent on hiring tractors and increased their control over the household 
production. Further, the introduction of new crops, which were more profitable than paddy, 
and new livestock rearing techniques had substantially raised the efficiency of the local 
people’s production. A farmer explained:
Previously, when raising a cow, the herdsman had to follow it all the time. Now, 
applying the new raising techniques, we do not have to follow it. We just tether it in 
one place and feed it with grass and salt. Doing this makes the cow grow faster and 
saves much of our time and efforts (Field Survey, Binh Kim, April 2007).
The responses showed that this form of empowerment had resulted in a sense of
confidence and increased control over household living and production for the respondents.
This form of empowerment can be classified from Chapter Two as an increase in ‘personal
power’, an increase in the confidence and capabilities of the respondents.
Data in Table 6.1 shows that the proportion of the ‘non-elite’ group experiencing 
this form of empowerment was 29.6 per cent, far exceeding that of the ‘elite’ group at 13.5 
per cent. The superior performance of the ‘poor’ group with regard to this form of 
empowerment may be in part attributed to their lack of access to productive assets, 
domestic infrastructure, or production skills in the first place. The difference between male 
and female in terms of achieving this form of empowerment is negligible (29.6 per cent and 
26.10 per cent) while the difference between the ‘less downwardly accountable’ and ‘more 
downwardly accountable’ communes in this respect is a bit more significant (27.5 per cent 
and 18.9 per cent).
‘Influence Community Decisions ’
A group of forty-four respondents reported a change in ability to influence 
community decisions. The responses from the survey largely referred to the decisions 
governing the allocation and management of the Village Development Fund (VDF).
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Specifically, the village issues that the respondents had discussed and decided covered the 
following areas: identification of problems and proposals for change, approval of priority 
activities to be implemented every year, identification of the beneficiaries, formulation of 
regulations governing the VDF, and selection of service providers.
The implementation of democratic decision-making through village meetings by the 
Chiase program gave local people the opportunity to discuss and make cooperative 
decisions on key issues of the communities. As mentioned above, all key decisions 
regarding the planning and management of the VDF were directly decided by the villagers, 
through majority voting. This mechanism significantly enhanced people’s awareness of 
their democratic right and sense of ownership, which facilitated their willingness to 
participate in village meetings, as demonstrated by the expression of a leader of the 
Women's Union Branch in Gio An commune:
Chiase is the only project allowing us to select development activities and 
beneficiaries by ourselves. We can define the problems of our village and devise the 
actions to solve the problems as well. We are now more self-motivated because we 
control our own development (Field Survey, Viet Loc, March 2007).
This group of respondents identified two important consequences. At the
community level, the respondents in this group reported that through implementation of the
Chiase program, community decisions became more relevant to local problems. As to the
individual level, the acquirers of this form of empowerment gained a sense of confidence
and improved social skills, what is public speaking. In relation to theories of empowerment
(see Chapter Two), this change in ability to ‘influence community decisions’ features an
increase of both ‘personal power’ defined as increased skills and self-efficacy, and
‘political power’ defined as the ability to influence the allocation of social and economic
resources.
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Data in Table 6.1 indicates that this form of empowerment was more common 
among the ‘elite’ group, with about 54.1 per cent of this group reporting this type of change 
as compared to only 12.7 per cent of the ‘non-elite’ group. Male respondents were more 
active than females in this regard, at 25.9 per cent and 14.8 per cent respectively. The 
percentage of respondents from the ‘more downwardly accountable’ communes 
experiencing empowerment of this type is almost double that of ‘less downwardly 
accountable’ communes’ (26.3 per cent and 13.7 per cent). This seems to indicate that the 
extent to which the Commune Program Management Unit (CPMU) is accountable to 
people has a strong bearing on the empowerment impacts of this program.
‘Query the Local Government Officials ’
Another group comprising thirty-one respondents reported the ability to query the 
local government staff, as the key change in agency. They could identify that their 
questions to commune-level government staff mostly focused on the provision of 
government support, such as: emergency aid for disaster victims, subsidies for elderly, 
disabled and lonely; selection of participants for agricultural extension services; and the 
allocation and management of the VDF in the Chiase program. Before the implementation 
of the Chiase program, though the right to query commune leaders had been 
institutionalized into grassroots democratization legislation, the understanding and exercise 
of this democratic right was very limited. People had very limited information about the 
government support they were entitled to and did not know where to go and how to apply 
for it. Further, their questions often received no feedback from the Commune People’s 
Committee (CPC) and district-level line agencies. People reported that through the 
implementation of the Chiase program, the officials became ‘closer’ and more responsive 
to their inquiries.
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According to the respondents, this form of empowerment was facilitated through 
the improved communication between the commune-level staff and local people. Through 
the village meetings, where the CPMU staff were required to attend to facilitate local 
planning and decision-making, people could acquire information and demand justification 
of the decisions of commune-echelon government. One respondent in Gio Viet commune 
asserted:
Through the implementation of the Chiase program, the commune-level government 
became closer to the people and it was easier for us to acquire information and voice 
our opinion to the officials (Field Survey, Viet Trung village, June 2007).
The key consequence of this form of empowerment was the improved
responsiveness of the government officials. The respondents in this group mentioned that
the local government had been more responsive to people’s feedback than before. A
villager reported:
The commune officials now join meetings with us frequently. They help us to 
prepare the proposals for Chiase-funded activities. They also informed us about 
government-support programs and help us to make the application (Field Survey,
Son Khe village, May 2007).
Further, the respondents of this group reported an increase in access at individual 
level to available resources and in confidence in dealing with the officials. In relation to 
theories of empowerment, this form of empowerment is characterized by an increase in 
both ‘personal power’ defined as increased self-efficacy and ‘political power' defined as 
the ability to influence the allocation of resources.
The percentage of ‘elite' households reporting this form of empowerment was 32.4 
per cent, much higher than that of ‘non-elite’ households at only 10.0 per cent (see Table 
6.1). Male respondents had a higher rate of experiencing empowerment of this type than 
females, at 17.6 and 12.0 per cent respectively. Finally, the percentage of respondents from
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‘more downwardly accountable’ communes acquiring this form of empowerment was 15.8 
per cent, higher than that of ‘less downwardly accountable’ communes’, at only 12.7 per 
cent.
‘Influence the Construction o f Community Works ’
Seventeen respondents referred to the ability to influence the performance of 
community works as the significant change they felt in their agency. Before the 
implementation of the Chiase program, all infrastructure work in the study villages was 
managed by the district or commune-level government. People’s supervision, though 
institutionalized in the grassroots democratization legislation, did not exist in the study 
communities. Under the Chiase program, people’s involvement in the supervision and 
inspection of community works had been encouraged and facilitated. The change was 
explained by a respondent in Gio An commune:
Under the Chiase program, people’s participation in the supervision of infrastructure 
work was substantially improved. Apart from the supervision performed by the 
construction supervisor, local people also monitored the construction process. When 
the work was completed and handed over to the village, the villagers were involved 
in inspecting the shortcomings as well. The contractors must correct all defects found 
by people otherwise the village will decline to make the payment (Field Survey, An 
Van village, March 2007).
The respondents largely attributed this change to the devolution policy of the 
Chiase program which gave the control over the VDF to the villagers and involved them in 
implementing and monitoring the community works. This substantially raised a sense of 
ownership among local people and also made the act of people’s supervision become more 
legitimate in the eyes of the contractors. People’s opinions were no longer disregarded as 
before. Further, access to information about construction sub-projects, such as technical 
design or budget estimates, was also crucial for the increased participation of local people 
in supervising infrastructure work. Plowever, it is noteworthy that only a small group,
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mostly the retired officials, experienced farmers and village leaders, were active in this 
respect.
This form of empowerment affected both community and individual levels. The 
consequence for the local communities was the increased cost-effectiveness of community 
infrastructure work. The respondents of this group claimed that the Chiase-funded works 
managed by the villagers was more cost-effective than those conventionally managed. 
Further, these respondents reported that through involvement in the supervision activities, 
they became ‘more confident and skillful' in monitoring infrastructure works and could 
perform better in future. These changes feature an increase in both ‘personal power’ and 
‘political power’ of the local people.
Data in Table 6.1 indicates that the percentage of ‘elite’ households experiencing 
this form of empowerment (29.8 per cent) was much higher than that of ‘non-elite’ 
households (3.1 per cent). This is not surprising as supervising community works required 
some technical skills and was not of interest to the majority of poor people. Males also 
dominated females in this respect, with 13.9 per cent and 1.9 per cent respectively reporting 
this form of empowerment. The percentage of respondents from ‘more downwardly 
accountable' communes experiencing empowerment of this type was much higher than that 
o f ‘less downwardly accountable’ communes’ at 9.6 per cent and 5.9 per cent. The inferior 
performance of the ‘less downwardly accountable communes’ in this respect is predictable 
as people’s participation in construction work was limited in these communes.
6.2.2. Domains of Change in the Chiase Program
People’s responses about their empowerment through the implementation of the
Chiase program described in the previous section refer exclusively to the changes in 
decision-making in two broad domains: household and community. First, in the household
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domain, there were two groups of responses, those around ‘influencing household 
decisions' and those around ‘handling household issues independently and efficiently’, 
which were related to decision-making at the household level. This is about the acquisition 
of ‘personal power’, which is defined as the increase of a sense of self-esteem, confidence 
and basic skills (Schulz and Israel, 1991: 10). The consequences of the change in agency in 
the household domain included changes in domestic relationships, independence of the 
household and efficiency of household production. Change in the household domain, 
according to the respondents, though having no direct effect on the political power, were of 
importance to the respondents.
Empowerment in the community domain is characterized by ability to ‘influence 
community decisions’; to ‘query the local government officials’; and to ‘influence the 
performance of community works’, which are all examples of decision-making on 
community issues. At community level, these changes led to an increase in the relevance of 
community decisions, responsiveness of local officials, and cost-effectiveness of 
community works. The consequence at individual level was an increase in both skills and 
confidence, defined as ‘personal power’, and the ability to influence the allocation and 
management of community resources, known as ‘political power’ (Schulz and Israel, 1991: 
10).
A striking finding emerging from Table 6.2 is that the rate of ‘non-elite’ people 
experiencing empowerment in the household domain was 42.5 per cent, while for the ‘elite’ 
it was 19.0 per cent, while the rate of ‘elite’ people experiencing empowerment in the 
community domain was 62.1 per cent, far exceeding that of the ‘non-elite’ at only 14.5 per 
cent. The Chi- Square test indicates that, at 95 per cent confidence level, the differences in 
the empowerment rates in both household and community domains between the two groups
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are statistically significant (see Appendix 6). This means the ‘elite’ were more likely to 
experience empowerment in the community domain while the ‘non-elite’ were more likely 
to achieve empowerment in the household domain. This finding has important implications 
for the implementation of the CDD approach and will be returned to in the next chapter.
Table 6.2: Empowerment in the Household and Community Domains
Group Domain of Empowerment
Household Community
Frequency % Frequency %
Non-elite group (n= 179) 76 42.5 34 19.1
Elite group (n=37) 7 19.0 23 62.1
Source: Field Survey 2007.
6.3. Effectiveness of the Chiase Program in Transforming Local Power Relations 
6.3.1. Poverty Targeting in the Chiase Program
Poverty reduction is obviously a focus of the Chiase program as its objective is for 
‘poor households [to] have good access to poverty alleviation resources’. Poverty incidence 
is consistently considered among the key criteria based on which the provinces, districts 
and communes are incorporated into the program (Chiase Program Document, 2003: 36). 
The focus on poverty is maintained as one of the key principles in implementing the 
program activities at all levels from village to national (Program Field Manual, 2003: 5). 
This section focuses on the performance of poverty targeting mechanisms in the Chiase 
program and its attendant effects.
During the period 2004-2005, the program adopted a ‘Community-based targeting’ 
mechanism and involved the local community as the ‘intermediary agent’ (see Chapter 
Three). The local communities were solely responsible for formulating poverty criteria, 
assessing eligibility and implementing the delivery of benefits. The identification of poor 
households was done directly by the local people, through majority voting if consensus
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could not be achieved. All the study villages managed their VDF through 'revolving fund' 
schemes. They decided that the support must be in the form of a loan to be paid back to the 
VDF and the non-poor were also eligible for economic support though the poor people 
were more prioritized in providing loans. The rationale for using loans, instead of grants, 
was that households would be more responsible and keen to work harder, thus making the 
income generating activity more profitable if they had to pay back the support they had 
received. Further, by supporting people in the form of loans, other people in the village 
could also borrow money from the VDF, through which sustainability of the VDF was 
achieved. Each village approved a set of regulations on the management of its income­
generating fund.
After two years of implementation, it was revealed that in the study villages this 
Community-based poverty targeting mechanism had delivered material support to both 
poor and non-poor households, though the rate of poor households receiving material 
benefits was much higher than that of the non-poor (see Table 6.3). T his tendency was also 
known to the program authority. The 2005 Gio Linh DPMU Annual Report found that 
1,646 poor households and 2,675 non-poor households had received loans from the Chiase 
program in the two years 2004 and 2005, and concluded: ‘The villages tended to equally 
allocate program financial resources to local households” 4 (2005 Gio Linh DPMU Annual 
Report, 2005: 14). The key informants attributed this phenomenon to two factors. First, the 
potential severe punishment of failure to pay back the loan had made many poor people -  
who have a low and unstable economic base -  fearful about borrowing from the VDF. 
Second, local people largely perceived equity - a principle of the Chiase program as equal
4 However, it is noteworthy that though the number of non-poor receiving loans, as shown in the report, was 
larger that that of the poor, the percentage of poor households receiving loans still far exceeded that of the 
non-poor, as the poverty rate of Chiase-funded villages in Gio Linh district in 2005 ranged from 16.2 to 29.4.
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opportunities for all to get benefits from the program. Therefore, as poor households had 
already received support in the form of loans during the first year, in the second year, the 
villagers believed that program benefits should come to the non-poor, even though some 
poor households wanted to borrow more money.
Table 6.3: Number and Percentage of Households Receiving Material Support in 2005
No Village Number of households Number and Percentage of 
beneficiary households
Total Poor0 Non-Poor Poor Non-Poor
Number % Number %
1 Viet Trung 96 26 70 14 53.8 7 10.0
2 Viet Loc 100 18 82 9 50.0 8 9.8
3 An Son 78 17 61 10 58.8 16 26.2
4 An Van 93 18 75 1 1 61.1 18 24.0
5 Binh Lieh 75 19 56 12 63.1 20 35.7
6 Binh Kim 64 14 50 7 50 13 26.0
7 Son Dong 97 24 73 12 50 17 17.8
8 Son Khe 86 21 65 10 47.6 16 24.6
Source: 2005 Village Development Plans
This phenomenon shows a discrepancy between the poverty targeting expectations 
of the program authority and the preferences of the local villages. While the program 
planners and managers expected that most program resources would be directed to the poor, 
local people mostly held the view that economic benefit provided by the Chiase should be 
given to all villagers though priority could be given to the poor (see Table 6.4). This was 
the most equitable and fairest way of distribution of economic resource as perceived by the 
majority of local people. This local preference had significantly affected the poverty 
targeting outcome of the program.
° The summary of poor households in this table is based on the MOLISA poverty line for the period 2001 - 
2005, which is much lower than the poverty line for the period 2005-2008 when this survey was carried out.
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Table 6.4: People’s Preference of Alternative Targeting Policies
Alternative of Targeting Policy Frequency Percentage
1. Economic benefit is equally accessible for all 28 12.9
2. Economic benefit is accessible for all; priority is given to the 115 53.4
poor
3. Economic benefit is accessible for the poor only 73 33.7
Source: Field Survey 2007.
In addition, community-based poverty targeting was also affected by factors other 
than destitution. Households seen by the local people as ‘lazy’ or ‘socially irresponsible’ -  
who did not fulfill their citizen responsibilities, such as not paying tax and regulated fees, 
not contributing to community works, or breaking village regulations - were less likely to 
be given support. There was also collusion in selecting the poor households through 
majority voting. For example, the village Head in An Van village explained:
It’s sometimes not equitable to select poor households by majority voting. Many 
people in good financial conditions were still voted as poor. In the meeting for 
selection of poor households, 1 advised people not to vote for those who were well 
off but they still did and the minority had to submit to the majority. At the same time, 
there were households who were really poor but not voted for. One example was Mr.
T, whose wife had died, leaving him two small children. I raised my hand to vote for 
him, but only some people followed suit. People thought that he was often absent 
from meetings and was not qualified for program support. They said those who did 
not attend meetings would be rejected. That day, he [Mr. T] didn’t join the meeting, 
but he in fact had attended some others. This problem was not caused by the cadres, 
but by people (Interview of key informant, An Van village, 2007).
In response to the leaking of development funds to the non-poor households, since 
2006 the Chiase program authority has decided to change the Community-based poverty 
targeting mechanism into a government-based ‘explicit’ mechanism. Both local 
government and community were then involved in assessing eligibility. Further, the 
program maintained that economic support must be in the form of grants and given to
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formally-identified poor households only.
In practice, the selection of beneficiaries involved two steps. First, the list of poor 
households in each village was to be identified by the CPC based on the poverty criteria set 
by the MOLISA. Second, the local communities were to select the beneficiaries for 
particular activities from this predefined list of poor households. Obviously, the accuracy of 
this ‘explicit’ poverty targeting mechanism then turned out to be dependent on two factors: 
the identification of poor households by the CPC and the identification of beneficiaries for 
particular activities by the local communities. However, the accuracy of the poverty 
assessment done by the CPC was often questioned by people as the list of ‘poor’ 
households identified by the CPC often contained ‘non-deserving’ cases (Field Survey, 
2007).
This government-based ‘explicit targeting’ mechanism caused two related 
problems. First, the exclusion of the non-poor households from accessing program benefits 
induced a widespread discontent among the non-poor people. It was reflected through the 
high drop-out of village meetings since the adoption of the new targeting scheme as will be 
examined in next section. Second, the identification of poor households by local 
government was often inconsistent with the perception of the local people. Most of 
respondents (92 per cent) reported that there were households identified by the CPC as 
‘poor’ but were not really poor as perceived by local people though the number of these 
cases was not large (Field Survey, 2007). However, as the list of poor households had been
,(’ In all eight study villages, the respondents complained about ‘non-deserving’ poor households. However, 
the number of complaints in villages where the CPMU held consultative meetings with people before 
approving the list of ‘poor’ was lower than that of other villages. Among four communes under study, only 
two communes, Gio An and Gio Viet, held consultative meetings with local people before approving the list 
o f ‘poor’ households.
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identified and approved by the commune government, the local communities could not rule 
these households out. Many complaints by local people referred to these cases and they 
were often mentioned as the examples of the unfairness of the Chiase program. This caused 
much pressure on the local leaders who directly implemented the delivery of benefits to the 
beneficiaries. The situation was explained by the village head in Gio Binh commune:
Much dispute and contradiction arose from this way of selecting poor households. 
Though the households were classified as poor, average and well-off, in reality, 
many of them were in similar conditions. Some ‘poof households were in good 
economic conditions. When people queried these cases, we could not explain. The 
government staff should consult the village before finalizing the list of poor 
households (Interview of key informant, Binh Kim village, April 2007).
Logically, the discontent arising from the ‘explicit’ poverty targeting would
considerably affect people’s motivation for participation and community cohesion which
are important factors of the empowerment of the poor in the CDD approach. These
problems are examined in the next sections.
6.3.2. Changes in People’s participation in local decision-making
Before the implementation of the Chiase program, in principle, people’s
participation in local decision-making in the study area was institutionalized by a range of 
grassroots democratization legislation which specified four levels of people’s 
participation to be mobilized depending on the nature of the issue in question: information 
sharing, consultation, decision-making, and supervision (see Chapter Four). However, in 
the study area, before the implementation of the Chiase program, in practice people’s 
participation in local decision-making was still limited. Consultation about important 
issues, such as local development plans, land use plans, the implementation of national 
programs, was not done. People’s supervision of the commune budget, land management
’7 The key contents of the grassroots democratic legislations are presented in chapter Four.
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and construction works was not mobilized. Annually, commune officials only held two 
village meetings to inform people about key government policies, the commune 
development plans, and key decisions of the Commune People’s Council and Commune 
People’s Committee, but they were just one-way presentations and no discussion occurred. 
People’s participation in decision-making was mobilized for only few activities relying on
t o
people’s contribution, or for the elaboration of village conventions (Interviews of Key 
Informant, 2007).
The extent to which local people participated in village meetings was also limited. 
The average attendance rates of village meetings were about 60 -  75 per cent of total 
number of households in the villages. In meetings, people were often passive and left the 
discussion and decision-making to a small group of local leaders including the village head, 
the secretary of the party cell, and some leaders of mass organization branches. . Ordinary 
villagers were not active in exacting accountability, demanding transparency from the local 
government, and overseeing the use of the budget of the local government. They also rarely 
exercised leadership, undertook independent initiatives, or supervised infrastructure work 
(Interviews of Key Informant, 2007).
The Chiase program, by devolving the control over decision making and resources 
to the local communities, created a substantial change in the level of people’s participation 
in local decision-making. The village meeting became the vehicle where all community 
decisions were made through direct people’s participation. The participatory decision-
38 The village conventions [huong uoc] have been reinstated in the study villages since the implementation of 
grassroots democracy legislation. They provided the basis for village’s self-management. It is noteworthy that 
while the ancient form of village conventions served as the ‘charter’ for the administration of villages as 
administrative unit, the new form of village convention should be seen as a social code of practice governing 
people’s behavior.
39 Mass organizations include Vietnam Fatherland Front, Women’s Union, Farmers’ Association, Veterans’ 
Association, and Youth Union.
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making at village level was facilitated by the Village Management Group (VMG) — a 
locally elected body - and the CPMU -  part of commune government. A wide range of key 
issues in the village, including formulation of the village development plans, formulation of 
regulations on the management of the VDF, selection of priority activities to be 
implemented every year, selection of beneficiaries, selection of service providers, and 
evaluation of activities implementation, were decided at the village meetings. In relation to 
theories of participation, people’s participation in the Chiase program was promoted at a 
level of consultation and partnership (Arnstein, 1969: 217; Pretty, 1995: 1252). Further, 
under the Chiase program, the chairs of the VMG were also involved in managing the CDF.
However, the extent to which different groups of people participated in village 
meetings showed a more nuanced picture of people’s participation in local decision-making 
in the Chiase program. From the outset, the Chiase program was successful in mobilizing a 
high rate of people attending village meetings (see Table 6.5). During the first phase, 2004- 
2005, the selection of beneficiaries was solely made by the communities without any 
restriction and all village residents could be considered for program support. The program 
provided a wide range of rewards, in both tangible and intangible forms, for the 
participants: economic benefit through income generating activities; improvement of 
community infrastructures, such as roads, water supply system, community houses, or 
electricity network; individual capacity development in terms of training and study tours; 
and the enhancement of social prestige for local leaders and active villagers. It seemed that 
this diverse set of rewards satisfied people’s expectations, which resulted in a high rate of 
people's participation in village meetings. About 90 per cent of households in the study 
villages always or often attended village meetings. All three groups, ‘elite’, ‘middle’ and 
‘poor', had high rates of village attendance during this time.
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Table 6.5: Frequency of Attendance at Village Meetings in 2005
Group Always Often Occasionally Never Mean of
‘meeting attendance’ 
(0-3 scale)
1- Poor group (n=85) 44 32 8 1 2.40
(51.8%) (37.6%) (9.4%) (1.2%)
2- Middle group (94) 58 28 6 2 2.51
(61.7%) (29.8%) (6.4%) (2.1%)
3- Elite (n=37) 23 10 3 1 2.49
(62.2%) (27.0%) (8.1%) (2.7%)
Total (n=216) 125 70 17 4 2.46
(57.9%) (32.4%) (7.94%) (1.9%)
Source: Field Survey 2007
The adoption of the government-based ‘explicit' poverty targeting mechanism40 as
a response to the perceived limitation of community-based targeting, which excluded the 
non-poor from income generating activities, significantly affected the motivation of this 
group. This is not surprising as the respondents largely saw material benefits as an 
important reward for their participation in collective activities. The effect was most serious 
for the ‘middle’ households whose economic condition may not be significantly different 
from that of the formally identified ‘poor’ households. The feeling of discontent was 
captured in the response of a non-poor farmer in Son Dong village:
At the outset of program implementation, people attended its meetings regularly; but 
later on, the non-poor households were discontented and refused to join. Poor 
households benefited much more than the other households: apart from the provision 
of cows and crop varieties, they were given grants for housing repairs and their 
children’s schooling. Many poor households had been granted cows in the last drive 
and were provided with further benefits in the following drive. As they got benefits 
from year to year, it was understandable that they went to meetings regularly. 
Though this program is named ‘ChiaSe’ [Sharing], it was not equitable. The State is 
right when giving priority to the poor, but it’s absurd to support them chronically.
40 Explicit poverty targeting is discussed in detail in chapter Five.
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They have to work to escape from poverty (Source: Field Survey, Son Dong village,
May 2007).
This problem, however, should not be overstated. Although the discontent caused a 
high drop-out rate among many ‘middle’ households, the motivation of the majority of 
local people was still maintained. This could be attributed to the diversity of the incentives 
system in the program, which offered a wide range of benefits to meet various expectations 
of the local people. Specifically, the ‘explicit’ poverty targeting which increased access of 
the ‘poor" households to material benefits apparently increased the motivation of this 
group. For the local leaders and many active villagers, opportunities to discuss and make 
cooperative decisions regarding village issues were still strong incentives inducing their 
participation. In addition, access to training and information was also important in 
maintaining the motivation of many non-poor people.
Quantitative data about people’s attendance at village meetings in 2006 also 
confirms the discontent of many ‘non-poor* people and the decreased extent of their 
participation. The survey of this study showed that many respondents, including ‘middle’ 
and ‘elite’ households still attended village meetings even after the adoption of ‘explicit’ 
poverty targeting (see Table 6.6). About 78 per cent of total households in the villages often 
or always attended the meetings. Only 5 out of 216, 2.3 per cent of respondents, reported 
that they never attended the village meetings. However, it is noteworthy that the attendance 
rate of the ‘middle’ group was much lower than what of the ‘poor’ and ‘elite’ groups. Only 
about 19 per cent of the ‘middle’ group always attended village meetings as compared to 
55.3 per cent and 45.9 per cent of the ‘poor’ and ‘elite’ groups respectively. The mean 
value of the ‘meeting attendance* variable of the ‘middle’ group was also significantly 
smaller than what of the other two groups. Obviously, the poorer performance of the 
‘middle’ group in terms of attendance rate at village meetings was considerable and, as
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revealed through people’s narratives, could be attributed to the discontent arising from the
poverty targeting policy of the Chiase program.
Table 6.6: Frequency of Attendance at Village Meetings in 2006
G ro u p A lw a y s O ften O c c a s io n a lly N ev er M ean  o f
‘m eetin g  a tte n d a n c e ’ 
(0-3  sca le)
1- Poor group (n=85) 46
(54.1%)
29
(34.1%)
9
(10.6%)
1
(1.2%)
2.4441
2- Middle group (94) 18
(19.1%)
47
(50.0%)
26
(27.8%)
3
(3.2%)
1.85
3- Elite (n=37) 18
(48.6%)
9
(24.3%)
9
(24.3%)
1
(2.7%)
2.14
Total (n=216) 82
(38%)
85
(39.4%)
44
(20.4%)
5
(2.3%)
2.13
Source: Field Survey 2007
The extent of people’s participation in local decision-making was also reflected
through the activeness of local people in village meetings which was much improved as 
compared to the state before the implementation of the Chiase program. The participants 
took the floor more frequently and were much more active in discussing village issues 
(Interview of Key Informants, 2007). However, data about the frequency of taking the floor 
in the meetings (see Table 6.7) showed that the ‘non-elite’ were still rather passive in 
village meetings as compared to the ‘elite’. About one-third of the ‘elite’ group often took 
the floor while this indicator was only 4.7 per cent and 5.3 per cent for the ‘poor’ and 
‘middle’ groups respectively. The mean value of the ‘activeness in meeting’ variable of the 
‘elite’ group was 1.81, much larger than what of the ‘poor’ and ‘middle’ groups, which are 
1.21 and 1.07 respectively. A t-test shows that, at 95 per cent confidence level, the ‘elite’
41 The increase of meeting attendance frequency of ‘Poor group’ and the decrease of meeting attendance 
frequency of other groups were attributed to the adoption of a government-based poverty targeting 
mechanism.
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were significantly more active in village meetings than the ‘poor’ and ‘middle’ villagers 
(see Appendix 6). The findings suggest that though the incentives provided by the Chiase 
program were effective in raising the motivation of the ‘poor’ group to attend village 
meetings, their activeness in the village decision-making was still limited.
Table 6.7: Frequency of Taking the Floor in Village Meetings in 2006
G ro u p O ften S o m etim es R a r e ly N ev er M ean  o f
‘a c tiv en ess  in m e e tin g ’ 
(0-3  sca le)
1- Poor group (n=85) 4
(4.7%)
24 (28.2%) 43
(50.6%)
14
(1.6.5%)
1.21
2- Middle group (94) 5
(5.3%)
17(18.1%) 51
(54.2%)
21
(22.3%)
1.07
3- Elite (n=37) 11
(29.7%)
15
(40.5%)
7
(21.6%)
4
(13.5%)
1.81
Total (n=216) 25
(11.6%)
37
(17.1%)
116
(53.7%)
38
(17.6%)
1.25
Source: Field Survey 2007
In order to explore the factors impeding people’s participation in community
decision-making, the respondents who responded ‘rarely takes the floor' or ‘never takes the 
floor’ were asked why they had not been more active in the village meetings. The responses 
were categorized into four factors as follows. The first is an attitude of dependence where 
people are accustomed to local leaders and other powerful villagers taking the leadership 
role in decision-making. For example, the respondents often mentioned such reasons as 
‘feeling afraid to voice an opinion’, ‘nobody would listen or pay attention to my opinion’, 
or ‘the cadres should know more about the issues of concern, so let them decide’ (Field 
Survey, 2007). This is not surprising as the majority of people in the study communes had 
limited experience with participatory decision-making: in the study villages, before the 
implementation of the Chiase program, the control over development funds was never
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devolved to the village level. Further, people’s narratives also indicated that the formal and 
‘public event' nature of village meetings further compounded the above limitation of local 
people; that is, the village meetings, with the presence of all villagers and program staff, 
were intimidating to many local people and prevented them from being active in the 
meetings.
Second, lack of information and social skills was another obstacle impeding 
people’s participation in the Chiase program. Local residents, whose typical contacts with 
government were through the Village Head, had very few connections outside their 
community, and were often unclear about government procedures as well as the Chiase 
rules and regulations. They also lacked information about new production models and 
service providers outside their communities which were essential in formulating and 
carrying out the village development plan. In addition, a large number of respondents 
mentioned lack of social skills, e.g. public speaking, as a problem making them less active. 
Consequently, many people often talked to each other outside the meetings but kept silence 
in the formal meetings. One poor farmer in Gio Binh commune explained:
We participated in all meetings but never took the floor. We thought a lot but dared 
not speak out. As we were not sure about the issues under discussion, we were afraid 
that our ideas were wrong. We didn’t want to lose face in front of the folk. So, we 
only talked with others outside the meetings (Field Survey, Binh Kim village, April 
2007).
Third, the ‘explicit’ targeting mechanism which excluded the non-poor from 
income generating activities considerably affected the motivation of this group. It gave rise 
to a sense of alienation and discontent among several ‘non-poor' people that seriously 
affected their participation. A farmer stated bitterly:
Now we attended only the meetings discussing village issues. If the meetings dealt 
with issues related to the poor, we would opt out. Let the poor run their projects’
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(Field Survey, An Son village, March 2007).
Finally, people might also choose not to participate for personal reasons, such as: 
'prefer listening to speaking out’, ‘do not want to speak out if not necessary’, or ‘the issue 
under discussion is not of interest to me’.
What emerges from the above discussions is the superior performance of the ‘elite’ 
regarding participation in the village decision-making process in the Chiase program. Being 
endowed with stronger capabilities and favorable access to information, the ‘elite’ were 
more likely to succeed in taking up and utilizing the decision-making power devolved by 
the Chiase program. This point is also supported by the exploration of people’s perception 
of empowerment in previous section, which shows the rate of the ‘elite’ experiencing 
empowerment in the community domain as much higher than the rate of the ‘non-elite’.
One way of examining ‘elite capture’ phenomenon is looking at the extent to which 
Chiase activities are relevant to the local problems (see Table 6.8). In the study villages, a 
wide range of activities were implemented: the provision of pigs, cows and other 
productive assets for poor households, house repair for poor households, loans borrowed 
from village revolving fund for various purposes; training courses, health care activities; 
and the construction of community centers, kindergarten, clinics, culverts, earthen roads 
and irrigation systems. About eight to twelve activities were implemented in a study village 
each year. When this survey was undertaken, the Chiase program had been underway for 
three years and in each village under study, about 25 to 31 activities were implemented. It 
is not that all activities were seen by the respondent as relevant to the local context. In 
response to the question asking about the relevance of activities implemented in the 
villages, while about three-fourths of respondents perceived that all activities in their 
village were relevant to the existing problems, only 19.0 per cent thought that few activities
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(one or two activities) were irrelevant and 5.6 per cent thought that many activities (more 
than two activities were irrelevant to the local situation. People’s responses indicated that 
elite capture generally did not occur as the respondents largely agreed that the activities 
having been implemented in their villages were relevant to the local problems. In addition, 
people’s narratives did not refer to any evidence of corruption or abuse of power. The 
improvement in the relevance of community decisions was largely attributed to the 
improved representation of the people in community decision-making.
Table 6.8: People’s Perception about the Relevance of Village Activities
The relevance of village activities (n=216) Frequency Percentage
All activities are relevant 158 73.1 %
Few activities are irrelevant 41 19.0%
Many activities are irrelevant 12 5.6%
Don’t know 5 2.3 %
Source: Field Survey 2007
People’s responses also indicated that people’s participation in study villages had 
been mainly driven by instrumental considerations. People might participate in order to be 
qualified for material benefits for which only the ‘poor’ were eligible. They saw their 
participation as the ‘cost’ of the benefits they pursued. This was an important motive of the 
‘poor’ households. Second, people might participate in order to be qualified for benefits for 
which all participants were eligible regardless of wealth status, such as information and 
training. Third, people might participate with a view to supervising the use of community 
resources, enforcing social equity and promoting community development. These different 
motives are not mutually exclusive but they do combine differently among different groups 
of people. However, it was noteworthy that nobody mentioned explicitly or implicitly 
changing local power relations as their motive.
In summary, the implementation of the Chiase program substantially improved the
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level of people participation in local decision-making. When a Community-based poverty 
targeting was adopted, all groups of local people exhibited a high rate of participation in 
village meetings. When a government-based ‘explicit’ targeting scheme was applied, the 
participation of the ‘middle’ and ‘elite’ was considerably affected. However, overall, the 
participation of local people was still maintained thanks to the diverse incentives provided 
by this program. While the activeness of the ordinary people far lagged behind that of the 
‘elite’, community decisions were still generally relevant to local problems, or in other 
words, elite capture did not occur. Further, the people’s participation in the Chiase program 
was largely induced by instrumental reasons mostly related to the program benefits, either 
tangible or intangible, at individual or community levels.
6.3.3. Changes in People’s Networks
People’s social networks in this study were explored through examining the 
important sources of support that the well-being of local households had relied on. The 
responses showed that local people were engaged in a number of social networks and 
relationships with various actors who can be categorized into four groups: external agency 
officials: commune-level officials and village leaders; local employers and creditors; and 
relatives and friends. The social networks of local people can be characterized by their 
relationships with these groups of actors. The most important sources of support for local 
people were summarized in Table 6.9.
External agencies identified by respondents as having important impacts on local 
people in the study area included the District Agriculture Extension Station and the District 
Aquatic Breeding Center. These institutions are in charge of introducing new production 
models, conducting training on production skills and provide consultancy services to local 
people. Many rubber plantations in midland communes and shrimp breeding farms in
183
coastal communes under this study are supported by these two agencies. The support given 
by agricultural extension officials, as relevant to the respondents in this study, includes 
advanced production knowledge and skills and marketing information for rubber planting 
and shrimp breeding. Therefore, maintaining good relationships with the officials of the 
above agencies can have important impacts on the production of households who have 
applied new production models and techniques. Notably, respondents identifying 
relationships with these agencies as the most important source of support were mostly the 
‘elite" households.
Table 6.9: Most Important Sources of Support for Local Households
Source of support Poor(n=85) Middle
(n=94)
Elite (n=37)
External agency officials 0 5 (5%) 10(27% )
Commune-level officials and village leaders 43 (51%) 34 (36%) 6(16% )
Local employers and traders 24 (28%) 25 (27%) 2 (5%)
Relatives and friends 18 (21%) 32 (34%) 19 (52%)
Source: Field Survey 2007
Commune-level officials were reported by a large number of respondents, mostly 
the ‘poor’ and ‘middle’ households, as their most important source of support. These actors 
performed as the intermediaries in providing many types of government support to local 
people, including low-interest loans for the poor, agriculture extension services, social 
security subsidies, and emergency aid for victims of disaster. Low-interest loans for the 
poor were provided by the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) through the facilitation and 
management of Commune Poverty Reduction Board and village units of mass 
organizations42. The Women’s Union and the Farmers’ Association also worked in
42" Procedures for a poor household to borrow money from VBP are as follows: (1) A poor household submits 
an application to a credit group managed by either the village unit of Women’s Union, Veterans' Association, 
or Farmers’ Association; (2) The saving and credit group gathers applications and submits them with their 
name list to the Poverty Reduction Board at the CPC; (3) After investigation and confirmation, the Poverty
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partnership with the District Agricultural Extension Station in coordinating and managing 
agriculture extension activities, such as training, study tours, and implementation of 
production models. Village Heads and commune-level staff were responsible for 
identifying candidates for social security subsidies including: elderly, lonely people, the 
disabled, and orphans. Finally, the provision of emergency aid, supporting the victims of 
natural calamities, was facilitated by the Labor and Social Affairs official of the CPC and 
the village Heads. In addition, the Commune People’s Committee was also involved in 
settling local disputes if they were not successfully mediated at village level.
Assistance and loans from relatives and friends were also important sources of 
support for local people, especially in emergency situations. However, these sources of 
support, for the majority of poor people, were often insufficient and not always available. 
This in part is reflected in the rate of ‘poor’ households relying on this source of support 
being much lower than that of the ‘elite’ group (see Table 6.9). One poor farmer explained:
‘In emergency situations, the friends and neighbors did help but their help was 
mainly spiritual. Only relatives offered material help, but which was often 
insufficient. As the entire village was poor and needed help, therefore, the 
government support was important’ (Field Survey, Viet Trung village, May 2007).
A great number of respondents viewed the local employers and traders as their most
important source of support. The responses show that these actors, for example the fish-
sauce making shop owners in Gio Viet commune, agricultural production materials traders,
or rubber tree plantation owners in midland communes, provided important sources of
income and credit for the villagers. In the study villages, access to land, employment, credit
and the conditions of such access are crucial to people. Given limited access to land and
Reduction Board at the CPC submits the lists to the District transaction office of VBP; (4) District transaction 
office of VBBP informs the CPC of the result of judgment and the date of disbursement, which is then passed 
on to the saving and credit group; (5) The leader of the saving and credit group informs the poor households 
of the date and place of disbursement; and (6) VBP directly lend money to the poor household.
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productive assets, local people, especially the poor, largely relied on paid employment 
offered by the local employers. In addition, unable to either accumulate their own savings 
or obtain loans from established credit institutions for coping with social and natural 
shocks, people must borrowed from the local employers or traders. Some respondents 
(seven persons) approached the creditors in the nearby markets for relatively big loans 
which were used for investment.
While being an important source of support, employment and credit provided by the 
local employers and traders also, to some extent, tied the local poor people into a 
dependency relationship. This dependency relationship weakened power of the poor in 
bargaining the price of their labor, price of their products, and their status as free actors in 
capital market. A number of respondents accepted unfavorable terms of employment in 
order to repay the employers for their supports. However, it was also observed that this 
dependency relationship did not involve punitive interest rate schemes or life-long 
indebtedness on the poor.
It is noteworthy that there is an important difference between the networks of the 
‘elite1 and those of the ‘non-elite1. The ‘elite1 households mostly relied on relatives and 
friends, with 52 per cent of this group reporting this as the most important source of help. 
They also sought assistance from government support, but mostly relied on external 
agencies which provided greater benefits than the commune government did. Conversely, 
the commune-level officials and village leaders were the most important source of support 
for the ‘poor1 and ‘middle1 groups, being seen as the most important source of help for 51 
per cent and 38 per cent of these groups respectively. Local employers and traders were 
also important sources of support for these groups. The percentage of ‘poor1 and ‘middle1 
households relying on relationships with friends and relatives was much lower than that of
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the ‘elite’.
Table 6.10: Changes in People’s Social Networks
Sources of support Increased Unchanged Decreased
E x t e r n a l  a g e n c y  o f f i c i a l s 7 2 0 9 0
C o m m u n e  o f f i c i a l s  a n d  l o c a l  l e a d e r s 4 7 1 6 9 0
L o c a l  e m p l o y e r s  a n d  c r e d i t o r s 0 2 1 6 0
R e l a t i v e s  a n d  f r i e n d s 0 2 0 4 12
Source: Field Survey 2007
The Chiase program generally created positive changes in people’s networking with 
government officials (see Table 6.10). A great number of respondents, mostly the non-elite, 
improved their relationships with the commune-level officials. These changes were mostly 
attributed to the ‘closer and more responsive’ commune-level officials, or in other words, 
the decentralization policy of the program. The impacts of this change, as revealed through 
people’s responses, were the improved connections with the commune-level officials and 
better access to a range of government support, such as provision of agricultural extension 
services, exemption from healthcare fees, credits for the poor, subsidies for the elderly 
disabled and lonely, and emergency aid. An example of the change in the networks of a 
poor household is shown in Box 6.1.
Further, seven respondents, who all belonged to 'elite group', reported improvement 
in their relationships with external agencies. This can be attributed to two factors. On one 
hand, through the implementation of the Chiase, these respondents had better access to 
information about agencies providing technical and financial support for rural development 
and poverty alleviation. On the other hand, the regulations maintained by the program 
specified in details the responsibilities of various state agencies in supporting local 
communities that enhanced their downward accountability. Box 6.2 shows an example of 
the changes in the relationship between the local people and external agencies.
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Box 6.1: Hoa’s Story
After getting married in 1996, Hoa came to this village. Her parents-in-law gave them a 
small house with a thatch roof, an old bicycle and some basic furniture. Having no land, her 
husband had to work as a casual laborer in construction sites while she worked as a rubber latex 
collector in a nearby rubber tree plantation. Since they earned little money and the income was 
irregular, so, they spent a rather difficult life at this time. Hoa often had to borrow money from the 
owner of the plantation where she worked.
In 2002, when their daughter was five years old, her husband got an accident and their life 
became very difficult. Their saving was quickly expended. They had to sell all valuable things to 
cover treatment and living expenses. They often experienced food shortage, and sometimes, hunger. 
Their neighbors and relatives often shared their food with them. Especially, Mrs. L., the owner of 
the plantation where she worked, helped them a lot by lending them money and giving them old 
clothes and appliances. They could not have been able to survive without this assistance.
At that time, the Chiase program was initiated in her village. She was selected as a 
beneficiary of Cow Raising project in 2004. After attending a training course which provided her 
with essential skills in caring for cattle, with a grant of 6 million VND provided by the Chiase 
program, she repaired the cow-house and started raising a steer. The commune agriculture extension 
worker and the veterinary officer visited their village regularly to provide necessary information 
and helped them to resolve problems. She followed all these instructions and the cows grew 
favorably. During the last three years, she has sold 2 cows, and presently has got a cow and two 
calves. In average, annual income from cow raising is about 5 millions which accounts for 50 per 
cent of her family's total income. With this supplementary source of income, the life of her family 
has been significantly improved
Along with economic improvements, her social network has been enhanced. She often 
shared with other villagers, who also participated in Cow Raising project, information about good 
practices in taking care of cows, and through which, established good relationships with them. She 
attended village meetings regularly to in order to have a grasp of the local situation. As the 
commune officials joined all important village meetings, she could ask them any matter of her 
concern easily. Hoa explained to me: ’through the implementation of the Chiase, officials become 
closer and more responsive to the people’. Regarding the local employers, Hoa said: 'Despite of the 
implementation of the Chiase program, the employment provided by local employers is still an 
important source of support for the poor'.
Source: Field Survey, Binh Kim village, May 2007.
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Box 6.2. Hai’s Story
Hai has settled in Viet Trung village since 1983, after fulfilling military service. He was an 
experienced fisherman and had a high prestige in the local community. He was also elected as the 
chairman of the Farmer Association Unit of this village. In early 2000s, when the demand for fish 
sauce in the local areas increased he intended to establish a fish sauce making shop with the 
production capacity of 10,000 litres per month and the total investment cost of 300 millions VND. 
According to Hai, this project, if being implemented, would benefit both him and other villagers: It 
would raise his income, create employment opportunities for unemployed women, and consume 
unsold fish. However, at that time, he could not manage to fund this project.
Since the implementation of the Chiase program, a lot of information about agencies 
supporting rural development and poverty reduction have been disseminated to the local villages. 
Annually, a Need Assessment Workshop was held by the District People Committee in order to 
connect the villages with the state agencies, banks, research institutions, NGOs and main service 
providers in the local area. Through these information channels, Hai approached many funding 
sources to convince them about the feasibility and socio-economic effects of his project. In 2005, 
IDE - an NGO aiming at developing small and medium enterprises - agreed to provide loan for this 
project. The project was implemented and came into operation in 2006. Presently, it employs 15 
laborers with a monthly salary of 1.0 million VND, and consumes all unsold fish of the villagers. 
The relationships with external development agencies has now become a precious asset of Hai.
Source: Field Survey, Viet Trung Village, 2007.
While the Chiase program created remarkable changes in the relationships between 
local villagers and government officials and external agencies, no significant change in the 
relationships between the poor people and the local employers has been recorded. The poor 
people still largely saw the local employers as an important source of support. This is 
understandable for at least two reasons. On one hand, as shown in Hoa’s story in Box 6.1, 
income generated through activities funded by the Chiase program may be not sufficient to 
cover all livings expenses of the poor people and they have to rely on the employment 
provided by the local employers. On the other hand, maintaining good relationships with 
the local employers can provide a ‘safety net’ in emergency cases for poor people who are
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often very vulnerable to natural and social shocks.
At the same time, the networks among relatives and friends in study villages were 
slightly weakened (see Table 6.10). This can be in part attributed to the lack of cooperative 
economic activities and the inappropriateness of the poverty targeting policies. According 
to the key informants, the communes under study did not have any activity which aimed 
specifically at raising village cohesion; no cooperative income generation activity was 
promoted in any of the study communes; loans and grants were given directly to the 
households, and all income generating activities were managed at household level. The 
only activity that could facilitate the connectedness between local people was the 
participation in small-scale infrastructure work; however, these activities were often one- 
off activities and had limited scope for maintaining cooperation sustainably. Moreover, 
only Gio An and Gio Viet communes actually supported community participation in the 
construction of small-scale infrastructure work while the other two communes contracted 
all of their construction work out to professional contractors. In addition, people’s 
responses also referred to the exclusion of the ‘non-poor' from accessing material resources 
as a key factor giving rise to the discontent of many households, which might have blocked 
some of the social interactions between people in the study communities.
The above findings indicate that there was a transformation in the social networks 
of the local people with the political intermediaries which was an important source of 
support for the non-elite people. This change had significant implications for people’s 
access to a wide range of government support and considerably contributed to their 
economic security and development. Networks with local employers and creditors, being 
unchanged through the implementation of the Chiase program, were still an important 
source of income of local people. Finally, the program caused some negative impacts on
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local people’s relationships with relatives and friends. It can be expected that with more 
appropriate design of poverty targeting, people’s networking could be developed to an even 
further extent.
6.4. The Factors Affecting Empowerment in The Chiase Program
In order to assess the factors that may have affected the empowerment outcomes,
a statistical analysis was carried out. As examined in the previous section, empowerment in 
the Chiase program might take place in the household and community domains, with 
different implications for the empowerment of the poor. While empowerment in the 
household domain has consequences on household independence and efficiency, and more 
equal gender relationships, empowerment in the community domain increase people’s 
ability to influence the allocation of social and economic resources. Therefore, in this 
section, the analysis of factors affecting empowerment in each domain is done separately.
Empowerment -  the dependent variable -  is looked at in terms of the probability or 
likelihood of a respondent being empowered. It is measured on a categorical scale with two 
categories: 0 if the respondent does not experience any change in agency, or 1 if a change 
in agency is experienced by the respondent. Six independent variables are analyzed: 
educational attainment, wealth level, participation in local organizations, amount of 
material benefit received, number of training courses attended, and the downward 
accountability of the CPMU. While ‘downward accountability’ is measured as a categorical 
variable, all other variables are measured on numeric scale. The details of the definition and 
measurement of all dependent and independent variables are presented in Chapter Five. The 
different scales adopted for the different variables do not affect the reliability of the 
analysis in this thesis because the emphasis is placed on the direction of change rather than 
comparing the magnitude of change.
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Tabic 6.11: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis for Empowerment Outcome
Model 1: Empowerment in Household Domain (n=216)
Independent variable B Wald Sig.
Material Benefit .872 10.894 .001
Training .399 4.764 .029
Downward accountability of the CPMU .079 .062 .803
Participation in local organizations -.120 .358 .549
Education Level .093 1.749 .186
Wealth Level -.219 3.312 .069
Constant -1.390 2.694 .101
Cox and Snell R square = 0.195 Nagelkerke R square = 0.264
Model 2: Empowerment in Community Domain (n=216)
Independent variable B Wald Sig.
Material benefits .192 .532 .466
Training .193 1.040 .308
Downward accountability of the CPMU .747 4.585 .032
Participation in local organizations .991 17.540 .000
Education level .026 .110 .740
Wealth level .040 .105 .746
Constant -3.428 13.271 .000
Cox and Snell R square = 0.143 Nagelkerke R square = 0.209
Source: Data Analysis
A statistical analysis using logistic regression was applied to establish the 
relationships between the probability of a respondent being empowered and the 
independent variables. The analysis results in two statistical models explaining individual 
empowerment probability in two domains: household and community. The results are 
presented in Table 6.11. In this table, B values are the ones which would be used in an 
equation to calculate the probability of a respondent falling into a specific category of 
dependent variable (0 or 1). The sign for a B value shows the direction of the relationship
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between independent and dependent variables. A positive value for B indicates a factor 
which increases the likelihood of the dependent variable having value ‘1’ and vice versa. A 
Wald value, which is calculated by the Wald test, shows the information about the 
contribution or importance of an independent variable. A Sig. value shows significance of 
an independent variable. At 95 per cent confidence level, a test is significant if the Sig. 
value is smaller than 0.05. The Cox and Snell R square and the Nagelkerke R square values 
provide an indication of the amount of variation in the dependent variable explained by the 
model.
Data in the first part of Table 6.11 shows that the likelihood of being empowered in 
the household domain is significantly determined by two variables: amount of material 
support a respondent received from the Chiase, and the number of training courses a 
respondent attended. The sign of the B value is positive for both variables which indicate 
two relationships: (1) the more benefit a respondent received, the greater the likelihood 
he/she will experience empowerment in the household domain; and (2) the more training 
courses a respondent attended, the more likelihood he/she will experience empowerment in 
the household domain. The Nagelkerke R square of 0.264 indicate that about 26.4 per cent 
of the amount of variation in the likelihood of being empowered in the household domain is 
explained by this model. The strong association between empowerment in the household 
domain and program benefit, in terms of material benefit and training, suggests the 
importance of program benefits, in either tangible or intangible form, towards 
empowerment in the household domain.
Data in the second part of Table 6.11 indicates that the likelihood of being 
empowered in the community domain is determined by two variables: the ‘extent of 
participation in local organizations' of a respondent and ‘downward accountability' of the
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CPMU. The sign of the B value of these two predictors shows a positive relationship: the 
likelihood of a person experiencing empowerment in the community domain increases if 
they are the members of a greater number of local organizations and live in a commune 
where the CPMU is downwardly accountable to people. The Nagelkerke R square of 0.194 
indicates that about 19.4 per cent of the amount of variation in the likelihood of being 
empowered in the community domain is explained by this model.
In the following sections, the relationships between empowerment and independent 
variables are further elaborated. The analysis mainly focuses on justifying and explaining 
the causal relationships between the independent and dependent variables.
6.4.1. Material Support
In this study, ‘material support’ was looked at in terms of the amount of material 
benefits a respondent received from the Chiase program. The result presented in Table 6.11 
shows that, at a 95 per cent confidence level, empowerment in the household domain was 
positively correlated to the amount of material support a respondent received from the 
program. The concern here is the direction of the relationship between material support and 
empowerment.
The causal relationship between material support and people’s empowerment is 
theoretically plausible. Theories of empowerment see the increased control over resources 
as a key component of empowerment (Sen G., 1997:2). The importance of material support 
toward empowerment has also been acknowledged in development literature (Osmani, 
2000: 23; Vijalakshmi, 2002: 282), that is, material support from development programs 
can enhance economic security of the poor, which forms the basis for social mobilization to 
take place.
The findings from this study also support a causal relationship between material
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benefits and people's empowerment. People’s responses about change in agency (see 
Section 6.2) largely attributed empowerment to the material support given by the Chiase 
program. Specifically, for the changes in ability to ‘handle household issues independently 
and efficiently’ -  one form of empowerment experienced by the local people - material 
support from the Chiase program is an important determinant. Further, as an ‘explicit’ 
poverty targeting was adopted in the Chiase program, the amount of material benefits a 
household was being given was largely determined by its destitution rather than its status of 
empowerment. This means that the probability of being empowered did not affect the 
amount of support a respondent received. Thus, the causal direction between ‘material 
support’ and empowerment in the household domain can be validly established.
6.4.2. Training
The variable ‘training’ was measured by the number of training courses a 
respondent attended. The training courses in the Chiase program largely focus on farming 
production skills, health care and gender equality. Logistic regression shows that, at a 95 
per cent confidence level, empowerment in the household domain was positively correlated 
to the number of training courses a respondent had attended. Given that theories of 
empowerment largely see empowerment as a cognitive change process and the 
development of people’s ‘understanding of their needs’ and ‘the opportunities and 
constraints they face’ (Korten, 1981b: 214; Zimmerman and Rappaport, 1988: 726), the 
causal relationship between training and empowerment is theoretically plausible. However, 
it is difficult to specify the time order, or in other words, the direction of this relationship. 
Given that most training courses in the Chiase program are held in the villages and open to 
all villagers, the number of training courses a person attends may be affected by the level of 
their empowerment - the dependent variable. That is, it is unclear whether empowered 
individuals are more likely to attend the training courses or the knowledge and skills
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provided by training courses improve people’s awareness and confidence.
Literature on research methodology (see Chapter Five) suggests that retrospective 
information and people’s perception can be used to establish the causal direction. In this 
study, people’s responses (see Section 6.2) largely attributed the change in their ability to 
‘influence household decisions’ and to ‘handle household issues independently and 
efficiently’ to the improved production skills and social awareness acquired through the 
training courses. Thus the causal direction between training and empowerment in the 
household domain in this study can be established.
6.4.3. Participation in Local Organizations
The variable ‘participation in local organizations’ was measured by the number of
local organizations of which a respondent was a member. Data analysis presented in Table 
6.11 shows that, at a 95 per cent confidence level, the likelihood a person experiencing 
empowerment in the community domain was positively correlated to the extent of his/her 
participation in local organizations. Further, the causal direction between the extent of 
participation in local organizations of a respondent and his/her likelihood of being 
empowered in the community domain was established because the likelihood of being 
empowered did not affect people’s membership in local organizations, at least in the short 
term. In addition, people’s responses showed that the participation in local organizations, 
particularly Women’s Union, Veterans’ Association, and Farmers’ Association, provided 
the members with better access to information, various government support, and better 
social skills, which facilitated their exercise of democratic rights devolved in the Chiase 
program and their achievement of empowerment in the community domain.
6.4.4. Downward Accountability of the CPMU
In this study, downward accountability of the CPMU is defined as its effectiveness
in promoting the constituent’s control over public decision-making and the implementation
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of these decisions. The logistic regression analysis indicates that in the Chiase program, 
people’s empowerment in the community domain was significantly co-related with the 
downward accountability of the CPMU, which is responsible for facilitating and 
monitoring all village activities. However, to infer accountability of the CPMU as a causal 
factor affecting people’s empowerment is less robust because there may be an 
interrelationship between the two variables. That is, on one hand, the CPMU, which is 
highly downward accountable, may promote people’s participation in decision-making and 
implementation of village activities and result in a higher rate of empowerment. On the 
other hand, a community with self-motivated individuals and a strong ability for collective 
action — which characterizes empowerment in the community domain - may be more 
successful in holding the CPMU downwardly accountable to it.
Qualitative analyses throw some light on this dilemma. Many people experiencing 
empowerment in the community domain, such as ability to ‘influence community 
decisions’, ‘to query the local government officials’, and ‘to influence the construction of 
community works’, referred to supports from the CPMU as a key factor of the change in 
their agency (see Section 6.2). In addition, the institutional analysis of democratic 
decentralization in the Chiase program (see Chapter Four) indicates that the accountability 
mechanisms enforcing the CPMU in the Chiase program is less effective44, and therefore, it 
is unlikely that pressure from the local villages could increase the downward accountability 
of the CPMU. Thus, the role of downward accountability of the CPMU as a causal factor of 
people’s empowerment in the community domain can be validly established.
4j The analysis of three dimensions o f democratic decentralization in the Chiase program -  actors, distribution 
of powers, and accountability mechanisms -  indicates that the accountability mechanisms enforcing the 
CPMU in this program are less effective.
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6.4.5. Educational Attainment
The results show that the education level of the constituents had no significant 
association with their empowerment. This finding is somehow inconsistent with the 
conventional view, which sees education as a key resource for poverty alleviation and 
development. Some studies of poverty in Vietnam also attribute the persistence of poverty 
to low educational attainment (UNDP, 2001: 53-54; Vu, 2004: 230). This discrepancy can 
be explained by at least two factors. Income generating activities in the Chiase program are 
mostly related to livestock rearing and crop farming, which are relatively simple practices 
and do not require a high level of education. Further, all income generating activities 
include training sections which effectively provide people with needed knowledge and 
skills that diminish the significance of the education factor. This point is in part supported 
by Deshmukh-Ranadive (2006) who argues that ‘...formal education is not a necessary 
precondition for empowerment to take place’ (p. 114). However, the association between 
the two variables may also be masked by the small sample size.
6.4.6. Wealth Level
The findings showed that, in the Chiase program, the level of wealth of a person 
was not correlated with his/her empowerment in both household and community domains. 
The fact that there was no association between wealth level of households and 
empowerment outcome can be attributed to two reasons. First, people’s responses of 
empowerment, as explored in Section 6.2, show that empowerment in the household 
domain is mostly attributed to program material benefits and training which are not 
dependent on the wealth level of the respondents. On the other hand, the ‘explicit" poverty 
targeting mechanism, adopted by the Chiase program, seriously weakened the motivation 
for participation in collective action of many ‘non-poor’ people (see Section 6.3). This, to a 
considerable extent, impeded the empowerment in the community domain of this group of
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people. Therefore, the negligible impact of the wealth level on empowerment in the Chiase 
program is, to some extent, predictable.
6.5. Conclusion
Three key findings have emerged from the research on empowerment in the Chiase 
program. First, empowerment was perceived by local people as improved performance in 
household and community. Empowerment in the household domain was characterized by 
the increase in ‘personal power’ - improved self-esteem, confidence and basic skills, while 
empowerment in the community domain is related to ‘political power’ -  ability to exercise 
political action. Further, the elite were more likely to experience empowerment in the 
community domain while the non-elite were more likely to acquire empowerment in the 
household domain. Regarding empowerment in the community domain, the communes 
with more downwardly accountable CPMU tended to have a higher empowerment rate than 
the communes with less downwardly accountable CPMU.
Second, the program did create transformative changes in the people’s 
representation in local decision-making and their social networks. This change had impacts 
at both individual and community levels: the community decisions were more relevant to 
local problems and people had better access to available resources and support provided by 
the government. However, program impact was to a considerable extent impeded by the 
inappropriate poverty targeting schemes and the lack of effective collective action.
Finally, logistic regression analysis found four factors significantly affecting 
empowerment. The amount of material support and training received was important to 
empowerment in the household domain, while the extent to which a respondent participated 
in local organizations and the downward accountability of the CPMU were all significant 
factors of empowerment in the community domain. These findings suggest a number of
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measures to promote empowerment in the CDD approach which will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
This chapter has highlighted key findings about meaning and characteristics of 
empowerment induced by the Chiase program, the effectiveness of this program in 
empowering the poor, and factors having significant effects on the empowerment. Chapter 
Seven summarizes and discusses these findings in relation to the theoretical background of 
empowerment (Chapter Two) and the CDD approach (Chapter Three) in order to draw 
conclusions about the effectiveness of the Chiase program in empowering poor people in 
the Vietnam context. The conclusions are presented in Chapter Eight.
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Chapter Seven: Discussion of Research Findings
7.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the issues related to empowerment in the Chiase program 
that emerge from the findings presented in the preceding chapter. By relating these findings 
to the theoretical background outlined in Chapters Two and Three, as well as the context of 
Vietnam and characteristics of the Chiase program discussed in Chapter Four, this chapter 
aims to draw conclusions for the empowerment of the poor in the CDD approach in this 
country. It focuses on three themes. First, meaning of empowerment in the program, 
including people’s perception of empowerment, implications for women’s empowerment, 
implications for transformation in power relations, and the relationship between individual 
empowerment and collective empowerment, are discussed. Second, effectiveness of the 
Chiase program in transforming local power relations is assessed on the basis of two 
sources of analysis: the findings about the two poverty targeting mechanisms adopted by 
the program are related to literature on poverty targeting in order to identify the strengths 
and limitations of both; and the impacts of the program on people’s participation in local 
decision-making and social networks are examined in order to highlight the achievements 
as well as identify factors impeding the performance of the program in this respect. Finally, 
the factors having a significant bearing on empowerment in this program will be 
highlighted.
7.2. Meaning of Empowerment in the Chiase Program
7.2.1. People’s Perception of Empowerment in the Chiase Prgram
The change in people’s agency in the Chiase program can be categorized into five
forms: influencing household decisions, handling household issues independently and 
efficiently, influencing community decisions, querying local government officials, and
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influencing the performance of community works. These forms of change in agency are 
directly related to performance in two important domains of life, household and 
community. This finding lends support to the view, which sees people’s empowerment as 
improved access to and performance within important domains of life space (Vijalakshmi, 
2002: 270-271), or the expansion of decision-making space (Jandhyala, 1998: 205). It also 
has resonance with theories of power (Bachrach and Barantz, 1970: 18; Lukes, 1974: 17), 
which argue that power can be exercised by confining an individual decision-making space. 
As the empowerment in this program was characterized by improvements in people’s 
performance in the household and community domains of life, the denial or limitation of 
access to and performance within these domains is disempowering. This confirms the close 
relationship between disempowerment and exclusion and voicelessness, which are key 
dimensions of poverty; and thus, supports the dominant view in poverty reduction 
discourse, that is, empowerment is not only as the means but also an end with regard to 
poverty reduction (Narayan et al., 2000: 31; World Bank, 2001: 15).
Examination of the respondents’ perception of empowerment showed that local 
people experienced empowerment personally and contextually. Facilitating factors, such as 
the devolution policies and training activities, or inhibiting factors, such as the demands on 
the participants’ time, caused different impacts on different groups of local people and led 
to different forms of empowerment. For example, respondents having little experience of 
interacting with people outside their families or involving political processes were likely to 
develop their confidence and self-esteem with peers, and in situations close to home. Other 
respondents, with existing experience of some sort of leadership and political actions, also 
developed confidence and self-esteem but for them these processes were likely to be 
manifested in their involvement in political processes and interaction with higher level
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officials or more experienced leaders. This finding are in line with the views holding that 
empowerment is contextual (Speer, 2000: 52) and subtle (Murthy, 2001: 350), and thus, 
justify the use of subjective measurement of empowerment in this study.
The responses also showed that empowerment in the Chiase program involved 
changes in ability to influence decision-making at both community and household levels. 
‘Non-elite’ people were more likely to experience empowerment in the household domain 
through gaining ‘personal power’, which resulted in more equal domestic relationships, 
independence and efficiency of the households. On the other hand, the ‘elite’ were more 
likely to acquire empowerment in the community domain, characterized by increased 
‘political power’, or in other words, an improvement in the ability to influence the 
allocation of community resources.
The existence of two separate types of empowerment with distinguished 
characteristics and implications for power relations in the Chiase program suggests that 
empowerment in the Chiase program has a broader meaning than the conception of Max 
Weber (1947) of power as ‘the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be 
in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which 
this probability rests’ (p. 139), which refers exclusively to political power. This study also 
lends support to a broader view of empowerment suggested by Schneider (1999: 524), 
which sees this concept as ‘the gaining of strength in the various ways necessary to be able 
to move out of poverty. ... [they] include knowledge, education, organization, rights and 
'voice', financial and material resources’; and Uphoffs (2005: 232) argument of strategy 
for the empowerment of the poor, which involves two components: directly enhancing poor 
people’s respective assets and capabilities, and establishing assets and capabilities at a 
higher level of decision-making.
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7.2.2. Implications for the Transformation of Power Relations
As discussed in Chapter Three, the poor are engaged in two ‘uppers-lowers’
relations: with the rich and with political patrons (Chambers, 1995: 42). The implications 
for transforming these power relations in the Chiase program are reflected through people’s 
responses regarding changes in agency in Chapter Six. Two forms of change in, ‘ability to 
influence community decisions’, and ‘ability to query the government officials’, are 
directly related to the power relations between the local people and the political patrons -  
the commune officials and local leaders. The improvements in ‘ability to influence 
community decisions’ simultaneously increased people’s representation in community 
decision-making, which resulted in more relevant community decisions, as found in 
Chapter Six. The changes in ‘ability to query the government officials’ gave people better 
access to information and enhanced their leverage in the policies of local government. The 
above changes indicated that the commune-level officials became more responsive and had 
more respect for the local people. Obviously, the power relations between the ‘lowers’ and 
the Tippers’ have become more equal though it does not mean that the two parties have 
equal power in implementing the development activities.
On the other hand, no respondents referred to a change in the relationship between 
the poor and the local employers and creditors. Through the implementation of the Chiase 
program, while the local people significantly increase their ‘voice’ in public decision­
making and become more confident in dealing with the political patrons, they still see the 
better-off as an important source of support, mainly for employment and credit. Though the 
assistance of the Chiase is very significant, it covers a small section of population and is 
insufficient for diverse demand of the local people. This suggests that changing the .power 
relation between the rich and the poor as proposed by Chambers (1995: 42) is difficult and 
perhaps, not feasible for CDD programs with fixed time-frame and clearly-defined structure
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and objectives like the Chiase.
7.2.3. Implication for Women’s Empowerment
Positive impacts on women’s empowerment were recorded as a good number of
female respondents had reported significant changes in agency through the implementation 
of the Chiase program, particularly in the household domain. Every form of change in 
agency (see Chapter 6) included female respondents though the number of women 
experiencing empowerment in the community domain was much lower than that of male 
respondents. Regarding four spaces important to women’s empowerment, that is, physical, 
economic, socio-cultural, and political (see Chapter Two), the responses regarding the 
changes in agency (see Chapter Six) indicated that the Chiase program mainly empowered 
the local women through expanding their economic and political spaces. However, the 
impacts on private political space are much stronger than those on public political space. 
These findings indicate the good potential of the Chiase program in empowering the 
women while at the same time, lending support to the Deshmukh-Ranadive’s (2006: 112) 
argument about the difficulty in developing public political space for the women.
The empowerment of the women in the Chiase was to some extent constrained. 
While Deshmukh-Ranadive’s (2006: 114) identifies two avenues to develop women’s 
cognitive space: bringing the women together in collectives organized around issues of 
their concern, and providing information about legal processes, human rights and 
entitlements, only the latter was promoted in the Chiase. It can be expected that, if 
cooperative economic activities are further promoted, the empowerment impacts will be 
substantially improved.
7.2.4. Individual and Collective Empowerment in the Chiase
People’s responses about changes in their agency showed that there is a relationship
between individual and collective empowerment. On the one hand, the change in individual
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agency directly influenced collective processes in the Chiase program, that is, empowered 
individuals directly impacted the performance of collective and political processes in the 
villages, such as village development planning and implementation of community works. 
On the other hand, village meetings in the program gave people ‘voice’ and access to a 
wide range of information, which was important for them to ‘influence community 
decisions’ or ‘query the government officials’. This finding supports the notion that there is 
a feedback loop between individual and collective empowerment in the theory of 
empowerment (Drury and Reicher, 1999: 383; Kroeker, 1996: 124; Rissel, 1994: 39; Speer, 
2000: 59). It also supports the notion that agency and power have a collective dimension 
(Giddens, 1979: 69).
However, the collective dimension of empowerment in the Chiase program was 
limited. People’s responses showed that the only form of collective action that facilitated 
individual empowerment in the Chiase was the village meeting which was formally held 
during steps of the LPMD cycle for different purposes: planning, management, monitoring 
and evaluation of village activities. There was no cooperative economic activity in the 
study villages as all income generating activities were implemented at household level. In 
organizing the training courses, the study villages had no activity aimed specifically at 
building the village solidarity. Most of activities involving the improvement of small-scaled 
infrastructure works were contracted out to professional contractors , and therefore, had no 
significant effect on local people’s capacities or cohesion among them. In addition, the 
inappropriateness of the poverty targeting policies further worsened the sense of cohesion 
between the villagers. As a result, while theories of empowerment recognize two 
mechanisms through which the group can affect individual empowerment - the group gives 
voice and support to the members; and the group itself increases the member’s sense of
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empowerment (Drury and Reicher, 1999: 383; Pilisuk et al., 1996: 17) - this study found 
that, during the implementation of the Chiase program, only the first mechanism took place. 
In responding to question about change in agency, while many respondents attributed their 
empowerment to increased ‘voice’ or access to information through village meetings, no 
one referred to the social aspect of collective processes, such as community cohesion, 
solidarity or sense of belonging to the community. This finding indicates the limitations of 
collective empowerment in the Chiase program. This point will be returned to in the next 
section.
7.3. Effectiveness of the Chiase Program in Transforming Local Power Relations
As illustrated in Chapter Three, the effectiveness of the Chiase program in
transforming local power relations is characterized by the improvements in the people’s 
participation in local decision-making and social networks. The transformation is also 
significantly affected by the performance of poverty targeting mechanisms. This section 
focuses on three issues: effectiveness of poverty targeting mechanisms in reaching the poor 
and their attendant effects on people’s participation and community cohesion; improvement 
in people’s participation in local decision-making which involves the level of participation, 
the extent of participation, and the outcome of participation; enhancement in people’s 
social networks involving the examination of people’s networks and assessment of change 
in people’s networks.
7.3.1. Poverty Targeting in the Chiase Program
In the CDD approach, the performance of poverty targeting is important because it
can affect not only the economic security of people but also their mobilization and 
community solidarity (Dupar and Badenoch, 2002: 22; Osmani, 2000: 23). Therefore, to 
understand the transformative effects on power relations of a development program, the 
analysis of poverty targeting mechanism is essential. This study found that both poverty
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targeting mechanisms adopted by the Chiase program were problematic, which 
significantly affected the empowerment of the poor in this program.
In the period 2004-2005, a community-based poverty targeting44 mechanism was 
used in the study villages. While community-based poverty targeting had the advantage of 
superior information, it relies on an arbitrary judgment of the local people, rather than a 
clearly-defined system of criteria. As shown in section 6.3.1, under this targeting scheme, 
income generating activities tended to provide program benefits to all villagers though 
priority was still being given to the poor. This finding about the shortcoming of 
community-based poverty targeting in this study is in line with Bergeron et al.'s (1998: 
1989-1901) conclusion regarding the context of an agricultural development project in 
Honduras, which argues that food security ranking by the local informant was unreliable. In 
Chiase other project components, however, including infrastructure improvement, training 
on skills and knowledge, healthcare, and improvement of production methods, benefited all 
members of the local communities. While it is difficult to quantify the amount of benefit 
gained by each household, the distribution of benefits seemed relatively equal as the 
majority of the respondents revealed that all activities implemented in their villages were 
relevant to local situations (see Table 6.8).
The failure of community-based poverty targeting in preventing the leaking of 
income generating funds to non-targeted groups could be attributed to the fact that the local 
preference favored the distribution of program resources to both the 'poor’ and ‘non-poor’ 
households, rather than directing available resources to the poorest. The majority of local 
people believed that it was fair to let all villagers access the income-generating funds, 
though priority could be given to the poor. This finding is to some extent expected as it has
44 Details o f ‘community-based poverty targeting’ in Chiase are discussed in Chapter Six.
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resonance with some past studies. Chan et al. (1992: 189) reported the failure of social 
welfare programs in China in targeting the childless elderly; and King (1997: 361) also 
found that local preferences for poverty relief varied considerably among the local 
communities during implementation of the Poor Law in England. This discussion lends 
support to Conning and Kevene (2002: 384), who argue that the understandings of social 
justice and poverty may vary among communities and differ from those of a national 
welfare agency.
In the second period, 2006-2007, the Chiase program adopted a government-based 
poverty targeting4^  mechanism which was characterized by two key characteristics: only 
formally-identified ‘poor1 households were eligible to access program benefits; the ‘poor’ 
households were identified by the CPC and, based on the list of ‘poor1 households, 
beneficiaries for specific activities were selected. This ‘explicit targeting’ mechanism 
considerably weakened the motivation for participation in collective action of many non­
poor households and the cohesion between local people as, explored in Chapter Six.
The adoption of this ‘explicit’ poverty targeting mechanism is problematic at both 
conceptual and practical levels. At a conceptual level, a question can be raised: as the non­
poor in a poor community may still be quite poor as compared to national or regional 
distribution, should they be totally excluded from income generating opportunities? This 
point is shared by Chase and Woolcock who reasonably questioned the ability of the most 
destitute in leading the development of a society:
If the history of progressive politics in the developed world is any indication, social 
change is unlikely to emerge from pressures by societies’ most destitute. Rather, 
change is likely to be promoted by those of middle status seeking to exert what they 
consider to be their rightful degree of influence against traditional, entrenched elites
Details of the government-based targeting mechanism in the Chiase are presented in chapter Six.
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who maintain their authority through long-standing social norms (Chase and
Woolcock, 2005: 11).
Therefore, it can be expected that the exclusion of non-poor from income 
generating component is likely to decrease the efficiency and sustainability of economic 
development activities, and thus affect the overall development of the communities. This 
point is also supported by the finding of Dupar and Badenoch (2002) about poverty 
targeting in the Vietnam-Sweden Mountain Rural Development Program, which contends 
that ‘the exclusion of wealthier households from receiving direct support precluded the 
formulation of holistic plans that would be socially and ecologically sustainable’ (p.22). 
Further, at a practical level, the identification of ‘poor’ households by local government is 
less legitimate to the local people. Though both government-based and Community-based 
assessment of poverty may have errors, the use of local knowledge in Community-based 
assessment ensures that it is seen as more legitimate by local people.
The above discussion of poverty targeting schemes also explains a point raised in 
the previous section: the limited collective empowerment in the Chiase program. Raising 
discontent among the ‘non-poor' households must have considerably affected community 
cohesion and impeded cooperative activities. Therefore, the limitations of collective 
empowerment in the Chiase program can be attributed to division within the communities: 
as warned by Drury and Reicher (1999: 398) ‘...[the] crowd may become more divided 
during the course of events and actually feel disempoweredf
What emerges from the above discussion is the importance of an appropriate 
poverty targeting mechanism which can accurately deliver resources to the most destitute 
people without causing much discontent among non-targeted groups. A useful suggestion is 
proposed by Conning and Kevene:
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The best community targeting outcomes are likely to be achieved within hybrid 
systems which allow for significant local community agent discretion but also 
stipulate clear rules and targeting guidelines and which keep local agents accountable 
through external auditing and evaluation, and institutions such as mandatory public 
meetings, and competition among groups for contracts and elected office (Conning 
and Kevene, 2002: 388).
7.3.2. Impacts on People’s participation in local decision-making
The Chiase program created a substantial change in the level of people’s
participation in study communities. Before the implementation of the Chiase program, 
people’s participation in local decision-makingwas promoted at varying levels -  
information sharing, consultation, supervision, and decision-making -  depending on the 
issues in question. Participation at decision-making level was only mobilized for collective 
action relying on local contribution and for the approval of village conventions. The Chiase 
program involved local people in decision-making governing all aspects of village 
development which effectively gave them the right to directly influence all community 
decisions. All village issues were decided by the local villagers themselves through the 
village meeting mechanism, which features a significant improvement in the political 
power of the local people. With regard to the typology of participation (Arnstein, 1969: 
217; Pretty, 1995: 1252), people’s participation in the Chiase program can be characterized 
at a level of consultation and partnership, indicating the empowering nature of this 
program.
The extent to which people participated in local decision-making, measured by 
attendance rate and activeness in meetings, was also better. However, there was a 
significant difference between the ‘elite’, ‘middle’, and ‘poor’ groups. Generally, the ‘elite’ 
were the most active group in village meetings while the ‘middle’ and the ‘poor’ were more 
passive. The passivity of local people in village meetings was attributed to three reasons:
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’attitude of dependence’, ‘lack of information and social skills’, and ‘lack of motivation’. 
Notably, while ‘attitude of dependence’ and ‘lack of information and social skills’ are 
related to deep-seated constraints of the local poor people, ‘lack of motivation’ was a direct 
impact of the ‘explicit’ poverty targeting policy adopted by the Chiase program.
The limitations of the local people in terms of direct participation in decision­
making are predictable, being widely acknowledged in development literature (Johnson, 
2001: 525; Korten, 1981a: 191; Oakley et al., 1991: 13). The asymmetrical performance in 
village meetings between the ‘elite’ and ‘non-elite’ is explained by Fung and Wright (2001: 
33): people enter decision-making process from unequal positions of power, such as
asymmetrical social positions, different access to material resources, and different levels of 
political knowledge. Oakley et al. (1991: 13) and Korten (1981a: 191) also highlight 
dependency and lack of organizational skill as common problems in participatory 
development. This finding highlights the importance of facilitation in the CDD approach.
The “lack of motivation’ resulted from the exclusion of the ‘non-poor’ households 
from acquiring program material benefits. This was quite understandable as an economic 
benefit was an important motive of people’s participation in the study villages. The finding 
lends support to the arguments of White (1996) about the importance of people’s interest in 
participation: ‘People’s enthusiasm for a project depends much more on whether they have 
a genuine interest in it than in whether they participated in its construction’ (p.14). This 
indicates that creating an effective incentives system, which fits people’s interest is of 
importance for the success of the CDD programs.
However, the active participation of the elite in village decision-making should not 
be associated with ‘elite capture’ as it provided positive outcomes for the local 
communities. The thesis found that through the implementation of the Chiase program,
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village decisions became more relevant to the local problems and needs. While ‘elite 
capture’ is commonly mentioned as a tenacious threat in decentralization initiatives, the 
results seemed to suggest it did not occur in the Chiase program as community decisions 
were largely seen as more relevant to local problems. This in part has resonance with 
Dasgupta and Beard’s (2007) findings about ‘benevolent’ elite in a CDD program in 
Indonesia which highlight the important distinction between ‘elite control’ and ‘elite 
capture’ (p.244). This discussion points to the advantage of broad-based participation and 
democratic governance promoted in the Chiase program: it can create opportunities and 
political space necessary to redress elite capture problem in community driven development 
processes. This is a great potential of the CDD approach in attacking poverty, whose merit 
is explained by Uphoff (2005): ‘Resources of richer persons can possibly be co-opted to 
improve the situation of poorly endowed persons’ (p.234). In this study, this view of 
Uphoff was authenticated by many people’s narratives claiming that they participated in 
village meetings with a view to securing community resources, enforcing social equity, or 
advancing community development.
The thesis also found that people’s participation in the Chiase program was mainly 
driven by instrumental motives including tangible and intangible benefits at both individual 
and community levels, such as individual material benefits, productive skills, access to 
information, and resources for community development. This suggests that to mobilize and 
sustain people’s participation, access to resources is essential. This is in line with Gita 
Sen’s (1997) argument about the importance of material resources for empowerment: 
‘Programs which start by raising people’s consciousness but are unable to deliver greater 
control over material resources, can lead to frustration and high dropout rates’ (p.2).
The above discussion indicates that, through the implementation of the Chiase
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program, people’s participation in local decision-making was substantially enhanced and 
community empowerment, defined as the combination of three components of a raised 
level of psychological empowerment, enhanced participation in political action, and a 
redistribution of decision-making authority favorable to the community (Rissel, 1994: 41) 
was also achieved. Though the extent of participation of the 'non-elite’ still lagged behind 
that of the elite, the institutional settings of the Chiase program allowed for more inclusive 
and relevant cooperative decisions to be made. It can be expected that, if poverty targeting 
is better managed and people’s capabilities are improved, the impacts on people’s 
participation and community empowerment would be achieved to a further extent. This 
finding strongly supports the argument that the CDD approach is an effective mechanism 
for empowering the poor people and communities (Chebil and Haque, 2003: 120; Dongier 
et al, 2001: 308).
7.3.3, Impacts on People’s Networks
The research found that, generally, the local people relied on four sources of 
support: external agency officials; commune officials and village leaders; local employers 
and creditors; and relatives and friends. The relationships with these actors form the social 
networks of the local people. Interestingly, there is a marked difference between the 
networks of the ‘elite’ and that of the ‘non-elite’. 'Elite’ households mostly relied on their 
relatives and friends and when approaching government support, they tended to go outside 
the locality to seek assistance from external agencies, which provided greater benefits than 
the commune government did. Conversely, the ‘non-elite’ groups saw the commune-level 
officials and village leaders as the most important source of support while local employers 
and traders were also important sources of support for these groups. Relationships with 
friends and relatives were relatively less important to the 'non-elite’ than to the ‘elite’, 
perhaps due to the fact that the friends and relatives of the poor were also poor and their
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ability to support was limited as well. This finding lends support to both Harris’ (2001) and 
Rao and Walton’s (2004) arguments that social networks are an aspect of the differentiation 
of classes in a social system (Harris, 2001: 115), and they can contribute to inequality 
because the elites ‘are able to access internal and external social networks that are more 
powerful and wealthy’ (Rao and Walton, 2004: 16), while the poor have less influential 
networks which restrict the resources they can mobilize.
The Chiase program created significant impacts on people’s networks with 
commune-level officials. As local officials are the most important source of support of the 
‘non-elite’, this change implied a significant improvement in their networks, which resulted 
in improvements in their access to various benefits. In addition, improvement in social 
networks with external agency officials was also achieved, but to a much lesser extent. 
With regard to the changes in ‘uppers-lowers’ relationships that characterize transformation 
as put forward by Chambers (1995: 33), the program significantly changed the relationship 
between local people and political patrons through making these intermediaries more 
responsive and approachable to people, and as discussed in previous section, making local 
decision-making more relevant and inclusive. People’s networks with relatives and friends 
were slightly weakened due mainly to the rising discontent about how program benefits 
were distributed. This is an important source of support for local people and the weakening 
of this type of network must have affected their well-being. Obviously, a more appropriate 
poverty targeting scheme is required to facilitate empowerment in the CDD approach.
The program did not affect the dependency relationship between the poor people 
and the local employers and traders. Although through the implementation of the Chiase, 
the poor had better access to credit for the enhancement of productive assets and living 
facilities, employment and credit from the local employers and traders were still important
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sources of support for them. Poor people remained dependent on the local better-off and 
suffered from unfavorable terms in dealing with these actors. This indicates that, through 
the implementation of the Chiase program, the ‘upper-lower’ relation between the better- 
offs and the poor did not significantly alter.
7.4. Factors Affecting Empowerment in the Chiase Program
The findings about the factors that are significantly correlated with empowerment
outcomes are important to the discourse on empowerment in the CDD approach. The 
factors, on the one hand, suggest how the CDD programs should be designed and 
implemented in the context of rural Vietnam. On the other hand, they contribute to 
theoretical understandings of the CDD approach.
7.4.1. Downward Accountability of the CPMU
This study found that in the Chiase program, the empowerment outcome was
significantly correlated with the downward accountability of the CPMU, which was 
responsible for monitoring and facilitating village activities. This correlation supports 
theories of accountability, which holds that accountability denotes a specific type of power: 
the capacity to demand someone to be answerable for past actions, and/or the capacity to 
impose a sanction for poor performance (Goetz and Jenkins, 2002: 5); and Tack of 
accountability ... is synonymous with the lack of power' (Day and Klein, 1987: 21). That 
is, in the CDD approach, when a government body is accountable to the people, it gives 
them some power, and the process of holding this body to be accountable to people is an 
empowering process.
This finding about the importance of downward accountability of a public body has 
resonance with some other studies looking at the role of downward accountability in 
different contexts of development practice. Smith-Sreen (1995: 260), who looked at the 
effectiveness of development NGOs at grassroots level in India, claimed that the extent of
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accountability to members within development organizations was strongly related to the 
benefits received by members from the development activities. This means that greater 
member-accountability within grassroots organizations is likely to yield higher benefits for 
members. More relevant to empowerment, Kilby (2006b: 960) studied fifteen development 
NGOs in India and found that the downward accountability of these NGOs was strongly 
correlated with empowerment outcomes for poor women -  the beneficiaries of those 
NGOs. In democratic local governance46, Blair (2000: 21), looked at six relatively 
successful case countries, and identified two related conditions that are essential for the 
success of this strategy: the participation of the local people must be extensive, and the 
accountability of the governors to the governed must be ensured. The contribution of this 
study is to confirm the relationship between ‘downward accountability’ of the local 
government and the empowerment effects on the constituents in the context of a CDD 
program in Vietnam.
The correlation between downward accountability of the CPMU and empowerment 
outcome indicates the ineffectiveness of accountability mechanisms enforcing the CPMU. 
This finding, though indicative rather than representative, is strongly supported by other 
sources of analysis. The analysis of democratic decentralization in the Chiase program 
(Chapter Four) indicates that the weak sanctioning power of the local villagers may result 
in a disincentive for the CPMU to be downwardly accountable. The finding is also 
supported by Fritzen’s (2002) analysis of the implementation of grassroots democratization 
in Vietnam:
The grassroots level is not yet well organized to demand participatory processes.
46 Democratic Local Governance is a development strategy which combines the devolutionary form of 
decentralization -  in which real authority and responsibility are transferred to local bodies - with democracy 
at the local level.
217
Information on rights and program investments is typically inadequate, previous 
experiences are often non-participatory (giving rise to mistrust of, or indifference to, 
upper level campaigns), and social organization via state channels (e.g. mass 
organizations) may be quite weak in some of the poorest areas of the country (p. 18).
The above discussion points to the importance of devising effective accountability
mechanisms enforcing public body acting as partner in the CDD approach if empowering
the poor is the goal of this development approach. Blair (2000: 31), through a study of
Democratic Local Governance in six countries, suggests a number of useful accountability
mechanisms: election, political party, civil society, media, public meeting, formal
procedures and opinion survey. The design of accountability mechanisms can be based on
Blair’s (2000) suggestion: ‘Any one or two of these mechanisms, even if effectively
operating, seems unlikely to promise sustainable accountability... they can be mixed and
matched in a variety of combinations’ (p.35). In addition, Agrawal and Ribot (1999: 479)
proposed a long, but by no means exhaustive, list of possible measures: procedures for
recall; referenda; monitoring by media and NGOs; auditing and evaluation; public reporting
by government; community education; embeddedness of leaders in communities; changes
in the belief system of leader and community; performance awards; social movements; and
government oversight of lower levels of government.
As the downward accountability of the CPMU is a significant factor in the 
empowerment outcomes for the people, a tension between the lines of accountability of the 
CPMU should have important implications for empowerment in the CDD approach. While 
poverty reduction is often the central goal of CDD programs, the poverty targeting 
preference of local communities may not be the same as that of the program authority, and 
that is often the case in poor communities. Therefore, there is a tension between downward 
accountability for people's expectation of the public body and its accountability to the
218
principal. This tension can considerably affect the performance of the public body, and 
thus, the empowerment impacts of the CDD programs. Thus, it is important for the CDD 
programs to balance the poverty targeting goal and community preference.
7.4.2. Participation in Local Organizations
The finding about the significant correlation between people’s participation in local
organizations -  measured through their membership in local organizations - and their 
empowerment can be explained both by theories of empowerment and the political context 
of Vietnam villages. On one hand, theory of empowerment argues that a group can give its 
members organizational resources, say coordination and communication; and a sense of 
power develops in the course of collective actions (Drury and Reicher, 1999: 383; Pilisuk et 
al., 1996: 17-18). On the other hand, local organizations in rural Vietnam are 
predominantly socio-political organizations which are formally recognized as part of the 
political system. Therefore, joining the local organizations often gives the member some 
political power — ability to influence community political processes. In addition, through 
joining local organizations, the members can enhance their social and political skills, such 
as public speaking and conflict resolution, which are important for their performance in the 
Chiase activities.
This finding is in line with empirical studies that find a relationship between 
membership in dominant social groups and participation in civil community development 
activities, which features an important dimension of empowerment (Beard, 2005: 36; Isham 
and Kahkonen, 2002: 679). This reflects the importance of people’s participation in local 
organizations toward their empowerment in the CDD approach which points to two key 
findings. First, the higher number of local organizations a person takes membership in, the 
better chance he/she experience empowerment through the implementation of the CDD
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programs. The second implication is that the stronger the existing local organizations the 
more significant empowerment impacts created by the CDD programs, that is, the CDD is 
more likely to be successful in areas where strong local organizations exist.
Therefore, the strength of the existing local organizations should be an important 
concern in designing and implementing CDD projects. Presently, in rural areas of Vietnam, 
where civil society is still under-developed, the most influential local organizations include 
the Fatherland Front, Women’s Union, Farmers’ Association, Veterans’ Association and 
Youth Union. While on one hand, these organizations should be seen as important partners 
and mobilization of them should be a key strategy of the CDD projects, on the other hand, 
as all of these local organizations are part of political system in Vietnam and being 
established for the purpose of mobilizing mass population to support the Party’s policies, 
their ability to monitor the local government is limited. In this context promoting the 
development of civil society can be an effective supplement to these existing political 
structures. In addition, the formation of new local groups and the implementation of 
cooperative activities are also of great importance for people's empowerment.
Another implication is that the development of local organizations should be an 
important factor to be considered in scaling up the CDD approach. In Vietnam, as the 
strength and influence of local organizations vary substantially between regions, between 
the Kinh and other minority groups, the adoption of the CDD must be based on a careful 
analysis of the situation of each project area. A rigid model of the CDD approach may be 
not effective for all areas in the country.
7.4.3. Material Benefit and Training
People’s responses showed that material support and training in the Chiase program 
directly affected their access to assets, basic skills, awareness and information, which
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resulted in an increase in a sense of confidence and self-esteem. Therefore, the finding 
about the correlation between empowerment and the two factors ‘amount of material 
benefit the respondent receives1 and ‘number of training courses the respondent attends’ 
indicate the importance of access to assets and capabilities at individual level in 
empowering poor people. This also shows that empowerment is not necessarily related to 
political power, referring to the capacity to act at community level.
This finding is a testament to the strategy for empowerment of the poor put forward 
by Uphoff (2005: 232), which specifies two measures to help people achieve what they 
need and desire: directly enhancing poor people’s respective assets and capabilities, and 
establishing assets and capabilities at higher levels of decision-making. It is also supported 
by the views of empowerment acknowledging multiple avenues to empowerment as ‘the 
gaining of strength in various ways necessary to be able to move out of poverty’ rather than 
focusing purely on political change (Osmani, 2000: 23; Schneider, 1999: 524). In the same 
vein, Gita Sen (1997) argues that empowerment includes both components: intrinsic 
transformation and extrinsic control of resources. For her, both components are important 
and she argues that ‘programs which starts by raising people’s consciousness but are unable 
to deliver greater control over material resources, can lead to frustration and high drop-out 
rates’ (p.2). Korten (1981b) also supports the approach to empowerment which relies on 
cognitive change by arguing that helping the poor to develop an "understanding of their 
needs’ and ‘the opportunities and constraints they face’ is critical to people’s self­
development (p.214).
7.5. Conclusion
Four key points have emerged from the research on empowerment in the Chiase 
program. The first point involves key characteristics of the empowerment in this program. 
It is found that empowerment is characterized by improved performance in household and
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community domains. Empowerment involves not only improvements in individual assets 
and capabilities but also the enhancement of capacity to act at higher decision-making 
levels. Further, while the program has a potential to transform local power relations, its 
collective processes are to a considerable extent constrained.
Second, the designs of poverty targeting schemes have important implications for 
empowerment in the CDD approach. Both community-based and government-based 
‘explicit’ targeting schemes in the Chiase program are problematic, with significant effects 
on empowerment in the program. The limitations of collective processes in the program in 
part can be attributed to raising discontent due to inappropriate targeting policies. 
Therefore, devising an appropriate poverty targeting mechanism is of importance to the 
success of the CDD programs.
Third, the transformation of power relations has been achieved through the 
improvements in the people’s participation in local decision-making and social networks. 
Through the implementation of the Chiase program, the level and extent of people’s 
participation are enhanced, and people’s networks with the political intermediaries are 
improved, which results in more relevant and inclusive community decision-making and 
better access to government support. Remarkably, while people’s networks reflect class 
differentiation, the program improves the key networks of the ‘non-elite’, which shows its 
effectiveness in transforming local power relations.
Finally, the key factors that affect empowerment are the amount of material benefit, 
number of training courses, participation in local organizations, and downward 
accountability of the CPMU. The importance of this finding is twofold as it contributes to 
the understanding of empowerment and suggests measures to promote the empowerment 
outcomes of the CDD program in Vietnam.
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion
8.1. Introduction
The goal of this thesis has been to examine the effectiveness of the CDD approach 
in empowering the poor in the socio-political context of Vietnam. This has been facilitated 
through a study of the Chiase program comprising three components of analysis: the 
meaning of empowerment in the Chiase program and its implications for the transformation 
of power relations; the effectiveness of the program in transforming local power relations 
including the examination of poverty targeting schemes in this program; and the factors 
significantly affecting empowerment in this program. This chapter summarizes the 
strengths, limitations, and tensions of this program in empowering the poor, and suggests a 
number of recommendations for promoting the empowerment of the poor in this 
development approach in Vietnam.
Four groups of findings are described in this study. First, the thesis finds that, 
empowerment, as people perceived, involves both change in access to assets and 
capabilities as well as the achievement of political power. The thesis also finds that while 
the program has a potential to transform power relations and empower women, the 
collective dimensions of empowerment in the Chiase program have been, however, 
impeded. Second, both poverty targeting schemes, adopted by this program, are 
problematic which has resulted in unfavorable consequences empowerment effects. Third, 
the Chiase program is effective in transforming local power relations through improving 
people's political representation and social networks. The transformation is characterized 
by more inclusive and responsive local decision-making and increased connection between 
people and the local government officials. The fourth finding of this study, relating to the 
key factors that affect empowerment and their implications for the implementation of the
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CDD in Vietnam, are discussed in the following section.
8.2. Meaning of Empowerment in the Chiase Program
Characteristics of empowerment in the Chiase program were explored through
examining the respondents' narratives of the important changes in their agency defined as 
the range of choices and ability to exercise them. People’s responses show that the changes 
in people’s agency can take multiple forms featuring their performance in and access to 
household and community domains. Empowerment in the household domain is 
characterized by more equal domestic relationships, independence and efficiency of the 
households, while empowerment in the community domain is characterized by the increase 
in ability to influence community decision-making and political processes. Changes in both 
household and community domains are valued by local people and empowerment in this 
program is conceptualized by local people as various ways of gaining access to assets and 
capabilities to exercise strategic life choices. This, in part, justifies the methodology of this 
study, which relied on subjective measurement of empowerment.
This finding is important in that it points to the importance of not only political 
power, but also material assets and capabilities at individual level in empowering the poor 
Therefore, in line with Schneider (1999: 524) and Uphoffs (2005: 232), this thesis has 
argued that interventions aimed at empowering the poor should focus on both individual 
assets and capabilities as well as capacity to act at higher decision-making levels. This 
argument also supports the World Bank’s approach to empowerment, which involves 
‘expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, 
influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives’ (World Bank, 
2002: 11).
In addition, it is found that the elite are more likely to achieve empowerment
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through gaining political power, defined as ability to influence the allocation of community 
resources, while the empowerment of the non-elite is mostly characterized by the increase 
in personal power known as an improved sense of self-efficacy, awareness, and basic skills. 
Therefore, reversing uppers-lowers relationship between the elite and non-elite, as 
suggested by Chambers (1995: 42), may be unrealistic in the CDD approach. However, 
positive outcomes in the other ‘uppers-lowers’ relationship between the local political 
patrons and people were recorded.
People’s responses also show the achievements as well as limitations of this 
program. The impacts of the Chiase program on women’s empowerment are significant, 
and mainly achieved through expanding economic and political spaces of the local women. 
However, the impacts of this program must have been considerably constrained due to the 
absence of collective economic activities -  the key factor facilitating women’s cognitive 
space as identified by Deshmukh-Ranadive’s (2006: 112). The program also creates a 
transformative change in the power relations between the people and the commune-level 
officials through increasing people’s ‘ability to influence community decisions’ and ‘ability 
to query the government officials’, which results in more responsive officials and a more 
relevant community decision-making. However, change in the relationships between the 
poor and the rich was not achieved. Finally, though the notion of feedback loop between 
collective and individual empowerment is supported in the Chiase, the impacts of collective 
processes on individual empowerment are limited. That is, while village meetings in the 
program can provide people with organizational resources, such as ‘voice’ and better access 
to information, they do not improve the cohesion among local people or people’ sense of 
belonging to the village. This finding points to a limitations of collective empowerment in 
this program, which will be returned to in the next section.
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8.3. Poverty Targeting in the Chiase Program
Being a poverty reduction intervention, poverty targeting is a key process in the
Chiase program. Two different targeting mechanisms were adopted by the program in two 
periods 2004-2005 and 2006-2007. In the first period, a Community-based poverty 
targeting47 mechanism was used, which involved the local community as the intermediary 
agent solely responsible for defining eligibility, selecting the beneficiaries, and 
implementing the delivery of benefits. In the second period, a government-based ‘explicit’ 
targeting mechanism was adopted which maintains that only formally-identified ‘poor’ 
households are eligible to access program material benefits. The Commune People’s 
Committee is involved to identify the ‘poor’ household based on household income and 
MOLISA poverty line, while the local communities are involved to identify beneficiaries of 
specific activities from the pre-defined list o f ‘poor’ households.
Both of the poverty targeting mechanisms adopted by the Chiase program have 
problems. Community-based poverty targeting is not based on clearly-defined eligibility 
and, therefore, is sensitive to the local preference for poverty targeting. In the case of the 
Chiase program, as the local preference favors the distribution of material resources to both 
poor and non-poor households, this targeting scheme fails to prevent the leaking of 
development funds to the non-targeted groups. This indicates that the superior information 
of the community-based mechanism does not necessarily result in better targeting effects. It 
suggests that, in poverty reduction programs, it seems to be unrealistic to expect that a poor 
community, where most residents are relatively poor, would voluntarily direct all material 
resources to a small group of its residents — the 'poor’ group. The belief that community- 
based poverty targeting would necessarily enhance the targeting effects of poverty 
reduction programs appears to be naive.
47 Details o f ‘community-based poverty targeting’ in the Chiase are discussed in Chapter Six.
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On the other hand, the amended government-based ‘explicit’ targeting mechanism 
can be challenged on a number of grounds. The exclusion of the ‘non-poor' from accessing 
material benefits results in rising discontentment among these households, which seriously 
weakens both community cohesion and the motivation of ‘non-poor' people. Further, 
poverty assessment undertaken by the local government is often inconsistent with people’s 
perception of poverty, which further increases their discontent. In addition, the ‘non-poor’ 
in a poor community may still be quite poor as compared to national or regional poverty 
distribution, and excluding them from benefiting from program resources may be unfair.
8.4. Transformation of Local Power Relations through the Chiase Program
Theories of empowerment indicate that empowerment of the poor must be
characterized by transformation in local power relations. One realistic way to analyze the 
transformation of power relations is to examine the creation o f ‘political capabilities’ of the 
poor, defined as the ability to ‘create new rules, transform social preferences, as well as 
secure new resources as they become available’ (Whitehead and Gray-Molina. 1999: 7). In 
the CDD approach, ‘political capabilities’ of the poor can be developed through enhancing 
people’s political representation and social networks. In this study, transformation in power 
relations has been analyzed through examining the changes in people’s participation in 
local decision-making and their social networks.
The Chiase program has substantially improved both the level and extent of 
people's participation in local decision-making. Under the Chiase program, the scope of 
issues to be decided by the local communities was much broadened as compared to the 
previous period. Local people were also more willing to attend meetings and more active in 
discussing village issues. This improvement in people's political representation has resulted 
in an increased inclusiveness and relevance of community decisions.
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However, improvements in people’s participation were, to a considerable extent, 
inhibited by three factors: ‘attitude of dependence'; ‘lack of social skills and information'; 
and ‘lack of motivation’. The first two factors are related to deep-seated constraints of the 
poor people and have been widely recognized in participatory development (Johnson, 2001: 
525; Korten, 1981a: 193; Oakley et al., 1991: 13), while the last factor is a result of the 
inappropriate poverty targeting policy of this program. The finding suggests that to promote 
the empowerment of the poor through the CDD approach, an effective system of support 
and facilitation for the poor’s participation and an appropriate poverty targeting mechanism 
are required.
In addition, the thesis finds that people mostly participate for instrumental purposes, 
and access to resources is essential to sustain their participation. This finding suggests the 
importance of material resources in the CDD approach. Therefore, to maintain and further 
develop the empowerment impacts of the Chiase program after it ceases, incorporating 
village planning into the formal state-funded development planning system is essential.
Social networks of the local people were analyzed through examining important 
sources of support that their well-being has relied on. Generally, local people’s networks 
comprise relationships with four groups of actors: ‘external agencies’; ‘commune officials 
and village leaders’; ‘local employers and creditors’; and ‘relatives and friends’. This study 
finds that there is a significant difference between social networks of the ‘elite’ and those of 
the ‘non-elite’: for the former, ‘relatives and friends’ are the most important sources of 
support, while the latter rely mainly on the ‘commune-level officials and village leaders’, 
and ‘local employers and creditors’, as the most important sources of support. The ‘elite’ 
also relied on government support but they mostly sought assistance from external agencies 
which provided more benefits than the commune-level governments. This indicates that
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networks are part of power relations in a social system and can contribute to inequality, as 
the elite can access powerful and wealthy networks while the poor have fewer influential 
networks, which provide limited resources.
Through the implementation of the Chiase program, the networks between local 
people with the commune-level officials and the external agencies were significantly 
improved, while their networks with relatives and friends were slightly degraded, and their 
relationships with local employers remained unchanged. Since the commune-level officials 
acted as the intermediaries in various government-supported programs, the changes in the 
networks with this group of actors facilitated people’s access to a wide range of 
government support and thus, their economic security and development. The degradation of 
people’s networks with relatives, neighbors and friends, as touched on in previous sections, 
indicates the negative impacts of the ‘explicit’ poverty targeting mechanism. This again 
suggests the importance of an appropriate poverty targeting scheme to promote 
empowerment through the CDD approach.
In a nutshell, through the implementation of the Chiase program, both political 
representation and social networks of the people have been significantly improved. This 
change has resulted in more relevant and inclusive community decision-making and 
improved people's access to information and government support, leading to increased 
‘political capabilities’ for the poor. This process also reflects a significant change in the 
‘uppers-lowers’ relationship between the political patrons and people, which is a key aspect 
of transformation as put forward by Chambers (1995: 33). This is a considerable success of 
the new generation of CDD programs, of which the Chiase program is a representative, as 
compared to the Social Fund -  an older model of the CDD approach - which was found to 
be failing to challenge existing local institutions and social relations (Babajanian, 2005:
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457; Rao and Ibanez, 2003: 33; World Bank OED, 2002: 43).
8.5. Implications for the Implementation of the CDD Approach in Vietnam
The discussions of the meaning of empowerment, effectiveness of the Chiase
program in transforming local power relations, and factors affecting empowerment (see 
Chapter Seven) highlight the importance of a number of factors toward empowerment in 
this program. Based on these findings, a number of implications for the implementation of 
the CDD approach in the socio-political context of Vietnam can be drawn. Key factors to 
be considered include: design of poverty targeting mechanisms, the accountability 
mechanisms imposed on the local government, strength of local organizations, and 
provision of material support and capacity-building activities.
Poverty targeting is important for poverty reduction and is an underlying process in 
the CDD approach. The design of a poverty targeting mechanism can significantly impact 
on people’s access to program material benefits as well as their motivation for participation 
and social networks. An inappropriate poverty targeting mechanism can, to a considerable 
extent, impede the empowerment of the poor people as shown in the case of the Chiase 
program. Further, while poverty reduction is a central goal of the CDD programs, the 
perception of poverty of a program authority is often different from that of the local people, 
and therefore, conflict between the downward accountability of the public body and its 
accountability to program goal and the principals is likely in the CDD programs. Thus, an 
appropriate poverty targeting mechanism is required to minimize this conflict between lines 
of accountability of the public body as well as to develop people’s participation and 
community cohesion. An appropriate poverty targeting scheme must be one which is able 
to deliver material resources to the poorest without causing much discontent among other 
groups of local people. Based on related literature and empirical findings, this study 
proposes that while the design of targeting schemes should vary depending on institutional
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characteristics of CDD programs, an appropriate targeting scheme must rely on two key 
characteristics: local community is involved in selecting beneficiaries, and a clearly-defined 
system of eligibility is applied for beneficiary selection.
While the CDD approach is specified by the CPRGS of Vietnamese government as 
the key mechanism for poverty reduction at local level in Vietnam, the local institutions in 
the country have not been well prepared to fit with this development approach. As 
discussed in 4.4.2, the effectiveness of all existing accountability mechanisms imposed on 
the commune-level government - monitoring by people's councils, monitoring by local 
organizations, monitoring by individual, and public reporting in the Village Meetings - 
appears to be limited. Therefore, while incorporating the commune-level government as a 
key facilitating agent in the CDD programs provides a great scope for scaling up 
development achievements, the weaknesses of the accountability mechanisms enforcing 
this group of actors can, to a considerable extent, hamper the impacts of this development 
approach. The causal relationship between downward accountability of the commune-level 
government and the empowerment effects of the CDD program established in this study 
indicates that improving the effectiveness of accountability mechanisms imposed on the 
commune-level government is essential for the success of the CDD approach in Vietnam, 
whose institutional arrangement relies on the partnership between local communities and 
local government.
To ensure the accountability of the local government in decentralization, a number 
of useful accountability mechanisms have been proposed by Blair (2000: 31) and Agrawal 
and Ribot (1999: 479) as shown in 7.4.1. It is also suggested that the combination of these 
mechanisms would promise a sustainable accountability. Drawing from the experience of 
the implementation of Democratic Local Governance approach in other developing
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countries, realistic measure to improve downward accountability of the commune-level 
government in Vietnam can be the combination of existing mechanisms with direct election 
of local government, and the monitoring by the media and civil society.
Direct election of the chairman of Commune People’s Committee would give the 
local people an effective sanctioning power and make the local government more 
responsive to the needs and demands of the constituents. In addition, to redress the 
weaknesses of election (as discussed in 4.5.4), monitoring by the media and civil society 
should be facilitated. Presently, the right to monitor the local government of the media and 
civil society has been institutionalized in the Constitution and the Grassroots 
Democratization legislations. What is lacking is an effective framework for the 
involvement of the civil society in the local governance and a policy environment which 
encourages the formation and operation of civil society. If this issue is addressed properly, 
the downward accountability of local government in the country is likely to be ensured.
The fact that the extent of participation in local organizations is a significant factor 
of people’s empowerment indicates the importance of existing local organizations toward 
empowerment in the CDD approach. This means that the CDD is more likely to be 
successful in areas with strong local organizations and vice versa. This suggests that 
decision-makers and planners should be more cautious about the use of the CDD approach 
in Vietnam context. In mountainous areas and ethnic minority communities, where local 
organizations are weak, empowerment impact of the CDD programs may be, to a 
considerable extent, limited. Therefore, the CDD programs implemented in areas without a 
network of strong local organizations should emphasize on institution building and 
collective activities as key strategies for people's empowerment. On one hand, the local 
groups would increase people's 'voice' on issues affecting their lives. On the other hand,
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group interactions would build up the sense of cohesion among local people. These assets 
provide a sustainable basis for people's empowerment as well as poverty reduction.
The correlation between people’s access to material benefits as well as training and 
their empowerment suggests the importance of access to assets and capabilities at 
individual level in empowering the poor. This again emphasizes the importance of an 
effective poverty targeting mechanism and effective capacity building activities toward the 
empowerment of the poor in the CDD approach. To promote empowerment of the poor, the 
CDD programs should focus on not only structural changes but also the improvements in 
asset bases, productive skills and social awareness of the target groups.
In conclusion, the thesis has presented three groups of findings. First, empowerment 
in the Chiase took many forms with different characteristics and consequences, which were 
all valued by the local people. It was also found that the elite tended to experience 
empowerment through gaining political power, the ability to influence the distribution of 
community resources, while the empowerment of the non-elite was mostly characterized by 
the increase in personal power, such as an improved awareness, confidence and basic skills. 
There were changes in power relations between local political patrons and the people, and 
between women and men, while the relationships between the economic better-offs and the 
poor remained unchanged. The effects of collective processes in the Chiase program on 
empowerment were limited. Second, the Chiase program did transform the local power 
relations through improving people’s participation in local decision-making and their 
networks with commune-level officials. The consequence of this transformation was the 
increased relevance of community decision-making and improved people’s access to 
available resources and support provided by the government. The transformative effect, 
however, was impeded by inappropriate poverty targeting schemes. Finally, downward
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accountability of the commune-echelon government, the extent one participated in local 
organizations and the amount of material support and training one received from the 
program were the factors that significantly affected people’s empowerment.
The findings suggest that empowerment of the poor should be undestood as a 
processes involving both the improvements of access to assets and capabilities at individual 
level and capacity to act at a higher level of decision-making. The CDD approach has a 
great potential to empower the poor, however, while changing the ‘uppers-lowers’ 
relationships between the local political patrons and the people, and women-men 
relationships are possible in this approach, reversing power relations between the elite and 
non-elite may be unrealistic. Key factors to be considered in the implementation of the 
CDD approach in Viet Nam include: the design of poverty targeting mechanisms, the 
downward accountability of the local government, the strength of local organizations, and 
the provision of material benefits and training. Careful attention to these factors would 
ensure more effective implementation of the CDD approach in Vietnam context, 
contributing to a considerable improvement in the empowerment of the poor, an important 
aspect of poverty reduction.
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Appendix 1: Data Concerning Responses of Empowerment
Notes:
1- Empowerment:
E_1: Influence household issues
E_2: Handle household issues independently and effectively
E_3: Influence community decisions
E_4: Query the commune-level officials
E_5: Influence the performance of community works
2- Wealth Group:
1: 'Poor' group 
2: 'Middle' group 
3: 'Elite' group
3- Education Attainment: Number of years schooling.
Village Respondent
code
Gender Age Education
Attainment
Wealth
Group
Empowerment
E_1 E_2 E_3 E_4 E_5
Viet Trung 1 M 40 5 1 Ö 1 0 0 0
Viet Trung 2 M 43 9 3 0 0 1 1 1
Viet Trung 3 M 40 10 1 0 1 0 0 0
Viet Trung 4 M 68 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 5 M 42 5 2 0 0 1 1 0
Viet Trung 6 M 40 5 1 0 1 0 0 0
Viet Trung 7 M 46 5 3 0 0 1 0 0
VietTrung 8 M 41 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 9 M 35 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 10 M 35 12 3 0 0 1 1 1
Viet Trung 11 M 62 5 1 0 1 1 0 0
Viet Trung 12 M 62 7 1 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 13 M 45 12 3 0 0 1 0 0
Viet Trung 14 M 41 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
VietTrung 15 M 34 10 2 0 1 0 0 0
Viet Trung 16 F 50 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 17 F 58 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Viet Trung 18 F 48 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 19 F 53 5 1 1 1 0 0 0
Viet_Trung 20 F 45 7 2 0 1 0 0 0
Viet Trung 21 F 30 6 1 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 22 F 42 8 1 0 0 1 0 0
Viet Trung 23 F 38 9 2 1 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 24 F 39 10 2 0 1 0 0 0
Viet Trung 25 F 36 4 1 1 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 26 F 42 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
Viet_Trung 27 F 32 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 28 F 36 10 3 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Trung 29 F 36 9 1 0 1 0 1 0
Viet Trung 30 F 34 6 1 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Loc 31 M 46 7 3 0 0 1 1 1
Viet_Loc 32 M 43 6 2 0 1 0 0 0
Viet Loc 33 M 35 6 2 0 0 1 0 0
Viet_Loc 34 M 38 9 3 0 0 0 0 0
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Viet Loc 35 M 54 5 1 0 1 0 1 0
Viet Loc 36 M 35 9 1 0 1 0 0 0
Viet Loc 37 M 53 7 2 0 0 1 0 1
Viet Loc 38 M 6 5 4 1 0 0 0 0 0
Viet_Loc 39 M 4 8 9 3 0 0 0 1 0
Viet Loc 40 M 4 9 6 2 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Loc 41 M 45 5 1 0 1 1 0 0
Viet Loc 42 M 38 12 2 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Loc 43 M 4 7 9 1 0 1 1 0 0
Viet Loc 44 M 61 9 3 0 0 1 0 0
Viet Loc 45 M 32 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Loc 46 F 52 6 2 0 0 1 1 1
Viet Loc 47 F 31 7 1 1 0 0 0 0
Viet Loc 48 F 25 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Loc 49 F 57 9 3 1 0 1 0 0
Viet Loc 50 F 4 9 9 1 0 1 0 0 0
Viet_Loc 51 F 39 6 2 0 0 0 0 0
Viet_Loc 52 F 4 3 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
Viet_Loc 53 F 29 11 1 0 1 0 0 0
Viet_Loc 54 F 41 7 1 1 0 0 0 0
Viet_Loc 55 F 38 6 2 • 0 0 0 0 0
Viet_Loc 56 F 4 7 9 1 1 0 1 0 0
Viet_Loc 57 F 35 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
Viet_Loc 58 F 37 4 2 1 0 0 0 0
Viet_Loc 59 F 38 8 2 0 0 0 0 0
Viet Loc 60 F 4 4 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n_Son 61 M 50 7 2 0 1 0 0 0
A n_Son 62 M 43 9 3 0 0 1 1 1
A n_Son 63 M 6 6 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n_Son 64 M 53 7 1 0 0 0 0 0
A n S o n 65 M 6 5 10 3 0 0 1 0 1
A n_Son 66 M 38 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n_Son 67 M 4 3 6 3 0 0 1 0 0
A n_Son 68 M 66 4 2 0 0 0 0 0
An Son 69 M 4 7 9 1 0 1 0 0 0
A n_Son 70 M 58 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
An Son 71 M 4 0 9 3 0 1 0 1 0
An Son 72 M 2 7 5 1 0 1 0 0 0
An Son 73 F 53 3 1 0 0 0 0 0
An Son 74 F 4 0 8 1 0 0 0 0 0
A n_Son 75 F 27 10 1 0 1 0 0 0
An Son 76 F 4 0 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
An Son 77 F 4 4 7 2 0 1 1 1 0
An Son 78 F 37 5 1 1 0 0 0 0
A n_Son 79 F 4 3 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n_Son 80 F 4 3 6 1 1 0 1 0 0
A n_Son 81 F 28 9 3 0 1 1 1 0
An Son 82 F 51 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n_Son 83 F 38 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
An Son 84 F 35 5 1 0 1 0 0 0
A n V a n 85 F 38 7 2 1 1 0 0 0
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A n V an 86 F 51 5 1 0 1 1 0 0
A n _ V a n 87 F 4 5 6 1 0 0 0 0 0
A n_V an 88 F 4 9 5 1 1 0 1 0 0
A n V an 89 F 51 7 2 1 1 0 0 0
A n _V an 90 F 4 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
A n V an 91 F 4 8 7 1 0 0 0 1 0
A n _ V a n 92 F 4 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
A n V an 93 F 4 3 6 1 1 1 0 0 0
A n _ V a n 94 F 4 9 2 1 1 1 0 1 0
A n _V an 95 F 4 6 6 1 0 0 0 0 0
A n _ V a n 96 F 4 2 10 3 0 0 1 1 1
A n V a n 97 F 21 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n V a n 98 F 2 5 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n _ V a n 99 F 4 6 9 3 1 0 1 0 0
A n _ V a n 100 M 4 5 7 1 0 0 0 0 0
A n_V an 101 M 3 8 9 1 0 1 1 0 1
A n _ V a n 102 M 2 9 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n _ V a n 103 M 6 0 6 3 0 0 1 0 1
A n _V an 104 M 3 5 5 1 0 1 0 0 0
A n _V an 105 M 4 9 9 3 0 1 0 0 0
A n _ V a n 106 M 5 4 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n _V an 107 M 58 5 2 0 1 0 0 0
A n _V an 108 M 3 6 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n _V an 109 M 3 7 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n _V an 110 M 3 9 8 3 0 0 0 0 0
A n _ V a n 111 M 4 8 9 3 0 0 1 1 0
A n _V an 112 M 5 4 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
A n V a n 113 M 4 6 8 2 0 0 1 1 1
A n _V an 114 M 3 2 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
B inh lieh 115 M 35 3 1 0 1 0 0 0
B in h j ic h 116 M 41 6 1 0 0 0 0 0
B inh lieh 117 M 5 3 7 1 0 0 0 0 0
B in h j ic h 118 M 56 8 1 0 1 0 0 0
B in h j ic h 119 M 4 9 7 3 0 0 1 0 1
B in h j ic h 120 M 6 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 0
B in h j ic h 121 M 36 10 2 0 1 0 0 0
B inh lieh 122 M 37 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
B in h j ic h 123 M 4 0 10 3 0 0 0 0 0
B inh lieh 124 M 31 12 2 0 0 0 1 0
B inh lieh 125 M 4 7 4 1 0 1 0 0 0
B in h j ic h 126 M 6 3 3 2 0 0 0 0 0
B inh lieh 127 F 4 6 9 1 1 0 0 0 0
B inh lieh 128 F 4 4 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
B inh lieh 129 F 52 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
B inh lieh 130 F 4 4 9 2 1 0 1 1 0
B in h j ic h 131 F 38 5 1 0 1 0 0 0
B in h j ic h 132 F 4 3 10 2 1 0 1 0 0
B in h j ic h 133 F 56 11 3 1 1 0 0 0
B in h j ic h 134 F 6 2 7 2 0 1 0 0 0
B inh lieh 135 F 32 10 2 0 0 0 0 0
B in h j ic h 136 F 4 4 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
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B in h jic h 137 F 36 7 1 0 0 0 0 0
B in h jic h 138 F 35 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
Binh_Kim 139 M 35 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
B in h K im 140 M 64 7 3 0 0 1 0 1
Binh_Kim 141 M 47 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
B in h K im 142 M 46 9 2 0 0 0 1 1
Binh_Kim 143 M 66 8 1 0 1 0 0 0
B in h K im 144 M 63 9 3 0 0 0 0 0
Binh_Kim 145 M 28 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
B in h K im 146 M 31 8 1 0 1 0 0 0
B in h K im 147 M 69 6 2 0 0 1 1 0
Binh Kim 148 M 39 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
B in h K im 149 M 38 12 2 0 0 0 0 0
Binh_Kim 150 F 35 9 2 0 1 0 0 0
Binh_Kim 151 F 42 7 1 0 1 0 0 0
Binh Kim 152 F 30 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
Binh_Kim 153 F 35 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
B in h K im 154 F 36 6 1 0 0 0 0 0
Binh_Kim 155 F 45 10 1 0 1 0 1 0
B in h K im 156 F 27 9 1 1 1 0 0 0
B in h K im 157 F 47 9 1 V« 0 0 0 0
Binh_Kim 158 F 45 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
Binh_Kim 159 F 55 10 2 1 0 0 0 0
B in h K im 160 F 55 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Dong 161 M 62 9 3 0 0 1 1 1
Son Dong 162 M 43 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
Son Dong 163 M 37 10 1 0 1 0 1 0
Son Dong 164 M 34 5 1 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Dong 165 M 56 9 3 0 0 0 0 0
S o n D o n g 166 M 55 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
Son Dong 167 M 30 12 1 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Dong 168 M 44 3 1 0 1 0 0 0
S o n D o n g 169 M 35 7 2 0 1 1 0 0
Son_Dong 170 M 29 9 3 0 0 0 0 0
Son Dong 171 M 65 4 1 0 1 0 0 0
S o n D o n g 172 M 42 9 3 0 0 1 1 0
Son Dong 173 M 35 12 2 0 0 0 0 0
S o n D o n g 174 M 55 5 1 0 1 0 0 0
S o n D o n g 175 M 38 7 2 0 0 1 0 0
Son_Dong 176 F 47 6 1 1 0 1 1 0
Son_Dong 177 F 41 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Dong 178 F 35 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
Son Dong 179 F 52 10 3 0 0 0 0 0
Son Dong 180 F 31 7 1 0 1 0 0 0
S o n D o n g 181 F 31 9 2 1 0 0 0 0
Son_Dong 182 F 57 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Dong 183 F 49 9 2 0 0 0 - 0 0
Son_Dong 184 F 39 6 2 0 0 0 0 0
S o n D o n g 185 F 43 8 1 0 1 0 0 0
Son Dong 186 F 32 9 1 0 0 0 0 0
Son Dong 187 F 41 12 2 1 0 0 0 0
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Son Dong 188 F 29 7 2 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Dong 189 F 45 6 3 1 1 0 0 0
S o n D o n g 190 F 38 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Khe 191 M 48 6 2 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Khe 192 M 31 12 1 0 1 0 1 0
Son Khe 193 M 52 8 2 0 0 0 0 0
S o n K h e 194 M 38 6 2 0 1 0 0 0
Son Khe 195 M 37 9 3 0 0 0 0 1
S o n K h e 196 M 35 4 1 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Khe 197 M 36 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Son_Khe 198 M 50 10 2 0 0 1 0 0
Son Khe 199 M 42 6 3 0 0 0 0 0
S o n K h e 200 M 37 9 1 0 1 0 0 0
Son Khe 201 M 29 5 2 0 0 1 1 1
Son Khe 202 M 38 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
S o n K h e 203 M 54 5 3 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Khe 204 F 29 7 1 1 1 0 0 0
Son_Khe 205 F 45 7 1 0 1 0 0 0
Son_Khe 206 F 38 7 2 1 0 0 0 0
Son_Khe 207 F 42 7 3 0 0 1 1 0
Son_Khe 208 F 47
~7
1 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Khe 209 F 47 5 2 0 0 0 0 0
Son Khe 210 F 35 7 1 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Khe 211 F 37 5 2 1 1 1 0 0
Son_Khe 212 F 38 7 3 0 0 0 0 0
S o n K h e 213 F 44 9 2 1 0 0 0 0
S o n K h e 214 F 65 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
S o n K h e 215 F 32 10 2 0 0 0 0 0
Son_Khe 216 F 35 6 1 0 1 0 0 0
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Appendix 2: Data Concerning Factors Affecting Empowerment
Village Respondent
code
Education
Atta inm ent
W ealth
Level
Am ount
of
Benefits
Training Participation in 
Local O rganization
Downward
Accountability
V ie t Trung 1 5 3 1 1 1 1
V ie t Trung 2 9 5 0 2 2 1
V ie t_Trung 3 10 2 1 2 1 1
V ie t Trung 4 7 6 0 0 0 1
V ie t Trung 5 5 6 0 1 1 1
V ie t Trung 6 5 2 2 2 0 1
V ie t Trung 7 5 7 0 1 2 1
V iet_Trung 8 7 7 0 2 1 1
V ie t Trung 9 9 5 0 0 1 1
V ie t Trung 10 12 6 1 2 4 1
V ie t Trung 11 5 2 2 3 2 1
V iet_Trung 12 7 1 2 0 1 1
V ie t T  rung 13 12 8 1 2 1 1
V iet_Trung 14 5 7 0 2 1 1
V ie t_Trung 15 10 5 1 3 2 1
V ie t Trung 16 9 5 1 1 0 1
V ie tT ru n g 17 0 3 1 2 1 1
V iet_Trung 18 3 5 0 0 1 1
V ie t Trung 19 5 0 3 1 1 1
V iet_Trung 20 7 4 1 1 0 1
V iet_Trung 21 6 3 1 1 0 1
V iet_Trung 22 8 2 2 2 1 1
V ie t_Trung 23 9 5 0 0 1 1
V ie t_Trung 24 10 4 1 2 0 1
V ie t Trung 25 4 4 1 1 1 1
V ie t_T  rung 26 5 7 0 0 2 1
V iet_Trung 27 5 5 0 1 0 1
V ie t Trung 28 10 5 0 1 1 1
V ie tT ru n g 29 9 3 1 1 0 1
V iet_Trung 30 6 3 2 2 2 1
V ie t_Loc 31 7 8 0 2 5 1
V ie t_Loc 32 6 4 1 2 1 1
V ie t Loc 33 6 5 0 1 2 1
V ie t_Loc 34 9 9 0 0 1 1
V ie t Loc 35 5 2 2 2 0 1
V ie t Loc 36 9 4 2 2 2 1
V ie t_Loc 37 7 5 0 0 1 1
V ie t_Loc 38 4 3 1 1 2 1
V ie t_Loc 39 9 6 0 1 1 1
V ie t_Loc 40 6 7 0 0 1 1
V iet Loc 41 5 3 2 2 1 1
V ie t Loc 42 12 6 0 0 1 1
V ie t_Loc 43 9 2 2 1 2 1
V ie t_Loc 44 9 5 0 2 2 1
V ie t_Loc 45 9 3 1 0 1 1
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Viet Loc 46 6 5 0 2 0 1
Viet Loc 47 7 4 1 1 1 1
Viet_Loc 48 7 6 1 2 0 1
Viet Loc 49 9 5 0 2 2 1
Viet_Loc 50 9 3 1 1 2 1
Viet Loc 51 6 5 1 0 0 1
V ie t L o c 52 5 3 2 1 1 1
Viet Loc 53 11 6 2 0 2 1
Viet_Loc 54 7 3 1 1 1 1
Viet_Loc 55 6 5 0 0 1 1
Viet_Loc 56 9 3 2 2 1 1
Viet Loc 57 5 3 1 2 1 1
Viet Loc 58 4 6 1 2 2 1
Viet_Loc 59 8 5 0 1 0 1
V ie t L o c 60 9 7 0 0 1 1
An Son 61 7 3 1 3 1 1
A n_Son 62 9 9 1 1 3 1
A n_Son 63 5 5 0 2 1 1
A n_Son 64 7 1 3 2 0 1
An Son 65 10 5 0 0 2 1
A n S o n 66 7 4 0 1 1 1
A n_Son 67 6 7 0 1 1 1
A n_Son 68 4 5 0 1 1 1
A n S o n 69 9 1 3 2 2 1
A n_Son 70 9 6 0 3 0 1
An Son 71 9 7 1 0 1 1
A n_Son 72 5 4 2 1 1 1
An Son 73 3 3 1 2 0 1
A n_Son 74 8 3 1 1 2 1
A n_Son 75 10 3 1 2 1 1
A n S o n 76 9 5 0 0 1 1
A n_Son 77 7 4 1 2 1 1
A n_Son 78 5 2 2 1 1 1
A n_Son 79 9 5 0 1 2 1
A n S o n 80 6 2 2 0 1 1
A n S o n 81 9 4 1 2 1 1
An Son 82 7 6 0 0 1 1
A n S o n 83 9 4 1 2 1 1
A n_Son 84 5 3 2 1 0 1
An Van 85 7 5 0 2 1 1
An_Van 86 5 1 3 1 1 1
An Van 87 6 6 1 0 1 1
An Van 88 5 4 1 2 2 1
An Van 89 7 7 0 3 1 1
A n V a n 90 2 4 1 2 1 1
An_Van 91 7 0 4 1 1 1
An_Van 92 0 4 1 1 0 1
An_Van 93 6 2 1 4 1 1
An_Van 94 2 1 3 2 2 1
An Van 95 6 2 1 0 1 1
An Van 96 10 8 1 3 1 1
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An Van 9 7 7 5 0 2 1 1
An V an 98 5 5 0 0 0 1
An Van 99 9 5 1 1 1 1
An V an 100 7 5 1 1 1 1
A n_V an 101 9 1 3 1 2 1
An V an 102 9 5 0 1 1 1
An V an 103 6 5 0 2 4 1
An V an 104 5 3 2 0 0 1
An V an 105 9 5 1 1 1 1
An V an 106 7 6 0 1 0 1
An V an 107 5 4 1 3 2 1
A n V a n 108 9 4 0 0 0 1
An V an 109 7 5 0 1 1 1
An V an 110 8 5 0 0 1 1
An V an 111 9 8 0 2 2 1
An V an 112 9 5 0 1 0 1
A n_V an 113 8 5 0 0 1 1
A n V a n 114 9 5 0 1 1 1
B in h j i c h 115 3 2 2 1 1 ■ 0
B in h j i c h 116 6 4 1 1 0 0
B in h j i c h 117 7 3 2 2 1 0
B in h j i c h 118 8 4 1 1 1 0
B in h j i c h 119 7 6 0 1 1 0
B in h j i c h 120 4 4 0 0 1 0
B in h j i c h 121 10 5 1 2 1 0
Binh lieh 122 5 4 0 2 1 0
Binh lieh 123 10 9 0 2 1 0
B i n h j i c h 124 1 2 3 0 0 1 0
B in h j i c h 125 4 2 2 1 0 0
B in h j i c h 126 3 5 0 0 1 0
B in h j i c h 127 9 4 2 2 1 0
B in h j i c h 128 5 3 1 0 0 0
B in h j i c h 129 9 5 0 2 2 0
B in h j i c h 130 9 4 1 1 1 0
Binh lieh 131 5 4 2 0 0 0
Binh lieh 132 10 6 0 3 2 0
Binh lieh 133 11 5 0 0 1 0
Binh lieh 134 7 4 1 1 1 0
Binh lieh 135 10 7 0 1 0 0
Binh lieh 136 7 5 1 2 1 0
B in h j i c h 137 7 2 2 1 1 0
Binh lieh 138 9 3 0 1 2 0
Binh Kim 139 7 6 1 1 1 0
Binh Kim 140 7 6 0 2 3 0
Binh Kim 141 9 5 0 0 1 0
Binh_Kim 142 9 6 1 1 1 0
Binh Kim 143 8 3 1 2 1 0
Binh Kim 144 9 8 1 0 0 0
Binh Kim 145 7 5 0 1 1 0
Binh Kim 146 8 3 1 1 1 0
B i n h K i m 147 6 4 1 1 0 0
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Binh Kim 148 5 5 0 1 1 0
Binh_Kim 149 12 5 0 2 2 0
B in h K im 150 9 6 1 0 1 0
B in h K im 151 7 3 1 1 1 0
Binh_Kim 152 7 5 0 1 0 0
Binh Kim 153 9 3 1 1 1 0
Binh_Kim 154 6 4 1 2 1 0
Binh Kim 155 10 1 3 2 2 0
Binh_Kim 156 9 3 2 1 1 0
Binh_Kim 157 9 3 2 0 0 0
Binh_Kim 158 5 7 0 1 1 0
Binh Kim 159 10 5 1 0 1 0
B in h K im 160 5 6 0 2 0 0
Son_Dong 161 9 6 1 2 4 0
Son Dong 162 5 5 1 0 1 0
S o n D o n g 163 10 3 1 1 1 0
Son_Dong 164 5 6 1 3 0 0
Son_Dong 165 9 6 1 0 1 0
Son_Dong 166 5 7 0 1 1 0
Son_Dong 167 12 4 1 2 0 0
Son_Dong 168 3
o «4 2 1 0
Son_Dong 169 7 5 0 1 1 0
Son Dong 170 9 5 0 2 0 0
Son_Dong 171 4 3 1 1 1 0
Son_Dong 172 9 6 1 2 2 0
S o n D o n g 173 12 5 0 2 2 0
S o n D o n g 174 5 3 2 1 0 0
S o n D o n g 175 7 5 0 1 1 0
Son_Dong 176 6 3 1 1 1 0
Son Dong 177 7 7 1 1 2 0
Son_Dong 178 9 5 2 2 2 0
Son Dong 179 10 5 1 2 0 0
Son_Dong 180 7 2 2 1 1 0
Son_Dong 181 9 7 0 3 2 0
Son_Dong 182 9 3 1 0 1 0
Son_Dong 183 9 5 0 1 2 0
Son Dong 184 6 4 1 1 1 0
S o n D o n g 185 8 5 2 2 1 0
Son Dong 186 9 2 2 0 3 0
Son_Dong 187 12 5 0 2 0 0
Son_Dong 188 7 5 0 2 1 0
Son Dong 189 6 8 1 2 1 0
Son Dong 190 9 5 0 0 1 0
Son Khe 191 6 4 1 0 1 0
Son Khe 192 12 2 1 2 1 0
Son_Khe 193 8 3 1 1 1 0
Son_Khe 194 6 6 0 1 1 0
S o n K h e 195 9 7 1 2 3 0
Son_Khe 196 4 5 1 2 0 0
Son Khe 197 0 2 2 0 1 0
Son Khe 198 10 5 1 3 1 0
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Son Khe 199 6 9 0 1 0 0
Son Khe 200 9 1 2 0 2 0
Son Khe 201 5 4 1 2 2 0
Son Khe 202 9 5 0 1 1 0
S o n K h e 203 5 4 1 0 1 0
Son Khe 204 7 5 2 4 2 0
Son Khe 205 7 4 1 1 1 0
Son Khe 206 7 6 1 1 1 0
Son Khe 207 7 4 0 0 2 0
Son Khe 208 7 3 1 1 3 0
Son Khe 209 5 5 0 2 0 0
Son Khe 210 7 0 2 1 1 0
Son Khe 211 5 5 0 1 2 0
Son Khe 212 7 7 1 1 1 0
Son Khe 213 9 6 0 1 1 0
Son Khe 214 9 3 1 2 2 0
Son_Khe 215 10 5 1 0 0 0
S o n K h e 216 6 2 1 1 1 0
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire
Australian National University 
School of Anthropology & Archaeology
_ *  *
Questionnaire
“Empowerment through the Community Driven Development Programs 
- A case study of Chiase Program”
Research:
Principal Investigator: 
Research Site:
PhD Research 
Truong Chi Trung 
Quang Tri province
Questionnaire Identity:
Questionnaire number: 
Interviewer:
Date of interview:
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I. Ethnographie Information of the respondent:
1.1. Name in full (optional):
1.2. Age:______________
1.3. Gender: __________
1.4. Religion: __________
1.5. Education:_________
1.6. Primary occupation:__
1.7. Secondary occupation:
1.8. Family size:________
II. Socio-Economic Information
2.1. Could you please roughly specify the grade of your house?
[ ] Temporary house 
[ ] Brick house with low-quality furniture 
[ ] Brick house with standard furniture 
[ ] Brick house with concrete roof
2.2. Do you have access to following facilities?_____________________________
__________ Type of facility_________________ Access____________Description
Clean water__________________________________________________________
Electricity___________________________________________________________
Hygienic Toilet_______________________________________________________
2.3. How much land do you possess?_____________________________________
_________ Type of Land_________________Area (sao)____________ Description
Garden_____________________________________________________________
Paddy Field__________________________________________________________
Water Pond__________________________________________________________
Planting Forest_______________________________________________________
Rubber tree__________________________________________________________
Coffee tree
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2.4. Is your household currently classified as poor?
[ ]Yes [ ]No
2.5. Which assets do you have? Please describe the quality and quantity.
No Assets Quantity Quality
1 Telephone
2 Mobile
3 TV
4 Bicycle
5 Motorcycle
6 Buffalo
7 Cow
8 Sow
9 Pig
10 Agriculture machine
11 Shop (tailoring, carpentry, small 
business, repair)
12 Other
2.6. Do you take membership of the following organizations? What is your position?
Name of the organization________ Member_____ Executive member_____ Note
_________ 1______________ 2__________ 3_________ 4_
Communist Party________________________________________________________
Veterans' Association____________________________________________________
Farmers' Association_____________________________________________________
Women’s Union
Seniors' Association_____________________________________________________
Learning Promotion Association____________________________________________
Youth Union___________________________________________________________
Red Cross Society
Buddhist Group_________________________________________________________
Funeral Group
Other (specify):_________________________________________________________
259
III. Poverty Targeting
3.1. In your opinion, which of following statement about poor household is most accurate?
[ ] All poor households are deserving.
[ ] Some "poor’ households are not deserving.
[ ] Many ‘poor’ households are not deserving.
3.2. To what extent are the village activities relevant to the local problems?
[ J All activities are relevant 
[ ] Some activities are irrelevant 
[ ] Many activities are irrelevant
[ ] Majority of activities is irrelevant
3.3. In your opinion, how should the program support be used?
[ ] Accessible to all villagers
[ ] Accessible to all villagers but priority is given to the poor 
[ ] Accessible to the poor only 
* Explain the reason:
IV. Change in Participation in Local Governance
4.1. How often did you attend the village meetings in the initial period of the Chiase?
[ ] Always [ ] Often
[ ] Occasionally [ ] Never
4.2. How regularly did you attend the village meetings last year?
[ ] Always [ ] Often
[ ] Occasionally [ ] Never
4.3. How often did you take the floor in the village meetings?
[ ] Often [ ] Sometimes [ ] Rarely [ ] Never
Please give examples of issues you raised:......................................................
* If the respondent rarely or never took the Poor: go to question Q4.4. Otherwise, go to 
question 4.5.
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4.4. Please explain the main obstacles obstructing your participation in village meetings
4.5. Why did you participate in village meetings?
4.6. In your opinion, to what extent are the village activities relevant to local problems and 
needs?
] All activities are relevant 
[ ] Some activities are irrelevant 
] Many activities are relevant
4.7. To what extent, are you satisfied with the performance of the village leaders?
[ ] Very satisfied 
] Somewhat satisfied 
[ ] Less satisfied
[ ] Not satisfied
V. Change in People’s Networks
5.1. What are the important sources of support that your 
household well-being has relied on? Please rank their 
importance and identify the providers or intermediaries of this 
support.
Source of support Providers or Intermediaries
1________________________________________________________________________
2_.___________________________________________________ _____________________________ __________________________
3 __________________________________________________________
4 .
5.2. How have your relationships with the following actors 
changed in recent years?
Type of networks Become worse Unchanged Become better 
External agency
officials_____________________________________________________
Commune-level
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Local employers & 
creditors
Relatives and
friends
Other (specify)
o f f i c i a l s
* Please explain how the changes have occurred?.......................................................................
5.3. What are the impacts of the changes in the above relationships (if any) on your well­
being?
VI. Empowerment
6.1. Have you received material support from the Chiase program?
[ ]No [ ]Yes
* If yes, how many times have you received material support?
* Did this support result in significant change in your life?
6.2. How many training courses have you attended? 
course
* What have you learnt from the training courses?
6.3. Did you learn new skills or something valuable through participating in activities of 
Chiase?
[ ]No [ ]Yes
* If yes, what have you learnt?
6.4. In recent years, did you experience a change in your rights and capability to make 
decisions on issues which are important to your life? (Do not prompt the respondents with 
selection; Check against the items matching the answer):
] Influence household decisions (expenditure, investment, education of children)
[ ] Handle household issues more independently and efficiently 
[ ] Influence community decisions 
] Query the commune-level staff
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] Influence the performance of infrastructure work 
[ ] Other (specify):
6.5. Could you please explain how the change has been achieved?
6.6. What are the consequences resulting from this change(s)?
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Appendix 4: Checklist for Key Informant Interview
Theme 1: The Chiase program
- Program goals, vision, principles, organizational settings, and operation.
- Accountability relations in the program.
Theme 2: Downward accountability of the CPMU
1- The extent to which the CPMU mobilizes people’s participation in planning and 
implementation of village activities.
Theme 3: Poverty targeting
1- Targeting methods, intermediary agents, and eligibility.
2- Strengths, weaknesses, and attendant problems associated with each targeting 
mechanism.
Theme 4: People’s participation
1- Level of people's participation in village decision-making (scope of issues to be 
decided through village meetings).
2- Extent of people' s participation in village decision­
making (attendance, activeness)
3- Improvement in village decision-making through the implementation of the Chiase 
program.
4- Obstacles to participation.
5- Motives of people's participation.
Theme 5: People’s social networks
1- Important sources of support for people’s well-being (social networks).
2- Changes in important social networks of people through the Chiase program.
3- Impacts of changes in social networks on people’s well-being.
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Appendix 5: The CPRGS -  Summary of key Contents
The CPRGS focuses on the following main objectives:
1- Promoting rapid and sustainable economic growth while 
ensuring social progress and equity, with attention to: 
developing agriculture and rural areas; ensuring food security; 
creating jobs; greater support to disadvantaged areas; and 
eliminating regional and ethnic inequities.
2- Creating an equal business environment for all types of 
enterprises from all economic sectors including enterprises 
with foreign direct investment (FDI), and encouraging the 
development of small and medium-sized enterprises.
3- Continuing with structural reforms, including: SOE 
reform; state budget; commercial banking; financial and credit 
organizations; trade liberalization; bilateral commitments 
under AFTA, WTO accession; promoting income growth; developing 
markets to distribute consumer goods, etc.
4-  Undertaking public administration reform, including: 
institutional reform, administrative reform, civil service 
reform, and public finance reform to increase accountability in 
civil service and administration, to improve access to public 
services, and to ensure social equity.
5- Encouraging human development and reducing inequality; 
priority to quality of and access to health and education 
services and development; environmental protection, prevention 
of HIV/AIDS transmission and infection, gender equality and 
improvement of the life of ethnic groups. Focus on urban 
poverty - especially regarding employment, income and housing, 
and ensuring equal access to services.
6- Reducing vulnerability and improving the capacity of 
vulnerable groups to manage risk better by developing and 
expanding social protection and safety nets for the poor and 
introducing a more comprehensive approach to natural disaster
265
management.
7- E s t a b l i s h i n g  a s y s t e m  o f  q u a l i t a t i v e  a n d  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
s o c i o - e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  p o v e r t y  r e d u c t i o n  i n d i c a t o r s  
( w i t h  g e n d e r  a n d  s o c i a l  g r o u p  e l e m e n t s  t a k e n  i n t o  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n )  t o  m o n i t o r  a n d  e v a l u a t e  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  
t h e  CPRGS.
Source: (Tim Conway, 2004)
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Appendix 6: Statistical Tests
1- Compare the percentage of respondents being empowered in the Household domain 
between “elite’ and ‘non-elite’ (Chi-Square Test1):
Crosstab
Count
Elite Total
0 1 0
Empo_1 0 103 30 133
1 76 7 83
Total 179 37 216
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 7.181(b) 1 .007
Continuity 
Correction(a) 
Likelihood Ratio
6.220
7.808
1
1
.013
.005
Fisher's Exact Test .009 .005
Linear-by-Linear
Association 7.147 1 .008
N of Valid Cases 216
a Computed only tor a 2x2 table
b 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 14.22.
* Interpretation:
Footnote b in the above table indicates that ‘0 cell (0%) have expected count less than 
5’ . This means that the assumption o f Chi-square test has not been violated, as all expected 
cell sizes are greater than 5.
The Continuity Correction value is 6.22 with an associated significance level o f 0.013 
(less than 0.05). This means that, at 95% confidence level, the difference between the ‘elite’ 
and 'non-elite’ in terms o f empowerment in the household domain is significant. There is an 
association between the elite status and the likelihood o f being empowered.
1 Chi-square test can be used to explore the relationship between two categorical variables. Each o f these 
variables can have two or more categories. This test compares the observed frequencies or proportion o f cases 
that occur in each o f the categories, with the values that would be expected i f  there was no association between 
the two variables being measured. It is based on a cross-tabulation table, with cases classified according to the 
categories in each variable (e.g. male/female; smoker/non-smoker).
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2- Compare the percentage of respondents being empowered in the Community domain 
between “elite’ and ‘non-elite’ (Chi-square Test):
Crosstab
Count
Elite Total
0 1 0
Empo_2 0 145 14 159
1 34 23 57
Total 179 37 216
Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(2-sided)
Exact Sig. 
(1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 29.414(b) 1 .000
Continuity
Correction(a) 27.234 1 .000
Likelihood Ratio 26.180 1 .000
Fisher's Exact Test .000 .000
Linear-by-Linear
Association 29.278 1 .000
N of Valid Cases 216
a Computed only for a 2x2 table
b 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.76.
* Interpretation:
Footnote b in the above table indicates that ‘0 cell (0%) have expected count less than 
5’. This means that the assumption of Chi-square test has not been violated, as all expected 
cell sizes are greater than 5.
The Continuity Correction value is 27.23 with an associated significance level of 0.00 
(less than 0.05). This means that, at 95% confidence level, the difference between the ‘elite’ 
and ‘non-elite’ in terms of empowerment in the community domain is significant. There is an 
association between the elite status and the likelihood of being empowered.
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3- Compare the mean o f ‘activeness in meeting’ variable between “elite’ and ‘non-elite’ 
(Independent-samples T-test“):
Group Statistics
elite N M ean Std. D evia tion Std. E rro r M ean
A c tiveness  1 37 1.86 1.004 .165
0 179 1.13 .782 .058
Independent Samples Test
Levene 's  T es t fo r 
E qua lity  o f V a riances t-te s t fo r E qua lity  o f M eans
F Sig. T df
Sig.
(2-ta iled)
M ean
D iffe rence
Std. E rror 
D iffe rence
Low er U pper Low er U pper Low er U pper Low er
A ctivene  Equal va riances  
ss assum ed 4.296 .039
4 .914 214 .000 .731 .149
Equal va riances  
not assum ed 4 .172 45.43 .000 .731 .175
* Interpretation:
The Sig. value of the Levene’s test is 0.039, less than 0.05. This means that the 
variances for the two groups are not the same (Equal variances not assumed).
T-test for Equality of means shows that the Sig. value is 0.00, less than 0.05. This 
means that at 95% confident level, the mean score of the ‘activeness in meetings’ variable for 
the ‘elite' is significantly higher than what of the ‘non-elite’.
2 Independent T-test can be used to compare the mean scores o f two different groups.
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Appendix 7: Executive Summary
of Chiase Programme Document
Chia Se
Vietnam - Sweden 
Poverty Alleviation Programme
Programme Document
Hanoi
10 June 2003
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“The commune level is the closest to the people and the 
foundation for public administration. I f  the commune 
level works, all work will smoothly follow. ”
(President Ho Chi Minh)
“Chia Se ” can be translated as “sharing”, and the term is often 
used to express “partnership”. In the case of the Chia Se programme, 
the term is used to express the spirit of good governance, 
and of devolving responsibilities for development to provincial, 
district and commune level. In the context of decentralisation, the 
term reflects “sharing of power”.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The new poverty alleviation cooperation initiative between the Government of 
Vietnam (GoV) and Sida, named by stakeholders “Chia Se”, builds on the GoV’s 
Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS) that was adopted in mid 
2002. The programme evolved from previous cooperation programmes between the two 
governments, especially the Mountain Rural Development Programme (MRDP). However, in 
line with CPRGS, the programme takes a much broader approach to poverty alleviation. In 
addition to the CPRGS, the programme rests on two central GoV policies: Grassroots 
democracy and decentralisation. The programme is also in line with Sida priorities and 
strategies in Vietnam and its policy of poverty. These include that poverty alleviation is based 
on the needs of the poor and is defined with their participation, to ensure local ownership and 
participation, while supporting capacity building, public administration reform, grass-roots 
democracy, process-orientation, and devolution of responsibility and authority.
The Chia Se programme has been planned and developed in close cooperation with the 
various stakeholders — from village to national level. The progress and outcomes have been 
discussed and endorsed in meetings of the Joint Reference Group of which key ministries and 
Sida are members, and to which also provincial representatives were invited. The planning 
process consisted of several phases: a pre-planning phase that took place between January and 
April 2002, and the in-depth planning phase that lasted from June till September. The pre­
planning phase resulted in the Concept and Framework Paper that was approved in principle at 
the annual consultations between the two governments of Vietnam and Sweden. The more 
detailed planning started in June 2002 and resulted in a set of programme and projects 
documents that were submitted to the partners in September 2002. After that the documents 
have been translated, reviewed by the stakeholders, and redrafted. A Sida appraisal of the 
programme proposal took place in January 2003. It has been agreed that the Programme 
Framework Agreement may include separate funding for other programmes or projects, one 
such project will be the RIDP project in Tuyen Quango The planning process has employed 
various methods all based on active participation of the stakeholders. In total some 1,500 
people have been involved in the planning of Chia Se.
Programme vision and approach to address identified constraints
The central problem that emerged from discussions with stakeholders at the local level 
was ‘the difficulty for households to access poverty reduction resources ’. Underlying 
problems related to:
• systems for effective two-way information exchange
• opportunities to access knowledge and skills
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• opportunities to access capital and other resources
• effective and appropriate technical and management support
With these constraints as a point of departure a programme vision was formulated. The 
vision is a demand-driven process in which planning and implementation processes are based 
on expressed local aspirations and needs, and in which resources for poverty alleviation are 
available and managed by local communities. The central mechanisms in Chia Se are Local 
Planning and Management for Development (LPMD) and Local Development Funds (LDF). 
Participation of local communities and people is organised in such a way that it builds on, and 
strengthens the capacities of local communities to improve their livelihoods in a sustainable 
manner. In addition, the outcome and benefits of poverty alleviation activities are distributed 
in an equitable manner among the different stakeholders. The vision highlights that the target 
for the programme is the poor villages/households and that their demands to achieve improved 
livelihoods drive the poverty alleviation support activities provided by the public and private 
sector, including civil society.
The programme approach represents a dynamic, flexible and process oriented 
environment, where the local communities and poor households are actively involved in the 
design and management of poverty alleviation activities. The approach builds on the concept 
of decentralised planning, management and funding of sustainable poverty alleviation.
Programme goal, objectives, outputs and components
The Chia Se overall goal is: A just and fair and sustainable society. This long-term 
goal will be accomplished through the fulfilment of the programme's objective or purpose, 
which is: Poverty Alleviation. To achieve the programme objective, four outputs have been 
formulated:
1. Effective resources delivery in terms of financial resources, skills, knowledge, techniques, 
information, etc
2. Effective structures for delivering the resources regarding communities, public sector 
institutions
(such as provincial, district and commune authorities), mass organisations and 
NGOs, and private sector.
3. Effective systems in terms of planning, financial management, information, legislation, 
regulations and guidelines and resources mobilisation.
4. Effective capacity (empowerment) among households, communities, public institutions and 
authorities, civil society and private sector.
These outputs will be realized through 3 provincial and 1 national projects. The 
objective of the provincial projects is summarized as: Poor households have good access to 
poverty alleviation resources.
To reach the provincial objectives, provincial project outputs and activities have been
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specified including effective systems and management structures, establishment of LPMD and 
LDF, and effective policies for poverty alleviation.
To ensure the overall programme outputs and to provide support to the three provincial 
projects, a national project is implemented with the objective of: Effective National Support to 
Poverty Alleviation, through the outputs of: effective policies, effective information and 
effective management o f poverty alleviation funds.
To achieve the outputs the programme has 4 major components:
1. Decentralised Planning system
Chia Se will develop and support efficient and technically sound and participatory 
planning mechanisms and systems that are fully integrated into the existing GoV’s planning 
systems.
2. Decentralised Management System
Chia Se will support the set up of comprehensive and effective structures and systems 
for management of development with specified roles and responsibilities of villages, 
communes, districts and provinces. Support will include planning facilitation, training and 
technical services.
3. Decentralised Financial System
A key operational mechanism of Chia Se is the Local Development Fund (LDF). The 
Fund channels development funds to district, communes and villages. The LDF will not be 
restricted to predefined investments but will enable local choices, and provides for meaningful 
local planning, programming and budgeting, as well as for related capacity building. The LDF 
will initially be financed by external grants, but it is foreseen that in the future financial 
sources can encompass national budget appropriations, and provincial, district and commune 
resource mobilization as well.
. Local Planning and Management for Development
In conjunction with the LDF, the second core mechanism of the Chia Se programme is 
Local Planning and Management for Development (LPMD). These two tools, LPMD and 
LDF, are the foundation of the programme to achieve decentralisation and local democracy, 
empowerment of local levels, and delivery of resources for investment and services. The 
LPMD and LDF build on several years of experience in Vietnam that have been working at 
reinforcing local development planning and management systems.
Programme principles
To become eligible for inclusion in the Chia Se programme, the principles guiding the 
programme in general, and the LPMD and LDF in particular, have to be accepted and adhered 
to. The guiding principles, which are listed below are in total conformity with the overall 
principles of the programme, and in line with Vietnam’s policy framework. During the
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preparatory discussions stakeholders fully subscribed to these principles.
• Decentralisation and local involvement
• Equality and equity
• Transparency and accountability
• Poverty focus
• Sustainability
• Multi-sector approach
Programme beneficiaries and expected outcomes
The Chia Se programme is focusing on the poor villages and the poor households 
within these villages. These are the primary beneficiaries as they will improve their livelihood 
and become empowered to make decisions about their own welfare and participate in the 
development process of the society. These changes will take place trough improved income 
generation -  on and off farm -  improvement of production methods, improvement in 
infrastructure and services, and improvement in knowledge, skills etc. However, the 
programme has a much wider approach to poverty alleviation, as it will build capacity in the 
Vietnamese society — public sector, civil society and private sector — for sustainable poverty 
alleviation. Therefore, there is also a secondary group of beneficiaries -  commune, district, 
provincial and ministerial staff. These will benefit from the Chia Se programme, as they will 
improve their capacity in policy analysis, planning, management and financial matters, as well 
as in technical matters regarding delivery of services, techniques and knowledge to the 
primary beneficiaries. Finally, there is a third group of beneficiaries, the actors in the civil 
society NGOs and private sector, that also will have improved capacity to deliver poverty 
alleviation programmes and become an active partner in poverty alleviation.
Management structure
In an overall perspective, the Chia Se programme structure and organisation will 
connect to CPRGS structures, thereby ensuring a broad based approach to poverty alleviation. 
The programme will be governed by a Programme Framework Agreement between the GoV 
and Sida. Within the framework of the overall agreement, the Government will delegate to the 
Provincial Peoples’ Committee in the concerned provinces the power to sign a Specific Project 
Agreement with Sida for the respective provincial projects. For the national project MPI will 
sign a Specific Project Agreement with Sida.
At the National level, A Joint Steering Group will be the “lead-institution” and bring 
together key ministries (preferable represented by the same persons that are members of the 
Working Unit of the Steering Committee for CPRGS), other national institutions relevant for 
Chia Se as well as representatives from the provinces in which the programme is 
implemented. The Group will have strategic responsibility of the programme implementation
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and approve all programme reports, be fore submission to respective parties.
The Chia Se Secretariat will be located in the CPRGS Secretariat. Its role is to monitor, 
collate and summarise reports and aggregate accounts from the different provincial and 
national projects activities. The reports will be discussed and approved in the Joint Steering 
Group.
For the National Project, the organisation structure consists of several ministerial sub- 
projects in ministries related to Chia Se (MPI; MoLISA; MARD; MoF and GSO). To ensure 
close cooperation and cross-ministerial exchange of experiences and information a National 
Project Coordination Group will be established. The Coordination Group will report to the 
Chia Se Joint Steering Group and will be supported by the Chia Se Secretariat.
At Provincial level, the provincial projects will be implemented under the supervision 
of the Provincial People’s Committee (PPC). The PPC will form a Steering Committee, 
chaired by the PPC and consisting of representatives of departments, mass organisations and 
other stakeholders related to poverty alleviation. The Steering Committee will monitor 
implementation but will not have immediate management tasks. The PPC will set up a 
Provincial Secretariat to collate reports and accounts from district projects, and to prepare 
reporting for discussion in the Steering Committee and for forwarding to the national level. 
The Secretariat will also liaise with the capacity building and learning activities within the 
project and ensure that learning feedback is reaching provincial and 
national levels.
At District level and Commune level, the respective PC’s are responsible for the Chia 
Se operations. At both levels a Project Management Unit (PMU) will be set up responsible for 
facilitating and supporting local planning, management and monitoring of poverty alleviation 
activities, and for accounting for the resources allocated to the district and communes. The 
DPMU will be divided into two sections, a Financial and Programme Management and 
Monitoring Section and a Capacity Building and Facilitation Section. The CPMU will report 
to the DPMU.
At Village level, the Village Meeting will be the main consultative and decision 
making body regarding planning, implementing and funding of poverty alleviation activities. 
For day-to-day management of activities the Village Meeting will select a Village 
Management Group that will be in charge of leading the local planning process, and for 
managing implementation, funds, and supervision and reporting. The Village Management
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Group shall have a majority of female members. The Village Meeting can also elect a 
Supervisory Group to supervise implementation and resource management. The Village 
Meeting reports to the CPMU.
Programme Budget
The overall budget for the Chia Se programme is USD 43.5 million. The core budget 
available for implementing the programme is USD 41.5 million. An additional USD 2 million 
has been allocated to Sida programme follow-up activities. The programme will continue for a 
period of 5 years, starting fourth quarter 2003 and ending in 2008 with the finalisation of the 
last LDF cycle in some villages (Table 1). The total budget of USD 43.5 million will be 
capitalised by a planned Sida allocation of SEK 310 million (USD 37.5 million), and GoV 
counterpart funding of USD 5.8 million (15%). The main components are LDF - USD -  21.2 
million (51%), local planning and management institutions building -  USD 5.7 million (14%), 
capacity building -  USD 7.5 million (18%) and Technical Assistance (TA) -  USD 7,1 million 
( 1 7 % ) 3.
Inception and piloting phase
Before full implementation is realised an inception and piloting phase of one year is 
envisaged, which will further develop -  in close cooperation with the stakeholders -  systems, 
structures, guidelines, workplans and the final logframe. An independent assessment of 
programme performance will take place towards the end of the inception and piloting phase, 
advising decision making on continuation of the programme. Specific benchmarks have been 
set that need to be achieved during the inception and piloting phase, and that will serve a
reference for the performance assessment:
♦> Preparation of workplans and budgets.
•  Arrangement of a Project Implementation Manual including:
• Financial systems and procurement guidelines
• Procedure for the recruitment of seconded and contracted project staff, including a 
system for periodical performance reviews
• Procedures for internal and external auditing
• M&E/MIS and reporting systems and procedures
• Guidelines for LDF utilisation, including allocation criteria for LDF sharing between 
villages and communes
• LPMD systems and criteria for how a higher level will approve and coordinate lower 
level development plans and priority activities.
• Criteria for identification of poor households and vulnerable groups within the selected 
villages.
3 Exchange eates applied: VND 15,900 and SEK 8.0 to 1 USD.
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❖  Preparation of a baseline for poverty alleviation, improved living conditions and 
empowerment indicators to be able to assess the impact of the programme on objective 
and goal level.
❖  Establishment of a baseline/assessment of the needs of human resources development 
and capacity of the National and Provincial Secretariats, DPMUs and CPMUs and 
village management groups in areas that will participate in the piloting phase.
♦t* Recruitment of the seconded and contracted staff to DPMUs and CPMUs and 
establishment of roles and procedures for salary and allowance following the EU 
norms.
❖  Conducting capacity building and pilot LDMP/LDF processes in the villages and 
communes that have participated in the planning process.
♦> Preparing for the 2004/2005 LPMD/LDF cycle.
❖  Select the next batch of communes and villages that will be included in the 
LPMD/LDF cycle (2004/2005 implementation).
❖  Start the 2004/2005 LPMD/LDF cycle in the newly selected communes and villages, 
in particular the capacity building activities and the preparations for the planning 
process.
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